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INTRODUCTION 
Promoting access to affordable medicine for poor countries 
is considered an important goal to a wide range of actors 
including not only poor countries, but also rich countries, 
patent owners, and scholars.1 However, promoting such access 
has thus far been a challenge. In fact, over the last decade, 
changes in international laws that require most countries of the 
world to patent drugs have arguably impeded access to low-cost 
generic drugs.2 
This Article posits that a major hurdle to actually 
addressing access issues is that there are fundamentally different 
views of patent policy (“patent perspectives”) that have a 
significant impact on how facts, laws, and proposed solutions are 
viewed. Unless and until there is a better understanding of the 
existence of these different views, viable solutions are likely to 
remain elusive. 
It is well documented in the field of social science that all 
individuals perceive new information based on pre-existing 
“schemas.”3 This Article suggests that different views of patent 
policy similarly function as schemas. Although there are many 
                                                                                                                            
1. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution of 12 July 2007 on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Access to Medicines, 2008 O.J. C 175 E/59; INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL 
PUBLIC HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 1–32 (Thomas 
Pogge et al. eds., 2010); GLAXOSMITHKLINE, 2010 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 
2 (2010), available at http://www.gsk.com/responsibility/downloads/GSK-CR-2010-CR-
at-GSK.pdf; see also World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 544 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Public Health 
Declaration], available at http://www.wto.org/english/ theWTO_e/minist_e/min01_e/
mindecl_trips_e.htm (stating that the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) “can and should be interpreted and implemented” in 
a manner consistent with public health, including access to medicine). 
2. The most important change to international law is the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, which requires all members of the World 
Trade Organization—including countries at all levels of development—to provide 
patents on drugs. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
art. 27(1), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS], 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf. 
3. E.g., SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 97–99 (2d ed. 
1991); ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 17–19 (1999). A 
schema has been defined as a “mental structure which contains general expectations 
and knowledge of the world.” MARTHA AUGOUSTINOS & IAIN WALKER, SOCIAL 
COGNITION: AN INTEGRATED INTRODUCTION 32 (1995); see infra note 54 (describing use 
of the term schema in this Article). 
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views of patent policy that exist along a continuum, the two most 
divergent views are the ones that dominate discussion and thus 
play a key role in how laws are developed and interpreted. On 
one end of the spectrum, there is a view of patents as a privilege 
granted by the state and inherently subject to limitations—
especially if necessary to promote other social policies, such as 
access to medicine—this is referred to as the “privilege view.” 
On the other end of the spectrum, patents are considered 
essential to promoting innovation, with more protection 
considered to be necessarily beneficial to promoting more 
innovation; this view is referred to as the “uber-right” view 
because it suggests a very strong right. The existence and impact 
of these competing perspectives are well illustrated with respect 
to recent seizures of in-transit generic drugs that allegedly 
infringed local patent rights. Consider the following situation:  
 
An Indian company makes a generic HIV medication and ships it 
to Nigeria through the Netherlands, a traditionally popular 
destination for global transport of goods. The drug is unpatented 
in both India and Nigeria, such that it can be made as a low-cost, 
generic version of the patented drug sold as Ziagen. However, the 
drugs are seized at the Amsterdam airport by Dutch customs 
authorities pursuant to [a European Union (“EU”)] regulation 
that has been interpreted to consider in-transit goods to infringe 
local patent rights.4 
                                                                                                                            
4. Technically, Dutch patent law would not consider in-transit goods to infringe 
patents. See 1 PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 121:27, § 121:5 (Henry D. 
Teegarden ed., 4th ed. 2011), available at Westlaw PATWORLD (discussing importation 
as a patent right but not specifically including in-transit imports). However, the 
European Union (“EU”) regulation has been interpreted by a Dutch court to permit 
suspension of in-transit goods on grounds of patent infringement based on the legal 
fiction that the good was manufactured in the country where suspensions occur. See 
Rechtbank‘s-Gravenhage 18 juli 2008, 311378/KG ZA 2008, 08-617 m.nt. 
(Sosecal/Sisvel) (Neth.). An unofficial English translation of the Sisvel v. Sosecal 
decision is available at http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/PDF_December09/The%
20Hague%20DC%20Sisvel%20v%20Sosecal%20EN.pdf. See also Council Regulation No. 
1383/2003 Concerning Customs Action against Goods Suspected of Infringing Certain 
Intellectual Property Rights and the Measures to Be Taken against Goods Found to 
Have Infringed Such Rights, 2003 O.J. L 196/7 [hereinafter Customs Action 
Regulation]. 
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Suspensions of drugs, like the one above, have prompted 
very different reactions. Brazil and India have decried the 
suspensions as “baseless” and clearly in violation of international 
law under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”).5 The EU, on the other hand, 
suggests that a few instances have been overblown and asserts 
that its laws are clearly consistent with TRIPS, although generally 
with no explanation.6 In addition, patent owners refer to 
suspended generic drugs as “counterfeit,”7 and also suggest that 
generics are not “safe or effective” simply because they were not 
made by the patent owner.8 
Whether nations can consider in-transit goods to infringe 
patent rights and thus be subject to suspension by customs 
                                                                                                                            
5. See, e.g., Intervention by India—TRIPS Council June 2009, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/
intervention-by-india-seizure-of-generic-drug-consignments-at-ec-ports.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Intervention by India, June 2009] (stating that “[t]he fact 
that the drugs were subsequently released are [sic] a proof that the allegations were 
baseless”); Intervention by Brazil, TRIPS Council,, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH, 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/brazil-statement-trips-
june-09.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Intervention by Brazil, June 2009], 
(stating that TRIPS does not allow suspension of goods in transit). Health Advocates 
have also echoed the sentiments of India and Brazil. See, e.g, Letter from Christian 
Wagner-Ahlfs, BUKO Pharma-Kampagne et al., to Margaret Chan, Dir. Gen., World 
Health Org. 3 (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.haiweb.org/07032009/
18% 20Feb%202009%20Open%20Letter%20to%20WHO%20on%20Dutch%20seizure%
20of%20generics.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) [hereinafter NGO Letter to Chan, 
Feb. 2009] (stating that the EU seizures are “clearly inconsistent” with the Doha 
Declaration and TRIPS). 
6. See infra notes 211-21 and accompany text (suggesting that suspended drugs 
were minimal and misconstrued); see also infra note 240 and accompanying text 
(suggesting that suspensions are in full compliance with TRIPS, but without any 
detailed analysis). 
7. In the first reported suspension of in-transit drugs, patent owner Sanofi Aventis 
initially asserted that the drugs were suspended as “counterfeit,” but subsequently 
stated that the drugs violated patent and related protection for clopidogrel. Letter 
from Patent Dept. Sanofi Aventis to Betalactamicos S.A. (Oct. 29, 2008), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/eudrugs2009letter2.pdf 
[hereinafter Sanofi Letter 1]; Letter from Annemarie Kwaspen, Sanofi Aventis Legal 
Counsel, to C.A. Franco, Sales Manager, Betalactaminos S.A. (Nov. 24, 2008), available 
at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/eudrugs2009letter2.pdf 
[hereinafter Sanofi Letter 2]. 
8. Letter from B.E.M. van Kessel, Attorney for Eli Lilly, to the Board of Directors, 
Cipla Ltd. (Dec. 9, 2008), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/eudrugs2009letter3.pdf [hereinafter Eli Lilly Letter] (stating that Cipla’s 
product “may not be safe or effective” because it is not made by the patent owner Eli 
Lilly or any of its global licensees). 
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officials provides a new opportunity to consider not only a 
proper interpretation of TRIPS but also the importance and 
impact of competing patent perspectives. As this Article 
demonstrates, no one is immune from perspectives; even 
scholars may be influenced by perspective.9 Moreover, 
perspectives may play a central role in the development of new 
laws. For example, simultaneously with the suspensions of drugs 
in the EU, the EU and other countries negotiated a new 
international agreement called the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (“ACTA”).10 As will be explained, this new 
agreement reflects more of an uber-right view that stronger 
patent rights are socially beneficial. 
This Article provides an interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of TRIPS and the ACTA concerning suspensions of 
in-transit goods as a backdrop to understanding the significance 
of the patent perspective schemas discussed above. In particular, 
this Article suggests—consistent with social science on schemas 
in general—that countries, companies, and scholars may all 
have patent perspective schemas that influence their view of 
facts and interpretation of laws. The schemas may help explain 
differing interpretations of whether EU suspensions of drugs are 
consistent with TRIPS. Brazil and India’s views that the EU’s 
actions were inconsistent led to official requests for 
consultations,11 which is the first step to a formal legal dispute 
before a World Trade Organization (“WTO”) panel.12 Although 
                                                                                                                            
9. See infra notes 290–97 and accompanying text (discussing interpretations by 
Daya Shanker and Frederick Abbott). 
10. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (Apr. 15, 2011) [hereinafter ACTA], 
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147937.pdf. 
The Agreement has not yet been formally signed and will enter into force when six 
instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval have been deposited. Id. art. 40. 
11. Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Union and a Member State–Seizure 
of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010) [hereinafter Brazil 
Consultation Request], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/
february/tradoc_147567.pdf; Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a 
Member State–Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010) 
[hereinafter India Consultation Request], available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
cr/ds408-1%28cr%29.pdf. 
12. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes arts. 4(5), 4(7), 6, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
2011] COMPETING PATENT PERSPECTIVES 7 
the countries seem to have reached an understanding that 
obviates the need for a formal panel at this time, an 
interpretation of TRIPS, together with the impact of the 
different patent perspectives on interpretations is nonetheless 
important.13 Not only may the current understanding collapse 
but there is also a related issue concerning what the ACTA 
permits or requires for in-transit suspensions of drugs.14 
Accordingly, this Article addresses appropriate interpretations of 
TRIPS and the ACTA concerning suspensions of in-transit 
drugs, together with the impact of patent perspectives on these 
interpretations. In addition to these legal interpretations, the 
analysis of patent perspectives should promote a better 
understanding of why questions concerning the proper balance 
between patent rights and access to medicine are so contentious 
as a first step to resolving them. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides 
fundamental information about intellectual property rights and 
how drugs enter the global marketplace. Part II introduces the 
two patent perspectives, including how the existence of these 
perspectives is supported by social science. Parts III and IV then 
demonstrate the impact of perspectives on how facts and laws 
are perceived. This Article concludes with considerations of the 
importance of the patent perspectives for understanding and 
anticipating broader global conflicts concerning the intersection 
of patents and access to medicine. 
                                                                                                                            
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994); see also 
Sue Ann Mota, TRIPS: Ten Years of Disputes at the WTO, 9 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 
455, 462 (2005) (providing explanation of the dispute settlement process and noting 
that consultations are a necessary step before a formal WTO panel is requested). 
13. See, e.g., Press Release, India Ministry of Commerce and Indus., India EU 
Reach an Understanding on Issue of Seizure of Indian Generic Drugs in Transit (July 
28, 2011), available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=73554; William 
New, EU-India Agreement in WTO Dispute Raises Bar for EU Drug Seizures, IP-WATCH (July 
30, 2011), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/07/30/eu-india-agreement-in-wto-
dispute-raises-bar-for-eu-drug-seizures/. 
14. In addition, even if the WTO eventually rules on this issue, that may not 
resolve the issue definitively for those with a schema that is inconsistent with the WTO 
interpretation. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
This Part explains intellectual property rights related to 
drugs, as well as regulations that promote drug safety, to lay a 
foundation for understanding why certain claims concerning 
suspensions of in-transit drugs are improper. First, this Part will 
clarify and distinguish the intellectual property rights that have 
been implicated for in-transit drugs—patents and trademarks. 
Second, this Part will address how other issues involving drugs in 
the marketplace can influence global access to medicine and 
define key terms relevant to global trade in drugs. 
A. Intellectual Property Rights 
There is one commonality to all types of intellectual 
property rights. Namely, that they are limited by national 
boundaries. There is currently no such thing as a global patent 
or trademark.15 Rather, a company that wants global protection 
must seek and obtain protection in each country where rights 
are desired.16 For example, a US patent gives its owner rights 
against others in the United States, but not Canada; to obtain 
rights against others in Canada, a Canadian patent is necessary.17 
In addition, although an inventor may seek and obtain a patent 
                                                                                                                            
15. Some have suggested, however, that there should be limited versions of global 
patents or trademarks. E.g., Edward Lee, The Global Trade Mark 1 (Apr. 4, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1804985 (advocating global trademarks with respect to the limited category 
of “well known marks”); Commission Communication to Member States on Europe 
2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth 12 (2010), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
COM:2010:2020:FIN:EN:PDF (proposing an EU-wide patent). 
16. E.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 4 bis (1), 
Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (noting that “patents applied for in the various 
countries . . . shall be independent of patents obtained for the same invention in other 
countries . . .”); see also WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PATENTSCOPE: WIPO GUIDE 
TO USING PATENT INFORMATION 4 (2010), http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/
patents/434/wipo_pub_l434_03.pdf (explaining that patents are applied for and 
enforced in different countries) 
17. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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in these countries, the scope of the patent rights may differ since 
each country decides on the scope of its own protection.18 
While all intellectual property rights share the principle of 
territoriality, there are important distinctions between the 
different rights. Identifying what rights are at issue is important 
since there are different scopes of protection related to different 
rights, as discussed in this section. Accordingly, this section 
discusses the intellectual property rights most pertinent to 
selling drugs—patents and trademarks. 
1. Patents 
A patent is an official document granted by a nation that 
entitles its owner to certain rights.19 The patent owner typically 
can exclude others from the patented invention for a limited 
time that is usually less than twenty years.20 In particular, the 
patent owner has the right to exclude others from making, 
using, selling, or importing the patented invention within the 
nation that granted the patents.21 This right to exclude provides 
a powerful commercial benefit, such that the owner of a 
patented drug can generally charge a premium price for the 
patented drug since no one else can make the identical drug.22 
                                                                                                                            
18. E.g., JAKKRIT KUANPOTH, PATENT RIGHTS IN PHARMACEUTICALS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 8 (2010) (stating that patents are 
territorial and national in nature); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text 
(explaining territorial limits of patents). 
19. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 970 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a patent as “the 
governmental grant of a right, privilege, or authority”).  
20. See e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (stating that the US patent term begins 
on the date that patent issues and ends twenty years from the application date); TRIPS, 
supra note 2, art. 33 (stating that patent term must end no later than twenty years from 
the date of filing). Notably, although the patent term ends twenty years from the 
application date, there are no patent rights while the patent application is pending, 
such that the actual term is twenty years, less the time spent examining the patent. For 
example, the average amount of time to evaluate a US patent application is currently 
34.6 months; therefore, the average patent term is slightly less than seventeen years. 
U.S. Patents and Trademark Office, Patent Pendency Statistics–FY09, 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/patentpendency.jsp (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).  
21. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (providing patent infringement where one 
“makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells the patented invention, within the United States”) 
(emphasis added); TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27. 
22. Although there may be competitive drugs within the same class (such as acid 
reflux or depression), patented drugs within a class do not usually compete based on 
price unlike generic drugs, such that each patented drug within a class usually still 
commands a substantial premium in price. See Z. John Lu & William S. Comanor, 
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Today, most countries are members of the WTO, and as 
such, must provide patent rights for all “inventions.”23 In 
particular, countries can not categorically exclude all drugs from 
patentability24—a major change in the laws of some countries 
that previously did not permit patents on drugs.25 However, 
because patent obligations under TRIPS only apply prospectively 
to new inventions, some member states in full compliance with 
TRIPS may nonetheless continue to make drugs that were 
unpatented and unpatentable before TRIPS. For example, India 
can continue to make certain HIV drugs as generics since they 
were unpatentable before 2005, when India was required to 
grant patents on new drugs.26 Even though these drugs may be 
patented in other countries (such as the United States), because 
patents are territorially limited, the same drug could be legally 
                                                                                                                            
Strategic Pricing of New Pharmaceuticals, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 108, 115–17 (1998); 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONG. OF THE UNITED STATES, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION 
FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES 23–24 (1998). 
23. See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 
23, 2011) (providing a list of WTO members); see also TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27 
(requiring that inventions that meet certain criteria be granted patents). 
24. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27; see also CARLOS CORREA, INTEGRATING PUBLIC 
HEALTH CONCERNS INTO PATENT LEGISLATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES II.1 (2000), 
available at http://apps.who.int/ medicinedocs/fr/d/Jh2963e/6.html ("Literally 
interpreted, Article 27.1 does not permit the exclusion from patentability of medicines 
in general or, arguably, of specific groups thereof."); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 109 (2001) (explaining 
that TRIPS does not permit exclusion of pharmaceuticals from patentability). 
25. Prior to TRIPS, fifty nations did not permit patenting of drugs, with some even 
prohibiting methods of creating drugs from patentability. E.g., United Nations 
Conference on Trade & Dev., THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 30 
(1996), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ite1_en.pdf. This exclusion 
helped to promote access to lower cost medicine. See e.g., WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, GLOBALIZATION AND ACCESS TO DRUGS—HEALTH ECONOMICS AND 
DRUGS SERIES, No. 007 19–21 (1998), available at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/
en/d/Jwhozip35e/3.4.3.html#Jwhozip35e.3.4.3 (noting that some countries chose to 
exclude drugs from patentability, which enabled them to freely imitate products 
patented in other countries and also avoid the high cost of patented drugs). 
26. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 65(4) (permitting a WTO country that did not 
previously provide patents on products to delay doing so for an additional five years 
beyond the other transitional provision); see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 519 (3d ed. 2008) (stating that 
countries, such as India, had until January 1, 2005, to provide patent protection on 
drugs if they had not previously provided such protection). 
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made in countries without patent protection for the drug, such 
as India. In addition, a country that did not previously provide 
patents on drugs, such as Brazil, could legally import drugs from 
India without violating Brazilian or Indian patent laws. 
2. Trademarks 
A trademark is a word, slogan, or symbol that identifies and 
distinguishes the goods of an entity from those of others.27 In 
other words, a brand name, such as Vioxx or Prozac, is a 
trademark.28 A trademark owner has the right to prevent others 
from using its mark, or a similar mark, if consumers would likely 
be confused.29 Accordingly, the owner of the trademark Prozac 
could prevent another company from using the word “Prozic” to 
market a similar drug because consumers would likely be 
confused. Patented drugs are often sold with a trademark, such 
as the trademark Rogaine, whereas unpatented drugs (including 
drugs where the patent has expired) are referred to as generics 
and generally sold using a non-proprietary chemical name.30 
Goods that are sold using identical marks as the trademark 
owner of the identical product are referred to as “counterfeit” 
trademark goods.31 This includes goods commonly referred to as 
“knock-offs,” such as relatively inexpensive watches, bags, and 
                                                                                                                            
27. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining trademark as a term that “includes any 
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” that is used by a person 
“to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that 
source is unknown”). 
28. A trademark can also include phrases, images, or packaging, so long as it still 
satisfies the basic requirement of distinguishing the product from others. For example, 
a trademark can include distinctive packaging, such as the curved shape of a Coca-Cola 
bottle. COCA-COLA, Registration No. 0696147 (registered for “Bottles, jars or flasks 
with bulging, protruding or rounded sides; Flasks with bulging or protruding sides; Jars 
with bulging or protruding sides”). 
29. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).  
30. For example, the term ibuprofen is the generic name for a product that 
contains that ingredient as the primary active ingredient, whereas Pfizer makes its own 
version of ibuprofen under the trademark “Advil.” While Pfizer can prevent other 
companies from using the term “Advil” to sell ibuprofen, it cannot prevent competitors 
from using the nonproprietary term ibuprofen. 
31. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (2006) (defining counterfeit in the context of 
clarifying that courts can order the seizure of goods with counterfeit marks); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2320 (2006) (defining counterfeit in the context of creating criminal liability for 
trafficking in goods using counterfeit trademarks). 
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clothing sold on the street that simulate expensive, brand-name 
items. Similar to knock-offs of luxury consumer goods, 
counterfeit drugs involve the unauthorized use of one or more 
trademarks and are often sold for much less than the legitimate 
product.32  
Trademarks are enforced through two different 
mechanisms. Intentional and unauthorized counterfeit 
trademarks may be enforced through the judicial system and 
policed by customs officials.33 Since a counterfeit trademark is by 
definition identical to a brand name, it can be easy to spot even 
by someone not trained in trademark law. However, when a 
trademark is used in a manner that is likely to cause confusion, 
but without rising to the level of a counterfeit use, infringement 
is much more difficult to determine. Traditionally, this has been 
the subject of unpredictable litigation.34 This is especially true 
because even if there might be arguable confusion, there are 
legitimate defenses, such as “fair use” of the mark.35 
                                                                                                                            
32. An example of a counterfeit drug would be one sold as “Vioxx,” but not made 
by the owner of the trademark Vioxx. 
33. E.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §§ 25:10–25:11 (4th ed. 2011). 
34. The “likelihood of confusion” test involves multiple factors, with no single one 
being dispositive, such that conclusions are considered unpredictable. See generally 
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2006). For example, trademark infringement is analyzed based 
on whether there is “likelihood of confusion.” One might assume that a well-known 
mark is less likely to result in confusion, but courts have sometimes concluded 
otherwise. E.g., Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., 963 F.2d 350, 355 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (finding likelihood of confusion between Playdough and Fundough for 
similar modeling compound and not considering it persuasive that consumers are 
familiar with Playdough brand in finding likelihood of infringement); McDonald’s 
Corp. v. Druck and Gerner, DDS., 814 F. Supp 1127, 1134, 1139 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(finding trademark infringement where there was no evidence McDonald’s planned to 
enter defendant’s dental business, yet the Court was suspicious of defendant’s good 
faith in selecting “McDental” name). Trademark infringement may also involve drugs. 
E.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc. 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding the 
herbal antidepressant name Herbrozac too similar to Prozac, and thus infringing its 
trademark). 
35. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2006) (listing some defenses to what would 
otherwise be infringement). In addition, a major issue with trade dress—what a 
consumer would normally consider product packaging—is that there is no protection if 
the trade dress is functional, regardless of any confusion. See, e.g., Shire US, Inc. v. Barr 
Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 350 n.2 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Jeremy A. Greene & Aaron S. 
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B. Drugs in the Marketplace 
Now that the parameters of how drugs are protected by 
intellectual property rights have been delineated, this section 
turns to how drugs are regulated and sold in the commercial 
marketplace. In particular, this section both explains how the 
safety of drugs is governed by issues beyond intellectual property 
rights and also clarifies some key terms that have been 
repeatedly conflated in the context of in-transit seizures. 
1. Drug Safety 
Drug safety and efficacy are serious issues, but patents and 
trademarks play little role in governing these matters. Drugs may 
be substandard (poor quality) if they fail to meet scientific 
specifications, or have become contaminated. Alternatively, fake 
drugs contain ingredients different than indicated on the label, 
or no active ingredient at all. However, patent and trademark 
requirements are not relevant to safety issues. A patent can be 
granted on a drug without any evidence that it is safe or effective 
since the patent standards do not require evaluation of such 
concepts. Similarly, a trademark signifies that a product is from 
a particular source to help guarantee consistency, but does not 
guarantee safety or efficacy since these are not requirements for 
trademark protection. 
In most developed countries, there is a domestic regulatory 
agency that evaluates whether drugs are safe and effective before 
they can be legally sold to consumers; drugs that do not go 
through this process are illegal and considered unsafe.36 The 
domestic regulatory agencies, such as the United States’ Food 
and Drug Administration, generally evaluate drugs and only 
approves drugs for sale that are shown to be safe and effective 
                                                                                                                            
Kesselheim, Why Do the Same Drugs Look Different? Pills, Trade Dress, and Public Health, 
365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 83, 83 (2011). 
36. Those who sell illegal drugs may be subject to criminal prosecution. See 21 
U.S.C. § 333 (2006). However, that does not necessarily prevent all illegal drugs from 
reaching consumers. Indeed, to the extent that patented drugs are expensive, there is 
an incentive for consumers to buy illegal drugs when there is no inexpensive 
alternative. See General Information on Counterfeit Drugs, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/index1.html (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2011). 
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based on scientific data.37 If a drug is not granted approval, it 
cannot be lawfully sold. The same basic standard applies to new, 
as well as generic drugs. However, a generic drug may be 
approved based on more limited tests that show it is 
“bioequivalent” to a previously approved (and usually patented) 
drug, such that it is considered equally safe and effective.38 
Whereas consumers in developed countries who buy legal 
drugs are assured that the drugs are safe and effective, this is not 
the case in a number of developing countries. Some poor 
countries lack the resources—both financially and in terms of 
technical expertise—to effectively analyze and monitor drug 
safety.39 Some countries overcome this resource issue by relying 
on the approval of other countries. For example, India will 
approve drugs that have been approved in other countries, such 
as the EU and the United States, with minimal testing in India.40 
                                                                                                                            
37. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006) (setting “safe and effective” as basic standard for 
new drugs). 
38. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
39. WHO Policy Perspectives on Medicines—Effective Medicines Regulation: Ensuring 
Safety, Efficacy and Quality, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Nov. 2003), 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4921e/s4921e.pdf. There are tremendous 
costs associated with drug regulation. For example, in 2010 the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) budget was about US$2.4 billion. See Food and Drug 
Administration: FY 2011 President’s Budget Request All Purpose Table—Total Program Level, 
FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM202312.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 
2011). This cost is underscored by the fact that roughly half the cost of drug regulation 
is underwritten by fees from drug companies that apply to the FDA for regulatory 
approval. See, e.g., White Paper—Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA): Adding Resources 
and Improving Performance in FDA Review of New Drug Applications, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUser
Fee/UCM149130.pdf (last updated May 3, 2010). In addition, the World Health 
Organization (“WHO”) estimates that as many as one third of all countries have 
limited or no ability to regulate drugs at all. WHO Policy Perspectives on Medicines, supra, 
at 1. 
40. Drugs & Cosmetics Act, No. 23 of 1940, INDIA CODE, ¶ 122 A(2), Schedule Y, 
available at http://indiacode.nic.in; see also Sandhya Srinivasan, Trial by Fire, ECON. & 
POL. WKLY., Aug. 29–Sept. 4, 2009, reprinted in INFOCHANGE (India) (Sept. 2009), 
http://infochangeindia.org/health/analysis/trial-by-fire.html. In addition, the World 
Health Organization (“WHO”) prequalifies drugs for HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis. 
See Prequalification Program, WORLD HEALTH ORG. http://apps.who.int/prequal/ (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2011). 
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However, other countries attempt to regulate their own drugs, 
yet are ineffectual due to corruption.41 
2. Terminology 
Now that the landscape of intellectual property rights and 
drug safety has been outlined, this section aims to explain 
terminology that has been particularly confusing with respect to 
in-transit drugs. In particular, this section explains what the 
term “generic” means with respect to drugs and then how the 
term “generic” is different from “counterfeit.” 
a. What is a Generic Drug? 
What constitutes a generic drug may be confusing in the 
global marketplace. This can be due to the fact that the word 
“generic” may be used to refer either to the use of a generic 
trademark (such as ibuprofen), or to suggest that the drug is 
unpatented (yet equivalent to a previously patented drug).42 In 
addition, the same chemical compound may be patented in one 
country, yet available as an unpatented generic in another. This 
is a reflection of the fact that patents are territorially limited, 
such that a US drug patent has no impact on whether that drug 
is or is not patented in another country.43 Thus, a drug to 
prevent strokes and heart attacks that is sold under the 
trademark Plavix in the United States at a premium by patent 
owner Sanofi Aventis44 is available as a cheaper generic drug in 
                                                                                                                            
41. Corruption is identified by the WHO as a major impediment to ensuring 
access to quality medicine. See, e.g., Guitelle Baghdadi-Sabeti & Fatima Serhan, WHO 
Good Governance for Medicines Programme: An Innovative Approach to Prevent Corruption in 
the Pharmaceutical Sector, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 6 (2010), http://www.who.int/
healthsystems/topics/financing/healthreport/25GGM.pdf. 
42. See supra Part I.A.2. 
43. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
44. The patent owner can sell a patented drug for a premium until the patent 
expires, which, in the case of the drug sold as Plavix, is May 2012. See Patent Terms 
Extended under 35 USC § 156, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/terms/156.jsp (last visited Sept. 25, 2011); 
Matthew Perrone, FDA Extends Plavix Patent by 6 Months, ABC NEWS, Jan. 25, 2011, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=12758125. Although there is 
technically no law that prevents a patent owner from maintaining the same price, the 
entry of cheaper generics typically results in the patent owner substantially reducing 
the drug’s cost. 
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India under the non-proprietary name clopidogrel because 
there is no applicable Indian patent. 
This Article addresses an especially confusing and 
previously uncharted area of nomenclature—what to call a drug 
that is unpatented (and generally referred to as generic) in the 
country of origin and destination, but might arguably infringe a 
patent while in-transit. Many assume that a drug made as a 
generic should always be considered a generic drug. This Article 
will follow popular convention in referring to a drug as 
“generic” if made as such, but with the important caveat that 
this label does not mean to suggest that the “generic” drug 
cannot infringe while in-transit. 
b. Generic vs. Counterfeit Drugs 
Another frequent point of confusion in discussions of in-
transit drugs involves the use of the word “counterfeit,” 
particularly, concerning whether a generic drug is counterfeit. 
The term “counterfeit” may refer to a counterfeit trademark, or 
alternatively, to a drug of dubious quality and safety. 
As noted above, the term “counterfeit” has a special 
meaning for trademarks—it refers to the unauthorized use of a 
mark that is identical to a trademark. For example, the use of 
the mark “Tylenol” on a bottle of painkillers that is not made 
(or authorized) by the owner of the trademark Tylenol would be 
a counterfeit. Based on the trademark definition of the term 
“counterfeit,” some contend that the word “counterfeit” can 
never apply to generic drugs that do not purport to use any 
mark of the original brand owner, let alone the identical mark. 
The term “counterfeit,” however, is often used more 
broadly. In particular, the term “counterfeit” may refer to sub-
standard medicines or falsified medicine. For example, a drug 
may fail to contain adequate amounts of the active ingredient 
listed, or none of the active ingredient. While such drugs are 
clearly problematic from a public health perspective, they raise 
very different concerns than a counterfeit trademark. Some 
health advocates strongly oppose the use of the term 
“counterfeit” in connection with fake drugs and prefer to refer 
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to drugs as “sub-standard” or “adulterated” to avoid confusion 
with counterfeit trademarks and to emphasize what is at issue.45 
Some public health advocates seem to assume that the term 
counterfeit can only properly refer to counterfeit trademarks 
and that any other use of the term counterfeit is a purposeful 
attempt to blur the lines between health and intellectual 
property issues to justify increased intellectual property (“IP”) 
rights.46 
There may be an overlap in some cases. For example, an 
unauthorized drug could have a counterfeit trademark on its 
packaging.47 However, that does not mean that all products with 
counterfeit trademarks are falsified. In addition, a generic name 
of a drug is not a counterfeit trademark. Although it is true that 
the only multilateral agreement on the definition of counterfeit 
is with respect to trademarks, it is nonetheless used more 
broadly. For example, both the Food and Drug Adminstration 
(“FDA”) and the World Health Organization (“WHO”) state 
that counterfeit drugs include branded and generic products.48 
Since generic drugs are by definition sold without a trademark, 
                                                                                                                            
45. See, e.g., EYE ON THE BALL: MEDICINE REGULATION—NOT IP ENFORCEMENT—
CAN BEST DELIVER QUALITY MEDICINES, OXFAM 23 (2011), http://www.oxfam.org/
sites/www.oxfam.org/files/eye-on-the-ball-medicine-regulation-020211-en.pdf 
[hereinafter EYE ON THE BALL] (stating that the term “counterfeit” has little meaning 
in the context of public health discussions, based on the trademark definition of 
counterfeit); Counterfeit, Substandard and Generic Drugs, CAMPAIGN FOR ACCESS TO 
ESSENTIAL MEDS., MÉDICINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, http://www.msfaccess.org/main/access-
patents/counterfeit-substandard-and-generic-drugs/ (last updated Apr. 2009). 
46. See, e.g., EYE ON THE BALL, supra note 45, at 24; Kaitlin Mara, Poin t ed  
Exchange  o f  V i ews  a t  WHO Br i e f ing  on  Coun te r f e i t  Drugs ,  IP -W A T C H 
(Mar.  31 ,  2010,  2 :49  PM),  http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/03/31/flare-
up-in-who-briefing-on-counterfeit/; Catherine Saez, WHO Member s  t o  Work  t o  
Di s en tang l e  Prob l em o f  Fake  Med i c ine s ,  IP  I s sue s ,  IP -WA T C H  (Feb .  25 ,  
2011 ,  12 :24  AM),  h t tp ://www. ip -watch.org/weblog/2011/02/26/who-
members  -  to -work - to -d i sentang le -problem-of - fake -medic ines - ip -
i s sues/ .  
47. An unauthorized drug with a counterfeit trademark is not the only possibility. 
A falsified drug may not use any trademark, but instead be false in that it fails to 
contain the stated ingredient(s). 
48. See, e.g., Counterfeit Drugs Questions & Answers, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm169898.htm (last updated Sept. 8, 2011) 
(explaining what constitutes a counterfeit drug and clarifying that counterfeit drugs 
may include generic or brand name drugs); Substandard and Counterfeit Medicines, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Nov. 2003), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/
2003/fs275/en/ (stating that “both branded and generic products are subject to 
counterfeiting”). 
18 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1 
 
the use of the word “counterfeit” in this Article generally refers 
to a sub-standard drug.49  
II. A NEW FRAMEWORK 
This Part provides an analytical framework that explains 
why there has been confusion and conflation of facts and law 
concerning in-transit suspension of drugs. Although advocates 
are known to use issue framing and rhetoric, there may be a 
more fundamental phenomenon that gives rise to issue 
framing.50 In particular, this Article posits that many 
misstatements stem from fundamentally different perspectives of 
patent policy. These perspectives are important both to 
understanding some of the statements that have been made and 
to understanding, predicting, and addressing future actions. 
This new theory may help fill in gaps left by traditional 
patent theories. In particular, while there are a number of 
theories concerning why countries grant patents,51 those 
theories are largely irrelevant to the current reality in which 
countries set patent standards according to international 
agreements that have trade benefits and not because of an 
inherent agreement in patent theory.52 In addition, while some 
                                                                                                                            
49. The one exception to this is in the case study concerning in-transit 
suspensions where some parties use the term “counterfeit” in ways that are ambiguous; 
these references are retained as important to evaluating the patent schemas at issue. 
50. The power of rhetoric and issue framing is widely recognized with respect to 
the development of international laws that promote patent rights. See, e.g., SUSAN K. 
SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW 5–6 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 2003); Amy 
Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 
117 YALE L.J. 804, 809 (2008).  
51. For example, patents can be seen as a “natural right” of inventors, or granted 
as a “utilitarian” tool to promote innovations. However, these general theories 
concerning the existence of a patent system do not provide guidance on how to fine 
tune a patent system to consider social goals beyond innovation, such as access to 
medicine. 
52. Although some suggested that developing countries would benefit from 
enhanced patent rights, that view was, and continues to be, challenged. Rather, TRIPS 
was concluded despite the patent requirements because developing countries were keen 
to gain greater access to the markets of wealthy WTO members. See generally GERVAIS, 
supra note 26, at 336 (noting that the patent section was one of the most contentious 
aspects of negotiation); Arie Reich, The WTO as a Law-Harmonizing Institution, 25 U. PA. 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 321, 362 (2004) (suggesting that the WTO and TRIPS succeeded 
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scholars have suggested that patent rights should be either 
maximized or minimized consistent with traditional patent 
theories, these arguments assume that one approach is 
necessarily correct.53 In contrast, the patent perspectives 
presented here, based on social science support, suggest that 
there may be different views of patent policy, each of which will 
lead to different perceptions of facts and laws. 
This Part is divided into two sections. The first section 
provides an overview of social science information relevant to 
the patent perspective theory. The next section explains the 
patent perspectives based upon lessons from social science. 
A. Social Science Foundation 
1. Schemas 
Social science literature repeatedly documents that people 
receive and understand new information based upon certain 
pre-existing “schemas,”54 which are developed through direct 
                                                                                                                            
because it was a package deal). Developing countries opposed inclusion of patents and 
wanted to limit intellectual property rights to only counterfeit trademark and pirated 
copyright goods. See, e.g., Communication from the Permanent Mission of India to the 
Indian Negotiating Grp., Standards and Principles Concerning the Availability Scope and Use 
of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/37, ¶¶ 2–4 (July 10, 
1989). 
53. In particular, patent rights and exceptions are often referred to as promoting 
either a “liability” or “property” rule. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, 
Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994). Those who 
support the use of compulsory licenses of patented drugs are considered to promote a 
liability rule whereas those who oppose such licenses are considered to promote a 
property rule. 
54. This Article uses the term “schema” broadly to refer to any organizing 
principle, hypothesis, script, or prototype that functions as a mental organizing system. 
See Reid Hastie, Schematic Principles in Human Memory, in 1 SOCIAL COGNITION: THE 
ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 39, 39–47 (Edward Tory Higgins & Mark P. Zanna eds. 1981); see 
also MARTHA AUGOUSTINOS ET AL., SOCIAL COGNITION: AN INTEGRATED INTRODUCTION 
68 (2d ed. 2006) (defining a schema as a “cognitive structure” which “contains general 
expectations and knowledge of the world”). Use of the term “schema” and related 
social science concepts such as “categories” and “concepts” are used differently by 
different social science scholars. See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically 
Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1103, 1131–32 (2004) [hereinafter Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased]. In addition, 
the terms “script” and “meta-scripts” have been used. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The 
Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 3–4 (2004) [hereinafter Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law]. However, one 
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experience, as well as communication with others.55 Individuals 
rely on schemas in processing information, drawing conclusions, 
and generally perceiving their every day life.56 In addition, 
individuals are likely to remember facts consistent with 
schemas.57 
Schemas often function as an unconscious lens through 
which information is perceived. One simple schema is a 
stereotype—including not only gender and racial stereotypes, 
but also stereotypes about occupations (such as lawyers as 
mercenaries).58 A schema could also be a bias that does not rise 
to the level of a broadly-recognized stereotype. For example, a 
schema could involve a bias that perceives more complexly 
written articles as better.59 Schemas may be more complex; for 
                                                                                                                            
unifying trend of particular pertinence to this Article is that they focus on a mental 
concept that serves as a lens through which future experiences are viewed. 
55. See, e.g., 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY, 158–60 (Alan E. Kazdin ed., 2000). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. For example, studies consistently show that race and gender stereotypes 
impact memory recall and mistake. See, e.g., Alison P. Lenton et al., Illusions of Gender: 
Stereotypes Evoke False Memories, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 3, 11 (2001) 
(showing that subjects created false memories based on gender stereotypes); Richard L. 
Marsh & Gabriel I. Cook, Gender and Orientation Stereotypes Bias Source-Monitoring 
Attributions, 14 MEMORY 148, 157–58 (2006) (illustrating that participants misremember 
facts that are consistent with gender and racial stereotypes); see also Jeanine L. Skorinko 
& Barbara A. Spellman, Stereotypic Crimes: How Group-Crime Associations Affect 
Memory and (Sometimes) Verdicts and Sentencing (June 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript), cited in Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, 
Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 375 n.154, 378 (2007) (showing 
that subjects were more likely to accurately recall race in instances that were consistent 
with a racial stereotype, such as Caucasian perpetuator of the stereotypical white crime 
of identity fraud). In addition, memory may be impacted by non-stereotypical schemas. 
See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision 
Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242, 251 (1986) (mock jurors not only 
forget incongruent facts, but also misremember facts that were not in evidence to 
support a pre-existing judgment). 
58. Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 54, at 1125. In fact, jokes can 
be predicated on cultural schemas, with the punch line of the joke playing on a 
presumed shared schema; some such schemas include women as shoppers, and men as 
disinclined to commit to personal relationships. Id at 1111–12. 
59. See, e.g., J. Scott Armstrong, Unintelligible Management Research and Academic 
Prestige, 10 INTERFACES 80, 84–85 (1980) (finding that management faculty from 
several prestigious institutions had a bias toward more complex language that resulted 
in academics rating more complex conclusion sections of research as superior in 
quality). In addition, students and educators alike have a schema that strongly favors 
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example, a philosophy that values market self-regulation over 
government regulation can be considered a schema.60 
All individuals rely on schemas. For example, Justice Joseph 
P. Bradley of the United States Supreme Court evidenced a 
schema about the inferiority of women when he commented 
that “[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which 
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the 
occupations of civil life.”61 More recently, there is a growing 
body of literature that shows that while our society may be more 
egalitarian than in the 1800s, stereotypes, such as racial bias 
against blacks continue, albeit often at a more unconscious level. 
For example, a physical bump may be viewed as aggressive when 
done by a black actor, but innocuous when done by a white 
actor; this difference exists even in individuals who display no 
conscious animus against blacks.62 Such bias is shown by 
individuals in a variety of professions including police officers, 
                                                                                                                            
teacher charisma and other non-substantive content in evaluating the teacher or 
lecturer. A famous study of an actor posing as “Dr. Fox” suggested that even trained 
academics are susceptible to a common bias that ascribes weight to a teacher’s 
[personal traits] more than content. Donald H. Naftulin et al., The Doctor Fox Lecture: A 
Paradigm of Educational Seduction, 48 J. MED. EDUC. 630, 633-34 (1973). The “Dr. Fox” 
study may also demonstrate a related schema that speakers have authority if they act 
with authority and are given authoritative titles. This is also depicted in the movie The 
Yes Men, in which two individuals embody fake personas and make controversial points 
that are generally accepted without question by well-educated audiences. THE YES MEN 
(Yes Men Films, LLC 2003). 
60. See Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 54, at 87–89. 
61. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872). The impact of schemas on the 
Court was shown in a more contemporary case in which Justices held different views of 
the same video of a police officer that rammed his car into a fleeing motorist. Scott v. 
Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). The justices held dramatically different interpretations of 
the view that was of critical importance to whether to affirm a lower court’s denial of a 
summary judgment motion by an officer that his use of admittedly deadly force did not 
constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 379, 395–96. A 
subsequent study revealed that the views likely reflected different cultural values—
which can be considered a schema—that played a prominent role in perception of the 
same facts. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris 
and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 860–61 (2009). 
62. H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black 
and White Children’s Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 590, 593–97 (1980); see also Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and 
Attribution of Intergroup Violence, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 590 (1976). 
The fact that individuals may subconsciously view facts differently, depending on the 
race of an actor, is considered implicit racial bias—as opposed to conscious bias against 
blacks. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 
970 (2006). 
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judges, and doctors.63 Although stereotypes are commonly 
studied, there are additional schemas that influence individuals. 
For example, studies have shown social science academics to 
favor studies consistent with their own beliefs64 or prevailing 
wisdom;65 they also perceive work from individuals at prestigious 
schools as more worthy of publication.66 
2. Confirmation Bias 
People tend to interpret new information consistent with 
their schemas. For example, a teacher who believes a certain 
student is smart is likely to interpret subsequent performance 
consistent with this schema.67 This tendency to view new 
                                                                                                                            
63. See, e.g., Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias among Physicians and Its 
Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 
1231, 1234–35 (2007) (documenting implicit racial bias among doctors that resulted in 
more appropriate treatment to whites than blacks); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does 
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221 (2009) 
(describing implicit racial bias in judges); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the 
Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2060–98 (2011) (detailing implicit racial bias 
in police officers); Janice A. Sabin et al., Physicians’ Implicit and Explicit Attitudes about 
Race by MD Race, Ethnicity, and Gender, 20 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 
896, 907 (2009) (indicating that most doctors have implicit racial bias against blacks). 
64. See, e.g., Andreas Hergovich et al., Biased Evaluation of Abstracts Depending on 
Topic and Conclusion: Further Evidence of a Confirmation Bias Within Scientific Psychology, 29 
CURRENT PSYCHOL. 188, 188–89 (2010) (showing that psychologists reviewing abstracts 
of research were more likely to evaluate research as higher quality when consistent with 
their own beliefs); Michael J. Mahoney, Publication Prejudices: An Experimental Study of 
Confirmatory Bias in the Peer Review System, 1 COGNITIVE THERAPY AND RES. 161 (1977). 
65. See, e.g., J. Scott Armstrong, Publication of Research on Controversial Topics: The 
Early Acceptance Procedure, 12 INT’L J. FORECASTING 299, 299 (1996); David F. Horrobin, 
The Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 JAMA, 1438, 
1441 (1990). 
66. In one study, twelve papers published by individuals from prestigious 
psychology departments at various colleges and universities were resubmitted to the 
same highly regarded journals in which the work had appeared, but with false author 
names and affiliations (e.g., Tri-Valley Center for Human Potential). Almost all (eight 
of nine) of the papers not detected as previously published work, were rejected on the 
basis of negative recommendations from most reviewers—even though the identical 
papers were previously worthy of publication. Stephen J. Ceci & Douglas P. Peters, Peer 
Review Practices of Psychological Journals: The Fate of Published Articles, Submitted Again, 5 
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI., 187, 187–255 (1982). 
67. Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11, 26 (1998). 
Similarly, counselors in clinical settings become increasingly more confident in initial 
judgments, although research shows that the confidence is not correlated with 
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information to confirm existing schemas is referred to as 
“confirmation bias.”68 Although this may seem to be inferior 
cognitive processing, it has also been explained as an adaptive 
survival skill.69 For example, an individual who has a schema that 
snakes are dangerous has an “advantage” over someone who 
insists on testing every snake to determine its dangerousness. 
Even though not all snakes are dangerous, the individual with 
the snake danger schema will more likely avoid physical harm.70 
When information is ambiguous, it is especially likely to be 
interpreted consistent with confirmation bias, thereby 
preserving the pre-existing schema. When evidence is 
ambiguous, individuals emphasize the strength and reliability of 
confirming evidence, but deemphasize the weakness and 
unreliability of disconfirming evidence, such that prior views are 
strengthened.71 For example, in evaluating research, individuals 
are more likely to overlook the problem of small sample sizes if 
the conclusion is consistent with their beliefs, yet suggest that 
lack of rigor is a problem if the conclusion is contrary to their 
beliefs.72 
The confirmation bias exists even in cases where the 
ambiguous evidence is minimal in nature. For example, one 
study showed confirmation bias of pre-existing schemas 
concerning academic abilities of children from rich or poor 
backgrounds based solely on an ambiguous videotape of a 
child’s performance.73 In the videotape, the child answered 
                                                                                                                            
increased accuracy. See, e.g., Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case Study Judgments, 29 J. 
CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 261, 264–65 (1965). 
68. The same phenomenon has alternatively been called belief perseverance, 
biased assimilation, conservatism, confirmational response bias, or agreement effect. 
See, e.g., Hergovich et al., supra note 64, at 188. It is suggested that individuals are most 
susceptible to this phenomenon when the schema is easily “activated,” strong, or 
consistent with a “framework of related opinions and values.” Charles G. Lord & Cheryl 
A. Taylor, Biased Assimilation: Effects of Assumptions and Expectations on the Interpretation of 
New Evidence, 3 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 827, 831 (2009). 
69. E.g., Hal R. Arkes, Costs and Benefits of Judgment Errors: Implications for Debiasing, 
110 PSCYHOL. BULL 486 (1991); Lord & Taylor, supra note 68, at 831. 
70. Lord & Taylor, supra note 68, at 831. 
71. The reason this occurs is that people have an inherent need to ignore, 
discredit, or rationalize inconsistent information to avoid the discomfort of cognitive 
dissonance. E.g., LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2–3 (1957). 
72. See KUNDA, supra note 3, at 229. 
73. See John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling 
Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 20 (1983). Subjects in two groups were 
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questions with mixed success, but subjects came to differing 
conclusions based on whether they believed the child was from a 
wealthy or poor background. In particular, subjects who 
believed that a child was from a wealthy home interpreted the 
child’s ambiguous performance to support their belief that the 
child had above average reading ability whereas subjects who 
believed the child was from a poor home interpreted the same 
ambiguous performance to support a belief that the child had 
below average reading ability.74 
In addition, individuals may become more polarized in 
their views after “interpreting” the same ambiguous evidence. In 
a study on the deterrent effects of capital punishment, subjects 
were randomly provided ambiguous “evidence” about the 
deterrent effects of capital punishment and later asked whether 
the evidence supported or discredited their views.75 The subjects 
became more entrenched in their views; for example, those who 
were already positively disposed to capital punishment believed 
more in its deterrent effect.76 The same effect was found in a 
study focused on subjects with pro- and anti-nuclear views.77 
Confirmation bias may result in ambiguous information 
being perceived differently by those with different group 
identities, such that prior schemas are maintained. A famous 
example of this involves the impact of school allegiance as a 
group identity. In particular, college students shown a film of a 
football game in which officials made a series of controversial 
decisions were viewed differently by students of two different 
                                                                                                                            
shown different videos of the child playing—either in a wealthy suburban area or an 
impoverished inner-city school. Id. at 23. In addition, subjects who viewed the child in 
the wealthy neighborhood were told that the parents were college educated with white-
collar jobs whereas those who viewed the child in the poor neighborhood were told 
that the parents were college graduates with blue-collar jobs. Id. 
74. Id. at 20 . 
75. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of 
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSCYHOL. 
2098, 2098 (1979). 
76. Id.  
77. S. Plous, Biases in the Assimilation of Technological Breakdowns: Do Accidents Make 
Us Safer? 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1058, 1068 (1991) (finding that fifty-four percent 
of pro-nuclear subjects became more pro-nuclear and fourty-five percent of anti-
nuclear subjects became more anti-nuclear). 
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schools.78 Students who attended the offending team’s college 
reported seeing half as many illegal plays as did students from 
the opposing institution.79 In other words, group ties had an 
unconscious, yet powerful effect in viewing the facts to favor 
their group affiliation.80 The same effect has been found outside 
of experimental settings. For example, democratic and 
republican partisans who watched the same presidential debate 
each viewed their preferred candidate as performing better.81 
Schemas are sufficiently powerful that they not only shape 
views of ambiguous evidence, but may even serve as a prism to 
either find ambiguity or entirely disregard inconsistent 
evidence. For example, despite substantial scientific support for 
the global warming phenomenon,82 some believe that the 
evidence is either ambiguous or supports a contrary 
conclusion.83 Although this contemporary controversy may be 
difficult for some readers who consider one view or another to 
be “clearly” false, history can provide evidence of the impact of 
schemas through a now generally discarded schema. For 
                                                                                                                            
78. See generally Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 
49 J. ABNORM. & SOC. PSCYHOL. 129 (1954). 
79. Id. at 132. 
80. For an additional example of this phenomenon, see generally Robert P. 
Vallone et al., The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media 
Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 577 (1985) 
(finding that pro-Arab and pro-Israeli students watching the same news coverage of a 
massacre of civilians viewed the coverage as consistent with their pre-existing schemas). 
81. Geoffrey D. Munro et al., Biased Assimilation of Sociopolitical Arguments: 
Evaluating the 1996 U.S. Presidential Debate, 24 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 15, 15 
(2002). 
82. See, e.g., JOINT SCIENCE ACADEMIES, JOINT SCIENCE ACADEMIES’ STATEMENT ON 
GROWTH AND RESPONSIBILITY: SUSTAINABILITY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND CLIMATE 
PROTECTION (2007), http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/G8Statement_
Energy_07_May.pdf; G8+5 ACADEMIES, G8+5 ACADEMIES’ JOINT STATEMENT: CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES FOR A LOW CARBON 
FUTURE (2009), http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/G8+5energy-
climate09.pdf; see also The Consensus on Global Warming: From Science to Industry & 
Religion, LOGICAL SCIENCE, http://www.logicalscience.com/consensus/consensus
D1.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). 
83. See, e.g., Mike Hulme, The Science and Politics of Climate Change, WALL. ST. J., 
Dec. 2, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487041071045745716
13215771336.html; Leslie Kaufman, Among Weathercasters, Doubt on Warming, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at A1; Andrew C. Revkin, Hacked E-Mail Is New Fodder for Climate 
Change Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at A1; The Truth about Denial, NEWSWEEK 
(Aug. 12, 2007, 8:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/08/13/the-
truth-about-denial.html. 
26 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1 
 
example, in the late 1800s when there was a common schema 
that women were inferior to men, that schema seemed to prevail 
even when women defied expectations. In particular, in the late 
1800s, a female student who excelled at Cambridge University 
did not receive the same recognition as her male cohorts; 
whereas her male cohorts had their name published in the 
official class list, hers was not, prohibiting her from including 
the initials “B.A.” after her name.84 In this case, the inconsistent 
information about a female student was simply ignored. 
Moreover, the process of articulating support for a certain 
schema, such as a particular theory, may serve to reinforce that 
schema. Studies have shown this effect to exist in general and 
even in the extreme case where the schema was subsequently 
discredited.85 This has important implications for the 
reinforcement of schemas in individuals in some occupations. 
For example, academics and judges may reinforce schemas by 
documenting their rationale. This may seem counterintuitive 
since some suggest that writing promotes careful reasoning.86 
Although the process of writing may help with the reasoning 
                                                                                                                            
84. Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 54, at 1116 (citing RITA 
MCWILLIAMS TULLBERG, WOMEN AT CAMBRIDGE 58 (1998)). 
85. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson et al., Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of 
Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1037, 1039, 1041 (1980) (describing an experiment in which subjects who 
were told to provide a written explanation of a case study suggesting a relationship 
between risk taking and success as a fire fighter continued to believe in the relationship 
even after told that information was false); Timothy D. Wilson & Suzanne J. LaFleur, 
Knowing What You’ll Do: Effects of Analyzing Reasons on Self-Prediction, 68 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 23, 26 (1995) (examining a study involving members of sororities 
who were asked to predict their own behavior toward future sorority members, with 
some randomly assigned to explain why in writing; those who “reasoned” their 
predictions were significantly more overconfident in their evaluations than those who 
did not); Lee Ross et al., Social Explanation and Social Expectation: Effects of Real and 
Hypothetical Explanations on Subjective Likelihood, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PYSCHOL. 817 
(1977) (asserting that subjects who were provided a case study and were asked to 
explain why it reached a certain result, then were told that there was actually no 
information about any result, were more likely to predict the occurrence of the event 
they had explained than those who were not asked to give any explanation). 
86. See, e.g., Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial 
Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1284 (2008). 
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process in general, it may simultaneously reinforce some 
schemas.87 
3. Naïve Realism 
The operation of schemas is further complicated by the fact 
that individuals are generally unaware of their own schemas, 
frequently referred to as biases, yet have a heightened sensitivity 
to the presumed biases of others; this is referred to as naïve 
realism.88 For example, an individual will assume that their 
position on how to address the US budget deficit is based solely 
on an objective analysis, such that they are likely to believe that 
others who are objective will share the same position; those that 
do not will be presumed to lack essential information, 
intelligence, or objectivity.89 The lack of objectivity could be 
attributable to multiple factors including, but not limited to, 
political ideology, self-interest, or other bias.90 
Individuals are not completely oblivious to possible flaws in 
perceptions, but when they actually perceive new information, 
                                                                                                                            
87. In particular, if writing is considered a form of increased thought, that may 
not necessarily reduce operation of schemas. See generally Duane T. Wegner et al., Not 
All Stereotyping Is Created Equal: Differential Consequences of Thoughtful versus Nonthoughtful 
Sterotyping, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 42 (2006) (suggesting that the process of 
writing down impressions does not necessarily lead to reduction of stereotype schema 
and may produce stereotypic perceptions with long lasting effects). 
88. See, e.g., Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual versus Assumed Differences in Construal: 
“Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
404, 404 (1995); see also Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naïve Cynicism: Maintaining 
False Perceptions in Policy Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499, 513-14 (2008). In addition, the same 
phenomenon has been observed without the use of this term. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, 
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1182-84 (1997) (referring to “[s]elf-
[s]erving [b]ias, [u]nrealistic [o]ptimism, and [o]verconfidence” in lieu of the term 
“naïve realism”). Furthermore, although not identical, a related trend that most people 
acknowledge, albeit not in themselves, is the tendency for individuals to be overly 
optimistic about their own situation. For example, although entering law students know 
that not everyone can be at the top of their class, most students believe that they will 
near the top of the class. See, e.g., Ari L. Kaplan, Would Law School Warning Labels Help?, 
NAT’L L.J., Mar. 8, 2010; see also Kaplan Survey: Despite Challenging Job Market, 
Tomorrow’s Lawyers Appear to Have a Healthy Outlook on Their Own Job Prospects, 
but Not Their Classmates’, KAPLAN (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.kaplan.com/
aboutkaplan/newsroom/Pages/newsroom.aspx?ID=571 (reporting that law students 
are more confident about their employment prospects than those of their peers). 
89. See, e.g., Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 
11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 37, 40 (2006) (using an example of bias based on 
position on latest welfare reform bill). 
90. Id. 
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they are oblivious to possible distortions in thinking.91 
Individuals are not consciously aware of bias that may impact the 
process of making judgments and inferences, such that they are 
inclined to believe that their judgments are neutral; those who 
disagree, on the other hand, are assumed to be biased as an 
explanation for a difference in opinion.92 Moreover, individuals 
can recall sometimes struggling to be objective and thus have a 
perception that this struggle reflects a cognitive process that is 
fair and balanced.93 Accordingly, although individuals recognize 
that biases exist, they generally consider themselves less 
vulnerable to biases than others. For example, in one 
experiment where subjects were informed that all individuals 
suffer from a self-serving bias, subjects nonetheless believed that 
only other subjects, not themselves, were in fact vulnerable to 
such a bias.94 
The problems of naïve realism are also compounded in 
cases of disagreements. There is a tendency to assume that the 
cause of the disagreement is that the other party is subject to 
bias.95 Individuals are quick to assume that the political 
affiliations of others bias them toward certain positions, yet deny 
that their own political affiliation might impact their views.96 For 
example, in a study of students concerning terrorism responses 
after 9/11, students were more likely to view other students as 
biased when their views differed from their own.97 
                                                                                                                            
91. See Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions 
of Bias in Self versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 783–84 (2004). 
92. See Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self versus 
Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 378 (2002). 
93. Pronin, supra note 91, at 784. 
94. Pronin, supra note 92, at 378. 
95. See, e.g., id. at 379; see also Kathleen A. Kennedy & Emily Pronin, When 
Disagreement Gets Ugly: Perceptions of Bias and the Escalation of Conflict, 34 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 833, 834 (2008) (suggesting that the assumption that others are 
biased is especially relevant to disagreements). 
96. Pronin, supra note 89, at 38 (citing Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: The 
Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 
(2003)); Pronin, supra note 91, at 783 (suggesting that opposing partisans can suggest a 
range of biases including self interest, peer group pressure, and media brainwashing to 
account for the difference of opinion that is presumed to be erroneous). 
97. Pronin, supra note 89, at 39. 
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B. The Two Patent Policy Schemas 
This Article builds upon this rich literature concerning the 
existence and operation of schemas, confirmation bias, and 
naïve realism to show how two different patent schemas have 
impacted the interpretation of facts and laws concerning in-
transit suspensions. However, before presenting the case study 
of these schemas in the context of in-transit suspensions, this 
section first presents two schemas of patent policy:98 patents as 
either an uber-right or as a privilege.99 
This Section focuses on two fundamental schemas 
concerning patent policy that are essential to the question of the 
proper scope of patent rights in light of issues concerning access 
to affordable medicine. Although there is an arguable schema 
that considers all patents to be problematic and improper, the 
two schemas presented here both assume that patents can and 
                                                                                                                            
98. In addition, there may be complementary schemas at issue. For example, the 
privilege view may also have a schema that is suspicious of profit-making corporations 
that own patents; on the other hand, individuals with an uber-right view may consider 
anyone advocating greater access to drugs as an anti-property activist or hooligan. 
99. As noted earlier, all individuals, this author included, are subject to schemas. 
There seems to be a schema perpetuated by the pharmaceutical industry that patents 
are essential to innovation and necessarily outweigh societal harm from the 
exclusionary power of patents. This schema is a widespread view among politicians and 
much of the general public. I myself held this schema and was influenced by it in 
writing my first article as a law professor; although some professors challenged some of 
my assumptions concerning the social impact of patent rights, I generally maintained 
my schema that patent rights were not generally a problem and found comfort in the 
comments of those that did not question my schema. See Cynthia M. Ho, Patents, 
Patients and Public Policy, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 601, 645–50 (2000) (arguing that the 
patent right to exclude is fundamental and should not be disturbed because of its 
possible negative impact on innovation). Although those initial comments did not 
immediately change my view, greater exposure to more information about how drugs 
are developed, as well as different approaches to patent rights and the impact of such 
rights has changed my views. Although I believe that I now have a more balanced 
perspective of patent rights, although I likely still suffer from a schema—albeit 
probably tilted somewhat more in the direction towards favoring exceptions to patent 
rights. Although my changing views are anecdotal, they are consistent with research 
that indicates that individuals may become less influenced by schemas as they are more 
cognizant of them. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Richeson & Richard J. Nussbaum, The Impact of 
Multiculturalism versus Color-Blindness on Racial Bias, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
417, 421 (2004) (showing that participants who learned about the virtues of 
multiculturalism had lower implicit racial bias than participants exposed to race-neutral 
information). 
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should exist in at least some cases.100 Focusing only on schemas 
that assume patents should exist is most consistent with the 
current reality in which most nations provide patent rights, yet 
the scope of current patent rights may be at odds with patent 
schemas. In particular, although WTO member nations are 
required to provide patent rights pursuant to TRIPS,101 the 
scope of those rights may create tensions for countries to the 
extent that those rights vary in scope from a domestic patent 
perspective. To some degree, tensions that reflect different 
patent schemas are more likely now than when TRIPS was first 
concluded. After all, the language in TRIPS was sufficiently 
ambiguous such that it could be interpreted consistently with 
both patent policy schemas. However, the different schemas are 
more readily apparent when interpreting how certain TRIPS 
provisions apply to specific issues. As will be discussed later, the 
TRIPS provisions concerning border measures could be 
interpreted differently based on different patent perspectives.102 
Before turning to the legal questions, however, this section first 
aims to clarify the patent schemas. 
1. The Privilege Perspective 
One side of the spectrum asserts that patents are a 
privilege, inherently subject to limitations and exceptions. As 
stated by Professor Brook Baker,103 “[p]atents are not ‘property’ 
in the traditional sense—they are government granted rights 
that are intended to balance the interests of innovators and the 
                                                                                                                            
100. Of course, another possibility is that the schema of patents as privilege is a 
subset of the schema that believes all patents are improper, or that patents are 
improper for developing countries, without regard to what TRIPS presently requires. 
See generally Alan V. Deardorff, Should Patent Protection Be Extended to All Developing 
Countries?, 13 WORLD ECON. 497 (1990) (suggesting that developing countries be 
exempt from patent protection); Jean Olson Lanjouw, Beyond TRIPS: A New Global 
Patent Regime, 1 CGD BRIEF (Ctr. for Global Dev., Washington, DC), Aug. 2002, at 3, 
available at http://www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/cgdbrief003.pdf (suggesting that 
companies choose between patent protection in wealthy or poor countries, but not 
both, in the case of global diseases). 
101. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27. 
102. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
103. Professor Brook Baker is associated with Health Global Access Project, which 
is dedicated to eliminating barriers to access to HIV treatment. 
2011] COMPETING PATENT PERSPECTIVES 31 
public at large, and which are granted by governments with 
many express and implied conditions . . . .”104 The United 
Nations Commissioner of Human Rights supports the idea of 
patents as a privilege that must be “subject to limitations in the 
public interest.”105 In particular, the United Nations (“UN”) has 
suggested that certain human rights, such as the right to health, 
are “inalienable and universal,” and must be recognized over 
state-granted rights, such as patents.106 Moreover, the UN 
Commissioner has suggested that, to the extent there is an 
“actual or potential conflict,” patent rights should yield to the 
right to public health.107 
The view of patents as a privilege, rather than an absolute 
right, suggests that the patent privilege should give way to other 
important social interests—such as a societal interest in 
promoting low-cost access to medicine. This view does not 
necessarily reject the idea that patent rights can promote 
innovation. It is a view, however, that requires a more balanced 
consideration of the extent to which innovation should be 
promoted if it negatively impacts access to medicine. 
Prior to TRIPS, the patent laws of a number of countries 
seemed to reflect this view of patents as a privilege. In particular, 
even in countries that provided patent rights, a number of them 
excluded drugs from patentability.108 This would be consistent 
with the patents as a privilege view that patents should be 
limited when necessary to promote public health. For example, 
India’s prior patent laws permitting patents on methods of 
                                                                                                                            
104. Brook K. Baker, Pharma’s Seven Deadly Lies about Thai Compulsory Licenses, 
CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH. (Feb. 1, 2007, 11:14 AM), http://www.cptech.org/
blogs/ipdisputesinmedicine/2007/02/pharmas-seven-deadly-lies-about-thai.html. 
105. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & 
Prot. of Human Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (2000) [hereinafter Resolution 2000/7]. 
106. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm’n on Promotion and Prot. 
of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001) (suggesting that rights under TRIPS, which are state-
granted rather than inalienable, should, where appropriate, bow to the more universal 
human rights, such as the right to health); accord Resolution 2000/7, supra note 105, 
¶ 3, (reminding “all governments of the primacy of human rights obligations over 
economic policies and agreements”).  
107. See Resolution 2000/7, supra note 105, pmbl. para. 11. 
108. See Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public 
Health, 82 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1469, 1511–13 (2007) (discussing the exceptions that India 
created to limit drug patentability, albeit subsequent to TRIPS). 
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creating drugs, but not the drugs themselves, fully embodies this 
view. This system maximized innovation in drug development 
while minimizing negative impacts on access to medicine. In 
particular, a patent on a method of creating a drug would not 
prevent others from developing new and improved methods. At 
the same time, since only the method was patented, and not the 
drug itself, the unpatented drug would likely be affordable. 
Similarly, this view of patents as a privilege, subservient to 
providing low-cost drugs, is consistent with compulsory licenses 
of issued patents. A compulsory license is a widespread 
exception to traditional patent rights, which permits a nation to 
force a patent owner to accept a license, subject to a state-
determined royalty, in certain situations that a country considers 
appropriate.109 Countries that grant patents on food and drugs, 
but permit automatic compulsory licenses of such patents would 
be consistent with the privilege view of patents. Although 
automatic licenses are no longer permissible pursuant to 
TRIPS,110 more limited licenses of patented drugs to promote 
public access to drugs similarly reflect the view of patents as 
privilege. This would be especially true with respect to drugs that 
are considered essential, or in the case where a nation had 
promised universal access to essential drugs. Accordingly, those 
with a privilege view would strongly support and even 
                                                                                                                            
109. See Robert C. Bird, Developing Nations and the Compulsory License: Maximizing 
Access to Essential Medicines while Minimizing Investment Side Effects, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 
209, 209–210 (2009) (discussing the development and importance of compulsory 
licenses in developing countries to promote the manufacture and sale of patented 
drugs within its borders); see generally Adi Gillat, Compulsory Licensing to Regulated 
Licensing: Effects on the Conflict between Innovation and Access in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 711 (2003) (explaining compulsory licenses generally and, in 
particular, the US approach). 
110. See, e.g., GERVAIS, supra note 26, at 391 (stating that TRIPS does not permit 
categories of inventions to be automatically licensed); CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE 
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT 320 (2007) (noting that licenses cannot be granted by subject matter 
because of the requirement for individual consideration); UNCTAD/ICTSD, 
RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 468 (2005) (noting that governments 
should avoid “blanket authorizations” for entire technologies). 
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congratulate nations that issued compulsory licenses to promote 
broader access to patented drugs.111 
The view of patents as a privilege not only suggests that 
patent rights should be flexible in general, but also that they 
should necessarily be modified to promote access to patented 
drugs. Opinions on the extent to which patent rights should be 
modified may differ, even among individuals that consider 
patents a privilege. For example, some may consider a right to 
health to necessarily include a right to any and all medical 
treatment that might improve health. Alternatively, others might 
hold a more tempered view that would only suggest modifying 
patent rights on drugs that are considered “essential” in some 
capacity. Regardless of these differences, there is a uniform 
belief that patented drugs necessarily impede affordable access 
to drugs during the patent term, such that patent rights should 
be modified. 
The view of patents as privilege may be accompanied by 
related views, whether they are considered part of the overall 
privilege schema, or complementary schemas. For example, 
since patents are often owned by large companies that are seen 
to spend substantial amounts of money on promoting drug 
sales, patent rights could be considered to simply fill the coffers 
of greedy companies.112 Suspicion of drug companies could 
promote naïve realism in that any actions and statements made 
by such companies would be assumed to be biased. In addition, 
there may be a related schema concerning wealthy countries 
where patent owners tend to reside. In particular, such countries 
could also be viewed sceptically as only being interested in 
                                                                                                                            
111. For example, in hailing Thailand’s issuance of compulsory licenses, Dr. David 
Wilson of Médecins Sans Frontières (“MSF”) stated that “the lives of patients have to 
come before the patents of drug companies,” in support of the compulsory license as 
an appropriate modification to the default patent rights. Press Release, Médecins Sans 
Frontières, MSF Welcomes Move to Overcome Patent on AIDS Drug in Thailand, 
Campaign for Access to Essential Medicine (Nov. 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.msfaccess.org/our-work/hiv-aids/article/389.  
112. Patent-owning companies are frequently criticized for spending more money 
on the advertisement and promotion of drugs than on scientific research. See, e.g., 
Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of 
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLOS MED. 29, 32 (2008). 
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maximizing their own wealth and possibly doing so at the 
expense of other countries and their health.113 
2. The Uber-Right Perspective 
The alternative perspective views a patent as a very strong 
property right that should in fact be stronger than most 
property rights, such that it will be referred to as an “uber-
right.”114 For example, Professors Richard A. Epstein and F. 
Scott Keiff have stated “patents are praised as a spur to 
innovation, which is made possible only with the predictable 
enforcement of rights of exclusion for the patented 
technology.”115 In other words, the uber-right perspective 
similarly views patents as a special type of property right, but in a 
very different manner than the privilege view. Patents are 
considered special in that they are much more limited in time, 
such that the strength of patent rights during that limited term 
is considered paramount. 
The uber-right perspective of patents also has some basis in 
human rights norms. In particular, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as well as the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights include a clause about 
how everyone should enjoy the benefits of scientific progress 
and benefit from protection of interests from any scientific 
                                                                                                                            
113. See Jerome Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition 
under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 25 (1997) (suggesting that 
consumers and others are “held hostage” to the political influence of powerful industry 
forces that are eager to “expand market power”). In fact, some have noted that the 
genesis of TRIPS can be traced to a group of powerful CEOs in a range of industries 
(including, but not limited to, pharmaceuticals), who argued in favor of broader global 
protection of intellectual property rights, which would result in greater profits for 
them. See generally SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL POWER (2003) (arguing that the successful conclusion of TRIPS reflects 
the effective efforts of private groups in framing their interests as consistent with 
domestic policies in the global economy); Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, 
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 7 (2002) (arguing 
that a small group of multinational companies conceived of and orchestrated the 
creation of TRIPS as a matter of self-interest).  
114. This view of patents as an uber-right is proposed to exist in general, although 
it has more specific implications for the issue of access to affordable medicine. 
115. Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of 
Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 71, 72 (2011). 
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production of which she is the author.116 These statements have 
been used to suggest that if patent rights are minimized, the 
author is improperly deprived of the protection of his or her 
interests.117 
The uber-right view also considers balance of interests an 
important part of patent rights, although what is balanced is 
inherently distinct from the privilege view of patents. In 
particular, the uber-right perspective considers strong patent 
rights as paramount to promote innovation. Although the uber-
right may recognize that patent rights have the potential to 
create challenges to accessing patented drugs in the short-term, 
these challenges are considered less important than maintaining 
long-term innovations.118 Exceptions to patent rights are 
considered a threat to crucial incentives needed to develop new 
drugs that involve “huge, lengthy and risky investments” of over 
a billion dollars per drug.119 For those with an uber-right 
perspective, short-term access issues can and should be resolved 
outside the patent system because reduced patent protection 
necessarily compromises long-term innovation. Accordingly, 
those with an uber-right view frequently suggest that access to 
                                                                                                                            
116. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 27(2), 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to the protection 
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author.”); International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI), art. 15(1) 
(Dec. 16, 1966). 
117. The same article, however, has been read to support the perception of 
patents as a privilege—that consumers are entitled to enjoy the results of scientific 
progress in drug discovery such that they have actual access to medicine, not merely 
theoretical access based upon economic conditions beyond their control. See HOLGER 
HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES 112 (2007) (stating that ICESCR article 15(1)(b) supports access to 
medicine); see also Philip Cullet, Patents and Medicines: The Relationship between TRIPS 
and the Human Right to Health, 79 INT’L AFFAIRS 139, 150–51 (2003) (suggesting that the 
ICESCR is focused on end user access). 
118. E.g., AIDE MÉMORIE, COMPULSORY LICENSES IN THAILAND ON 
PHARMACEUTICALS UNDER PATENT PROTECTION, available at http://www.keionline.org/
misc-docs/1/swiss2thailand_cl.pdf (stating that patents are part of the solution to “long 
term access” to medicine and suggesting that mechanisms to increase short term access 
may negatively impact long term development, as well as access). 
119. Epstein & Kieff, supra note 115, at 78. Others with an uber-right view similarly 
acknowledge the high cost of patented drugs, but tend to emphasize that drug 
discovery is lengthy and expensive. See, e.g., Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do 
Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 
1886, 1886 (2001); Bird, supra note 109, at 216. 
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affordable medicine is not precluded by patents, but by 
poverty.120 
Although an uber-right view of patents recognizes that 
access to affordable medicine may be limited during the patent 
term by prices set by patent owners, they suggest that strong 
patent rights nonetheless benefit all. Professor Martin Adelman 
has suggested that the question of access to medicine often 
overlooks the fact that “without patents there would be far fewer 
drugs around for people to access. One cannot have access to 
something that does not exist.”121 Similarly, Fred Hassan, 
Chairman and CEO of major pharmaceutical company Schering 
Plough, suggests patent protection is the important first step 
toward low-cost generics by considering generics to be the 
“direct result of IP-fuelled innovation.”122 
Those who view patents as an uber-right may consider any 
exceptions to this right as not only improper, but in fact 
“stealing.” For example, the traditionally recognized and 
internationally sanctioned doctrine of compulsory licenses have 
nonetheless been characterized as “stealing” or “piracy” by 
those with an uber-right perspective.123 In addition, those that 
impose compulsory licenses are referred to as “anti-property 
hooligans” or free-riders who want to benefit from innovations 
encouraged by the patent system without paying their due.124 
The uber-right view of patents may consider any 
modification of patent rights to not only be improper, but also 
to inappropriately destroy incentives to create new drugs. The 
importance of a strong patent right may be considered so 
                                                                                                                            
120. See, e.g., Richard P. Rozek, The Effects of Compulsory Licensing on Innovation and 
Access to Health Care, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 889, 896–99 (2000) (pointing to other 
barriers to access to affordable medicine). 
121. Martin J. Adelman, Compulsory Licensing of Drugs: TRIPS Context, INT’L ASS’N 
FOR ADVANCEMENT TEACHING & RES. INTELL. PROP. (Aug. 4, 2003), 
http://www.atrip.org/Content/Activities/s02-Adelman_art.doc. 
122. Caroline Joiner, Building a Better World through Innovation, CHAMBERPOST 
(Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.chamberpost.com/2008/10/building-a-bett/.  
123. See, e.g., Christopher C. Horner, Thailand Stealing out of WTO?, WASH. TIMES, 
May 17, 2007, at A15; Ronald A. Cass, Drug Patent Piracy, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2007, at 15. 
124. Editorial, Bangkok’s Drug War Goes Global, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Mar. 7, 2007, at 
13; Ronald A. Cass, Op-Ed., Patent Remedy, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Aug. 28, 2007, at 13. 
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sacrosanct to the uber-right that any potential limit of patent 
rights is considered equivalent to no patent rights at all. Notably, 
those with an uber-right view tend to suggest that there will be 
no innovation without patents in response to the suggestion to 
modify, but not eliminate patent rights.125 However, evidence 
does not unequivocally support this schema. After all, there are 
notable inventions that were created without any patent 
incentive, such as the Polio vaccine.126 
The uber-right view of patents (or a complementary 
schema) may believe so strongly in the power of patents to 
promote socially productive innovation that broad patent rights 
for all countries are assumed as necessarily desirable. In other 
words, the uber-right view advocates not just patent rights for 
wealthy countries, but also advances the idea that patent rights 
in developing countries will necessarily promote wealth in those 
countries. Indeed, in promoting global patent standards under 
TRIPS, some suggested that requiring developing countries to 
provide patents on all inventions would promote foreign direct 
investment from wealthy countries as well as spur local 
innovation despite more modest evidence.127 Although TRIPS 
                                                                                                                            
125. This frequently occurs in the context of compulsory licenses. See, e.g., Cass, 
supra note 124, at 13 (asserting that Thailand’s compulsory licenses threaten the 
worldwide system for the protection of innovation); see also A Gathering Storm, 
ECONOMIST, June 7, 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/9302864 (quoting Fred 
Hassan of Schering-Plough saying “without intellectual property there is no 
innovation”). In addition, the same phenomenon occurs in defending laws that 
provide stronger patent rights. See, e.g., GSK’s Position on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA), GLAXOSMITHKLINE (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.gsk.com/policies/
GSK-Public-Position-on-ACTA.pdf (in a statement supporting the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) asserted “[w]ithout IP laws, GSK would not 
be able to fund new R&D and to provide new innovative products” even though the 
discussion was not about eliminating IP laws, but only about the extent to which such 
laws should be further strengthened) (emphasis added). 
126. See, e.g., Melody Petersen, Our Daily Meds: How the Pharmaceutical Companies 
Transformed Themselves into Slick Marketing Machines ch. 6 (2009); About Jonas Salk, SALK 
INSTITUTE, http://www.salk.edu/about/jonas_salk.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2011); see 
also François Bompart et al., Innovative Public-Private Partnerships to Maximize the Delivery 
of Anti-Malarial Medicines: Lessons Learned from the ASAQ Winthrop Experience, 10 MALARIA 
J. 143, 143 (2011) (describing a successful collaboration that resulted in the 
development of the anti-malarial ASAQ without patent protection by DnDI). 
127. See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent 
Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 517, 
530 (1996) (suggesting that patent provisions of TRIPS will spur India to innovation); 
Michelle McGrath, The Patent Provisions in TRIPS: Protecting Reasonable Remuneration for 
Services Rendered—Or the Latest Development in Western Colonialism?, 18 EUR. INTELL. 
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has not clearly had this impact, those who believe in an uber-
right view of patents may nonetheless continue to hold this view 
since they continue to promote ever-increasing global standards 
of patent protection.128 This could be consistent with social 
science evidence concerning schemas, even when there is no 
evidence that patents promote progress, any possible ambiguity 
is still interpreted in favor of the schema of strong patent rights 
as a necessary good. For example, US officials have repeatedly 
stated that increased patent rights in Jordan have encouraged 
foreign direct investment and stimulated local research, 
consistent with the uber-right view that these are benefits of 
strong patent protection.129 However, although Jordan has 
developed its own medicines, providing more patent rights has 
not increased innovation or resulted in greater collaboration 
                                                                                                                            
PROP. REV. 398, 400 (1996); Mariko Sakakibara & Lee Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents 
Induce More Innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms, 32 RAND. J. 
ECON. 77, 78 (2001). 
128. Studies concerning whether increased patent rights increase foreign direct 
investment are not conclusive. See, e.g., Darnita York Akers & Sencer Ecer, The TRIPS 
Agreement and Its Effects on the R&D Spending of US-Owned Multinational Companies in 
Developing Countries, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 1173, 1174 (2009); Pamela J. Smith, “How Do 
Foreign Patent Rights Affect U.S. Exports, Affiliate Sales, and Licenses?” 55 J. OF INT’L ECON. 
411, 411 (2001); see also Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
109, 118 (1998) (noting the large amount of foreign investment in Latin American 
countries, in part due to tax and operating advantages). Moreover, as pointed out by 
Professor Carlos Correa, countries such as Brazil and Thailand have received 
substantial foreign direct investment at times when they had low levels of patent 
protection. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 27 (2000); see 
also Arman S. Kirim, Reconsidering Patents and Economic Development: A Case Study of the 
Turkish Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 WORLD DEV. 219 (1985) (finding that foreign direct 
investment in Korea increased after patents were eliminated on pharmaceuticals). 
129. See US-Bahrain FTA: Fact Sheet on Access to Medicines, OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Sept. 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/bahrain-fta (asserting that Jordan has developed its own medicine 
since the enactment of Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”) with the United States as 
evidence that stronger patent protection helps developing countries); Marilyn Chase & 
Sarah Lueck, In New Trade Pacts, U.S. Seeks to Limit Reach of Generic Drugs, WALL. ST. J., 
July 6, 2004, at A1 (quoting USTR spokesperson that Jordan had a blossoming of its 
pharmaceutical industry after implementation of the FTA with the United States). 
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with multinational pharmaceutical companies.130 This is another 
example of rejecting information that is inconsistent with a 
schema. 
III. EXPOSING THE IMPACT OF PERSPECTIVES ON FACTS 
This Part shows how the competing patent perspectives may 
view facts concerning suspensions of generic drugs in-transit 
differently. In particular, this Part begins by providing 
background on the legal framework permitting such 
suspensions, as well as facts concerning the actual suspensions. 
Then, the facts are re-considered through two vignettes written 
from the lens of each perspective. 
A. Background 
This Section begins with the EU Regulation that gave rise to 
suspensions of in-transit drugs on the ground of patent 
infringement. Then, it describes the actual suspensions. Finally, 
it discusses more current international developments that 
further threaten global trade in generic drugs, focusing in 
particular on the recently-concluded ACTA. 
1. EU Regulation 
The EU Regulation permitting suspension of goods that 
allegedly infringe patents is a relatively recent expansion of a 
regulation first designed to address counterfeit trademarks that 
entered into free circulation in Member States.131 It was 
subsequently expanded to address not only pirated copyrighted 
goods,132 but also both counterfeit and pirated goods in 
                                                                                                                            
130. Hamed El-Said & Mohammed El-Said, TRIPS-Plus Implications for Access to 
Medicines in Developing Countries: Lessons from Jordan-United States Free Trade Agreement, 10 
J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 438, 438–57 (2007). 
131. See Council Regulation No. 3842/86/EEC on Laying Down Measures to 
Prohibit the Release for Free Circulation of Counterfeit Goods, 1999 O.J. L 27/1; see 
also Commission of the European Communities, Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy 
in the Single Market: Green Paper, COM (98) 569 Final (Oct. 1998) (identifying a 
need to address counterfeiting and piracy). 
132. See Council Regulation No. 3295/94/EC on Laying Down Measures to 
Prohibit the Release for Free Circulation, Export, Re-Export or Entry for a Suspensive 
Procedure of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, 1994 O.J. L 341/8. 
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transit.133 In addition, the regulation was expanded to permit 
customs officials to take action on their own initiative without 
awaiting a specific request from the right holder.134 
The expansion to include patent infringements was made 
in 1999135 and may have been in response to industry interest in 
including them.136 Extending the scope to patented inventions 
was also justified as important to “safeguarding innovation” and 
permitting European products to be internationally 
competitive;137 although safeguarding innovation does not 
appear to have previously played a prominent role in the history 
of the regulation.138 However, this inclusion was admitted to be 
an “experiment” in that identifying patent infringement was 
admittedly more difficult than identifying counterfeit 
trademarked or pirated copyrighted goods.139 
Under the current EU Regulation, customs officials may act 
either on behalf of a specific application by a rights-holder or on 
their own initiative in suspending goods that infringe an 
intellectual property right based on local right. In other words, 
although the Regulation applies to all EU member countries, 
whether an intellectual property right is being violated is a 
function of national law. For example, German customs officials 
                                                                                                                            
133. See id. 
134. See id. The ex officio provisions were included in 1994. There are, however, 
mechanisms in the regulation intended to prevent abuse of the system. For example, 
the owner should be able to obtain release by either objecting to a patent owner’s 
request to destroy the goods or by notifying the customs office that legal procedures 
have been initiated to evaluate whether patent infringement is occurring. See Customs 
Action Regulation, supra note 4, arts. 13–14, at 12. 
135. Council Regulation No. 241/1999/EC Amending Regulation (EC) No 
3295/94 Laying Down Measures to Prohibit the Release for Free Circulation, Export, 
Re-Export or Entry for a Suspensive Procedure of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, 1999 
O.J. L 27/1. 
136. See Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) Amending Regulation (EC) No. 
3295/94 Laying Down Measures to Prohibit the Release for Free Circulation, Export, 
Re-Export or Entry for a Suspensive Procedure of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, 1998 
O.J. C 108/63, ¶ 7.1 [hereinafter Amending Regulation].  
137. Id. 
138. Innovation was not previously mentioned in the 1986 nor the 1994 
regulations. 
139. Amending Regulation, supra note 136, ¶¶ 6.4–6.5. 
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apply German patent law to assess whether in-transit goods 
infringe patent laws.140 
However, there is a wrinkle in assessing local patent 
infringement of in-transit goods. In particular, no EU member 
state has patent laws that specifically include in-transit goods as 
goods that violate the patent owner’s right to exclude imports. 
Nonetheless, Dutch courts have interpreted the EU regulation 
to create a similar effect. In particular, recital 8 of the 
Regulation suggests that infringement is assessed based on 
whether the goods would infringe if made in the Member 
State.141 Based on this recital, Dutch courts have held that in-
transit products can infringe Dutch patents based on an 
admitted legal fiction that the products were made in the 
Netherlands.142 In other words, although Dutch patent law does 
not consider in-transit goods to be imported, the Dutch 
interpretation of the EU regulation considers in-transit goods to 
nonetheless infringe its patent law for purposes of permitting 
customs to suspend the drugs based on a fiction that the in-
transit products are made in the Netherlands. 
The Dutch case law has been criticized as inappropriate 
and inconsistent with the EU regulation, as well as prior 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“Court of Justice”).143 The Dutch law, however, has not been 
specifically overruled. While there are some cases before the 
Court of Justice that challenge the application and 
                                                                                                                            
140. Customs Action Regulation, supra note 4, art. 10. 
141. See id., pmbl. recital 8 (“Proceedings initiated to determine whether an 
intellectual property right has been infringed under national law will be conducted 
with reference to the criteria used to establish whether goods produced in that 
Member State infringe intellectual property rights.”). 
142. See, e.g., Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage 18 juli 2008, 311378/KG ZA 2008, 08-617 
m.nt. (Sosecal/Sisvel) (Neth.), ¶ 4.14.  
143. See, e.g., Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan & Thomas Jaeger, Policing Patents 
Worldwide? EC Border Measures against Transiting Generic Drugs under EC and WTO 
Intellectual Property Regimes, 40 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 502, (2009); 
Frederick M. Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based on Allegations of 
Patent Infringement: A Threat to International Trade, Development and Public Welfare, 1 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. J. 43 (2009). In particular, some suggest that Montex 
Holdings Ltd. v. Diesel SpA, a trademark case that precluded seizure of in-transit goods 
without evidence of likely diversion into the EU markets, suggests that there can be no 
infringement of in-transit goods without evidence of likely diversion E.g., Abbott, supra, 
at 47–48; see also Montex Holdings Ltd. v. Diesel SpA, Case C-281/05, [2006] E.C.R. I-
10,881. 
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interpretation of the EU Regulation, they do not directly 
challenge the Dutch suspension of in-transit goods based on 
patent infringement.144 There is one pending case before the 
Court of Justice that does question whether an analogous 
provision should be interpreted to avoid the legal fiction.145 The 
Court of Justice might eventually find that in-transit goods 
should not be considered to infringe copyrights, the intellectual 
property right at issue, such that perhaps in-transit infringement 
of patents would also cease to be an issue in the EU.146 However, 
even if that were to occur, the basic principle of suspending in-
transit goods on grounds of patent or trademark infringement is 
possible in the international realm under the ACTA, as 
discussed in a later section.147 
2. EU Seizures 
Although EU customs officials were permitted to suspend 
alleged patent infringements in 1999, actual suspension of 
goods did not happen for another decade. In 2008, EU customs 
officials began using their authority to detain drugs that 
allegedly infringed patent rights.148 Over a period of about 
eighteen months, almost twenty shipments were detained, with 
                                                                                                                            
144. See Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV v. Lucheng Meijing Indus. Co., Joined Cases 
C-446/09 & C-495/09, [2011] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Feb. 3, 2011). 
145. See id. ¶ 113.  
146. See id. Although the Court of Justice of the European Union (“Court of 
Justice”) has not yet ruled, the Advocate General (“AG”) has advised that the provision 
that relates to the problematic recital be interpreted as meaning that member states 
should not discount the transitory status of goods and in particular, should not apply 
the legal fiction that the good was manufactured in the transitory state. Id. Even before 
the AG opinion, some had suggested that existing Court of Justice jurisprudence 
should compel the same conclusion despite the fact that no Court of Justice case 
involved patents. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
147. See infra Part IV.B. 
148. See e.g., XAVIER SEUBA, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., FREE 
TRADE OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS: THE LIMITS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ENFORCEMENT AT THE BORDER, ISSUE PAPER NO. 27 at 1 (2010); THOMAS JAEGER ET AL, 
MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INTELL. PROP., COMPETITION & TAX L., STATEMENT OF THE MAX 
PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION AND TAX LAW ON THE 
REVIEW OF EU LEGISLATION ON CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS, RESEARCH PAPER NO. 10-08 para. 3 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1622619.  
2011] COMPETING PATENT PERSPECTIVES 43 
many delayed for months and some even destroyed.149 Most 
shipments originated from India, where they were legally made 
as unpatented generics.150 The shipments were predominantly 
destined for developing countries where the drugs were also 
considered unpatented generics.151 The drugs were most often 
suspended in the Netherlands, where courts have construed the 
EU regulation to consider in-transit goods to infringe Dutch 
patent rights based on an admitted legal fiction.152 However, 
there were also suspensions of generic goods in France and 
Germany.153 
The seized drugs treated a variety of conditions including 
HIV, heart disease, dementia, and schizophrenia.154 Some of the 
seized drugs were major profit-makers for patent owners. For 
example, Sanofi-Aventis aggressively enforces its patent on the 
heart medication it sells as Plavix,155 which is a blockbuster 
drug.156 In addition, the antipsychotic drug olanzapine, sold as 
                                                                                                                            
149. See, e.g., Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member 
State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1, at 1 (May 19, 2010) (noting 
nineteen confirmed shipments). 
150. See id. 
151. See id., Annex (noting shipments to Brazil, Columbia, Nigeria, and Peru). 
152. Id. 
153. The suspension in Germany was actually based upon an inappropriate 
assumption of trademark infringement, as discussed later in this section. However, the 
suspension in France was for a generic anti-platelet drug called clopidogrel (the 
generic form of what is sold as Plavix) from India destined for Venezuela; a shipment 
was suspended at the Paris airport in October 2009. See, e.g., Macleod’s Clopidogrel Generic 
Pills Consignment Seized at Paris: Reports, DANCE WITH SHADOWS (Nov. 3, 2009, 3:12 PM), 
http://www.dancewithshadows.com/pillscribe/macleods-clopidogrel-generic-pills-
consignment-seized-at-paris-reports/. Although the French have not historically 
interpreted the EU Regulation as considering in-transit drugs as violative of patent 
rights, this shipment was suspended nonetheless. 
154. Letter from J. van der Vlist, Mgmt. Team Member, Neth. Ministry of Fin., to 
S. Bloemen, Health Action Int’l Eur. (HAI) (May 7, 2009) [hereinafter HAI Letter 
from Netherlands], available at http://www.haiweb.org/19062009/7%20May%202009%
20Dutch%20government%20response%20to%20Freedom%20of%20Information%
20request%20(EN).pdf. 
155. See, e.g., IMS Health, Top 10 Global Products—2007, IMS HEALTH (last 
updated Feb. 26, 2008), available at http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/
imshealth/Global/Content/StaticFile/Top_Line_Data/Top10GlobalProducts.pdf 
(noting indicating that Plavix was the second most profitable drug in global sales in 
2007); Peter Loftus & Shirley S. Wang, Bristol Posts a Profit As Drugs Make Gains, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 28, 2009, at B3 (noting that Plavix brought in US$1.47 billion in fourth-
quarter sales in 2009). 
156. In the pharmaceutical industry, a blockbuster drug is one that has annual 
world wide sales exceeding US$1 million. E.g., STAN FINKELSTEIN & PETER TEMIN, 
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Zyprexa by Eli Lilly, is a global best-seller.157 Similarly, 
Rivastigmine, a dementia treatment sold under the trademark 
Exelon by Novartis, is considered a top-performing drug for 
Novartis,158 and Losartan potassium, a high blood pressure 
treatment sold by Merck under the trademark Cozaar, is a 
similarly profitable drug for Merck.159 
Many of the suspended drugs never reached their final 
destination. About half of the seized drugs were destroyed.160 
The destruction was often due to the lack of response from the 
manufacturer to a notification of the seizure; pursuant to the 
EU regulation, authorization to destroy goods is presumed if 
there is no response.161 While full details are not known about 
each case, in at least one case, the shipment was abandoned 
because the estimated cost of litigation was deemed to exceed 
the cost of the shipment.162  
                                                                                                                            
REASONABLE RX: SOLVING THE DRUG PRICE CRISIS 6 (2008); European Commission, 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Preliminary Report 17 (DG Conpetition Staff, Working 
Paper, Nov. 28, 2008). Companies substantially rely on sales of blockbuster drugs since 
they have large profit margins and also focus research and development efforts on such 
drugs. E.g., FINKELSTEIN & TEMIN, supra, at 5–6; see also European Commission, supra, 
at 33 (noting that companies rely substantially on blockbuster drugs for profits). 
157. John W. Miller & Geeta Anand, India Prepares EU Trade Complaint, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 6, 2009, http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2009-August/
014110.html. 
158. See, e.g., Financial Report, NOVARTIS INT’L AG, 7, 14, http://www.annual
reports.com/HostedData/AnnualReports/PDFArchive/nvs2009.pdf (reporting that 
global Exelon sales were over US$900 million); Daniela Sigrist, Novartis Posts 32 Percent 
Rise in 3Q Net Profit, USA TODAY (Oct. 20, 2008, 3:10 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
money/economy/2008-10-20-715205609_x.htm (naming Exelon as a top-performing 
drug contributing to net profits). 
159. See Press Release, Merck, Merck Reports Second Quarter 2008 Financial 
Results (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press_releases/
financial/2008_0721a.html (noting global sales of Merck’s antihypertensive medicines 
COZAAR (losartan potassium) and HYZAAR (losartan potassium and 
hydrochlorothiazide) were US$941 million for the second quarter of 2008). 
160. E.g., Miller & Anand, supra note 157; Daniel Pruzin, Brazil Cites Growing 
Instances of ‘Illegal’ Dutch Generic Medicine Seizures, 2009 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT 
L. DAILY (BNA) (Mar. 4, 2009). 
161. Customs Action Regulation, supra note 4, art. 11, at 12.  
162. E.g., Cipla Export Consignment Too Seized at Amsterdam, MONEYCONTROL.COM 
(Feb. 4, 2009) http://www.moneycontrol.com/ news/business/cipla-export-
consignment-too-seized-at-amsterdam-_383598-1.html. In general, the known value of 
shipments ranges from US$50,000 to US$100,000. See, e.g., Jyothi Datta, Amsterdam 
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The grounds for seizing the drugs are often confusing as 
they conflate issues, or at least loosely use the term “counterfeit” 
when referring to generic drugs. For example, in the first 
reported seizure of in-transit drugs, Sanofi-Aventis informed the 
company anticipating a shipment of generic heart medication 
(comparable to Sanofi-Aventis’ Plavix-brand drug) that the 
goods were seized on suspicion that they were “counterfeit.”163 
However, subsequent correspondence refers to the problem as 
one of patent infringement.164 In a different situation, patent 
owner Eli Lilly did not go so far as to call generic versions of its 
antipsychotic drug olanzapine counterfeit, but nonetheless 
suggested that the generic Indian versions “may not be safe or 
effective” because they were not made by Eli Lilly.165 Similarly, 
the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations (“EFPIA”), which represents pharmaceutical 
companies in Europe, stated that EU Member States have the 
right to stop products suspected of being counterfeit and that 
customs authorities play an important role in “protecting 
patients from the danger of counterfeit medicine.”166 In 
addition, an EU official was quoted as stating that “[m]any 
countries actually should be grateful to European customs, who 
most likely have saved lives and certainly in developing 
countries, because fake medicines are more spread in 
                                                                                                                            
Authorities Release Ind-Swift Exports, HINDU BUS. LINE, May 23, 2009, 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2009/05/23/stories/2009052350971500.htm 
(stating that the Ind-Swift consignment of clopidogrel was worth US$50,000). 
163. Eli Lilly Letter, supra note 8. 
164. The letter explains that infringement exists under Netherlands law because 
of case law that finds goods in transit destined for countries outside the EU to 
nonetheless be considered infringing if they would have been infringing if 
manufactured in the Netherlands—with full acknowledgment that this is a legal fiction. 
Id. 
165. Sanofi Letter 2, supra note 7. 
166. Press Release, Eur. Fed’n of Pharm. Indus. and Ass’ns, Customs Seizures of In-
Transit Medicines (Mar. 13, 2009) [hereinafter EFPIA Press Release], available at 
http://www.efpia.eu/content/default.asp?PageID=559&DocID=6574. The membership 
of the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (“EFPIA”) 
includes Eli Lilly, March, and Sanofi—all companies that have been involved with in-
transit seizures. EFPIA Membership, EFPIA, http://www.efpia.eu/Content/
Default.asp?PageID=353 (last visited Aug. 25, 2011). 
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developing countries than developed countries.”167 However, in 
no case were the suspended drugs in-fact fake.168 
Although most of the suspended drugs were held on 
grounds of alleged patent infringement, there was one instance 
where generic drugs were suspended for alleged trademark 
infringement. On May 5, 2009, a shipment of amoxicillin, the 
non-proprietary name for a generic antibiotic used to treat a 
wide range of infections, was suspended in the Frankfurt airport 
on grounds that it might infringe the trademark antibiotic sold 
as Amoxil by GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”).169 When contacted, 
GSK clarified that there was no trademark problem and the 
goods were ultimately released to their final destination in 
Vanuatu, a least-developed country.170 Although GSK did not 
initiate the suspension and in fact timely indicated that there 
were no intellectual property problems,171 the shipment was 
nonetheless delayed for four weeks—a time period that may 
have delayed effective treatment. This suspension prompted 
further calls for change.172 
There have been no seizures since Brazil and India brought 
a formal challenge to the WTO in May 2010. However, unless 
and until there is a change in the laws, there remains a threat to 
trade in generic drugs because of legal uncertainty. Even before 
the formal challenge, some Indian companies had rerouted 
                                                                                                                            
167. Fight over Generic Drug Seizure Takes Centre Stage at TRIPS Council Meeting, 13 
INT’L CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. (2009), 1–2, 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/42823/. 
168. See id. 
169. See, e.g., Khomba Singh, Row over Generic Drugs Intensifies after Seizure in 
Germany, ECON. TIMES (India), June 8, 2009; Kaitlin Mara, Drug Seizures in Frankfurt 
Spark Fears of EU-Wide Pattern, IP-WATCH (June 5, 2009), http://www.ip-watch.org/
weblog/2009/06/05/drug-seizures-in-frankfurt-spark-fears-of-eu-wide-pattern/print/. 
170. Id. 
171. Glaxo is reported to have informed German customs authorities that there 
was no trademark infringement within seven days of notification. Press Release, Health 
Action Int’l et al., Another Seizure of Generic Medicines Destined for a Developing 
Country, This Time in Frankfurt (June 5, 2009), available at http://www.haiweb.org/
19062009/5%20Jun% 202009% 20Press%20release%20Seizure%20of%20generic%
20medicines%20in%20Frankfurt.pdf. 
172. See, e.g., id. (quoting Sophie Bloemen, from Health Action International— 
Europe (“HAI”), as saying “this suggests that the detainment of legitimate generics in 
transit “is not just a Dutch issue, but rather a European problem”). 
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their global trade to avoid the EU, even though that meant 
shipping costs were twice as expensive.173 This action is likely a 
function not only of the Dutch law, but also the actions of patent 
owners. For example, in at least one case, a European patent 
owner requested an Indian manufacturer of generic drugs that 
had been suspended to sign a declaration that it would “not 
send other consignments containing products which 
infringe.”174 
3. The ACTA and Beyond 
Even if the EU regulation, or its interpretation, is modified 
to eliminate in-transit infringement of patents, the problematic 
result may be exported to other countries through an 
international agreement that the EU helped negotiate.175 In 
particular, concurrent with suspensions of in-transit drugs in 
Europe, some countries negotiated the ACTA. As will be later 
explained, the ACTA requires members to police certain types 
of infringement at its borders that may result in suspensions of 
in-transit drugs. 
B. A Case Study of Patent Perspectives 
This Section considers how the views of patents as either a 
limited privilege or uber-right may play a role in conflicts 
concerning the relevant facts of the EU seizures, as well as 
subsequent agreements, such as the ACTA. This Section focuses 
primarily on factual issues, although some information 
concerning whether the facts represent extraterritorial 
                                                                                                                            
173. E.g., Miller & Anand, supra note 157. 
174. Eli Lilly Letter, supra note 8. 
175. The EU recently proposed amendments to the regulation at issue here. 
Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Concerning Customs Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, COM (11) 285 Final (May 2011). However, the amendments do not 
prevent in transit generic drugs from being suspended for patent infringement. See 
Catherine Saez, Proposed EU Customs Regulation May Not Dispel Fear of Wrongful Drug 
Seizures, IP-WATCH (May 31, 2011), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/05/31/
proposed-eu-customs-regulation-may-not-dispel-fear-of-wrongful-drug-seizures/; Letter 
from Peter Maybarduk, Access to Meds. Program Dir., Public Citizen, to the 
Directorate-Gen. for Taxation and Customs Union, Eur. Comm’n (May 25, 2010), 
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Public%20Citizen%20comments%20
submitted%20to%20DG%20TAXUD%20on%201383.pdf. 
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applications of law or are inconsistent with TRIPS are included 
as a preview of a later discussion of the impact of perspectives on 
legal interpretations. This section is written as a case study with 
vignettes representing the privilege versus uber-right views of 
patents. While some liberties were taken to create cohesive 
statements from a variety of different documents over several 
years, each vignette should overall represent what has been 
actually stated, as clarified by the quotes in the accompanying 
footnotes. 
1. The Privilege View 
The EU is putting public health at risk by its aggressive and 
abusive implementation of its EU Regulation. Any law that 
permits seizure of in-transit generic drugs presents a serious risk 
to public health as treatment delays are not merely undesirable, 
but potentially life-threatening. Indeed, the UN Special 
Rapporteur recently expressed concern that the seizures 
jeopardize achievement of human rights norms.176 Accordingly, 
the seizures must be condemned as unacceptable and the EU 
Regulationpromptly reviewed and altered.177 
The EU Regulation creates barriers to the export of quality, 
low-cost generic drugs. Patients in the developing world are 
deprived of access to affordable life-saving drugs due to the EU 
Regulation.178 Generic drugs from India have been a “lifeline for 
                                                                                                                            
176. See Intervention by India, June 2009, supra note 5. 
177. See, e.g., Press Release, Health Action Int’l et al., Seizure of 
UNITAID/Clinton Foundation Anti-Retroviral Medicines by Dutch Customs 
Authorities “Unacceptable” (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.haiweb.org/06032009/
6%20Mar%202009%20Press%20release%20More%20generic%20medicines%
20intercepted%20in%20the%20Netherlands%20(English).pdf [hereinafter HAI, Dutch 
Seizure of Drugs] (“Oxfam International, Health Action International and Knowledge 
Ecology International condemn the unacceptable seizure of legitimate generic 
antiretroviral medicines in transit from India to Nigeria by Dutch customs officials, and 
call on the European Commission to immediately review and modify its 
regulations . . . to allow lawful trade of generic medicines.”). 
178. See Radhieka Pandeya, Dr. Reddy’s Consignment of Drugs to Brazil Seized, 
LIVEMINT.COM (Jan. 15, 2009, 12:09 AM), http://www.livemint.com/2009/01/
14220926/dr-reddy8217s-consignment-o.html (quoting MSF attorney Leena 
Menghaney, who stated that “‘[t]he fallout will be on patients’ lives in the developing 
world who will not be able to access affordable life-saving drugs from India”). 
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countries” that cannot afford patented drugs—a lifeline that is 
now in jeopardy.179 Trade in legitimate medicines is critical to 
ensuring access to medicines for millions.180 
The EU is repeatedly placing embargos on medicines at the 
behest of drug company “bullies” under a law they 
masterminded to give them authority to harass generic drug 
companies.181 The EU Regulation allows “corporate criminals”182 
to act with impunity when making frivolous intellectual property 
rights claims concerning goods.183 These claims have no legal 
basis. If the goods were intended for actual sale in any EU 
Member State, there might be grounds for patent infringement. 
However, all the seized goods were merely part of the regular 
and legitimate flow of products in transit that do not infringe 
patents.184 The fact that some suspended drugs have been 
released after protracted delay simply underscores that the 
patent allegations are baseless.185 
                                                                                                                            
179. See Miller & Anand, supra note 157 (quoting Sophie Bloemen of HAI). 
180. See Priyanka Golikeri, EU Seizes Another Generic Package, DAILY NEWS & 
ANALYSIS (Nov. 3, 2009, 2:13 PM), http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report_eu-seizes-
another-generic-package_1306411 (quoting an official from an Indian pharmaceutical 
company, who stated that “‘trade in legitimate medicines between countries is 
fundamental to ensuring access to medicines for millions’”). 
181. See Brook K. Baker, Pointing the Finger at Big Pharma—Dutch Seizure of Generic 
Medicines, PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. (Feb. 10, 2009), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/pointing-the-finger-at-big-pharma-
dutch-seizure-of-generic-medicines. 
182. See id. (“[T]oo little attention has been directed at these corporate criminals 
who are acting with impunity to thwart lawful generic competition even in countries 
where their patents and marketing rights have no effect.”). 
183. See id. (noting that the EU Regulation “gives impunity to Big Pharma to 
make frivolous claims of its ‘suspicion’ that the products ‘might’ violate intellectual 
property rights in the Netherlands”). 
184. See id. (noting that the shipment would infringe on patent-holder rights if 
intended for sale in the Netherlands but neglecting to mention any Dutch patent law 
that would consider in-transit goods an infringement); see also Michael Day, WHO Angry 
at Seizure by Dutch of HIV Drug Shipment, PHARMATIMES (Mar. 12, 2009), 
http://www.eatg.org/eatg/Global-HIV-News/Access-to-treatment/WHO-angry-at-
seizure-by-Dutch-of-HIV-drug-shipment (noting that the WHO has condemned the 
shipment’s suspension as “farcical”); UNITAID Statement on Dutch Confiscation of 
Medicines Shipment, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/resources/news/156-unitaid-
statement-on-dutch-confiscation-of-medicines-shipment.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2011) 
(stating that a seized shipment did not infringe on any form of intellectual property). 
185. See Intervention by India, June 2009, supra note 5 (stating that India takes 
“serious exception to such unsubstantiated and wild allegations [that seized drugs were 
counterfeits, fake drugs, patent violations, et cetera]. The fact that the drugs were 
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The EU repeatedly conflates generic drugs with counterfeit 
and suggests that it is somehow protecting the public against 
dangerous counterfeit drugs.186 However, the EU is confusing 
multiple issues. Counterfeit drugs are ones that improperly use 
the trademark of another; they may pose health risks if they are 
substandard drugs, but the word counterfeit by itself does not 
mean that the drug is of poor quality. 
Even if the EU were genuinely concerned about counterfeit 
trademark drugs, its procedure is seriously flawed as EU customs 
officials seem unable to distinguish legitimate generic drugs 
from counterfeit products.There was at least one shipment of 
drugs that was improperly suspended on the grounds of a 
purported counterfeit trademark.187 The supposed counterfeit 
trademark—amoxicillin—was in fact the internationally 
recognized nonproprietary (i.e., non-trademark) name of the 
drug. Notably, counterfeit trademarks should be easy to identify, 
as that is one of the reasons they have been considered 
appropriate for customs officials to police. The inability of EU 
customs officials to distinguish between a nonproprietary name 
from a counterfeit trademark—a supposed “easy” task—is not 
reassuring to generic drug manufacturers. To the contrary, this 
suggests that EU customs officials are seriously misguided in 
their enforcement attempts. 
The EU is evidencing a deep—yet wrongly held—belief that 
violation of intellectual property rights, including patent rights, 
                                                                                                                            
subsequently released are [sic] a proof that the allegations were baseless”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
186. See Kaitlin Mara, Medicines Access Again Captures Attention at WTO as Progress 
Urged in Round, IP-WATCH (Oct. 30, 2009, 12:52 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/
weblog/2009/10/30/medicines-access-again-captures-attention-at-wto-as-progress-in-
round-urged (quoting India’s statement that “[u]nderlying the drug seizures is also a 
deliberate mixing up of the issue of spurious/sub-standard drugs . . . with [intellectual 
property rights ‘IPRs’”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sanjay Suri, EU Blocking 
Medicines for the Poor, IPS, Oct. 20, 2009, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48935 
(quoting Sophie Bloemen from HAI who stated that although “‘[t]he EU has argued it 
needs to check for counterfeits as these are dangerous for public health,’ . . . 
‘counterfeits actually relate to a trademark infringement, not a patent infringement’”). 
187. See Intervention by Brazil, June 2009, supra note 5, at 2. 
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must necessarily involve potentially dangerous substances.188 
Such a linkage is not only overly simplistic, but just wrong.189 
Generic medicines neither infringe on intellectual property nor 
are dangerous.190 Generic medicines are “not substandard or 
illegal.”191 Rather, generic drugs are by definition legal drugs 
that have been properly evaluated and certified as being 
equivalent in safety and efficacy to the original brand name 
version. 
EU claims about saving lives are a transparent attempt to 
misrepresent the facts; in none of the cases of seized drugs was 
quality an issue.192 This underscores that the EU is not truly 
worried about quality; rather, their concern is in overzealous 
enforcement of EU patents.193 The EU Regulation is a thinly 
disguised trade barrier that protects the European 
pharmaceutical industry while undermining the Indian generics 
industry.194 
The EU seizures violate the concept of territoriality that is a 
“key stone in the edifice of the TRIPS Agreement” as well as a 
“widely understood and accepted principle.”195 Only the country 
of final destination should be involved in enforcing its own 
patent laws. It is “farfetched” to claim that the in-transit country 
will understand the laws of a destination country and have the 
authority to enforce them; each country should only enforce its 
                                                                                                                            
188. See Intervention by India, June 2009, supra note 5 (“It seems that it has been 
ingrained very deeply within the EC authorities that IP violative products are synonymous 
with potentially dangerous substances.”). 
189. See id. (“This clearly is an untenable logic.”). 
190. See id. (“[W]e are talking about generic medicines, which neither infringe 
IPRs nor are they ‘potentially dangerous.’”). 
191. Intervention by Brazil, June 2009, supra note 5, at 1. 
192. See id. at 2 (“This is a blatant attempt to confound the issue. . . . In none of 
the cases . . . was there any issue with the quality of the drugs.”); see also Intervention by 
India, June 2009, supra note 5. 
193. See id.  
194. See Pallavi Aiyar, No Cure in Sight for India-EU Drug Seizure Controversy, BUS. 
STANDARD, Nov. 14, 2009, at 8 (suggesting that India “maintains that European 
countries are creating trade barriers against Indian drug companies to protect the 
interests of their firms”); Miller & Anand, supra note 157 (quoting Rajeev Kher, Joint 
Secretary of Commerce in India, who stated that the country views the in-transit 
seizures “‘as an attack on the Indian generics industry’”). 
195. Intervention by India, June 2009, supra note 5 (emphasis omitted). 
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own laws.196 The EU Regulation thus constitutes an improper 
extraterritorial enforcement of patent rights.197 Moreover, such 
action simply cannot be reconciled with the Doha Declaration, 
which requires member states to promote access to medicine.198 
The EU seizure of goods, as well as its broader international 
efforts to associate generics with counterfeit medicines, go 
beyond TRIPS and negate steps that the international 
community—including the EU—has taken or promised to take 
to promote access to medicine.199 For example, the EU 
Regulation that authorizes seizures of generic goods threatens a 
global accord (recognized by the EU) that permits compulsory 
licensing of goods for export to developing countries.200 In 
                                                                                                                            
196. See id. (“[S]overeign functions of the country of destination should be 
exercised by the country itself and other countries may assist in enforcement of their 
law if requested. It may be farfetched to claim that the country of transit will have 
sound understanding of the IPR laws of country of destination or origin and will have 
the authority to enforce them during transit.”). 
197. See Intervention by Brazil, WTO General Council, IP WATCH, para. 7 (Feb. 3–4, 
2008), available at http://www.ip-watch.org/files/RemediosIntervencao-do-Brasil-
Conselho%20Geral-03%2002%202008.doc [hereinafter Intervention by Brazil, Feb. 2009] 
(“Brazil is gravely concerned with the setting of a precedent for extraterritorial 
enforcement of IP rights.”); Intervention by Brazil, June 2009, supra note 5, at 3 (“[T]he 
TRIPS Agreement does not allow the detention of goods in transit. The seizure of 
goods in transit on grounds that they may be violating IP rights in the country of transit 
violates the principle of territoriality, a keystone of the international IP system.”). 
198. See Intervention by Brazil, Feb. 2009, supra note 197, para. 8 (“Extraterritorial 
enforcement of patent rights cannot be reconciled with the terms of the Doha 
Declaration . . . .”). 
199. See, e.g., Intervention by India, WTO General Council, IP WATCH (Feb. 3, 2008), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/files/India%20Statement%20to%20General%20Council%
20Jan2009.doc [hereinafter Intervention by India, Feb. 2008] (noting that the intellectual 
property maximalist trend, including efforts to link generics with counterfeit 
medicines, circumscribes TRIPS flexibilities and is “counter to the spirit of the TRIPS 
Agreement which is a minimum standards agreement”). 
200. See, e.g., Intervention by India, June 2009, supra note 5 (“It is ironical that while 
on one hand WTO has taken steps to promote access to affordable medicines and 
remove obstacles to proper use of TRIPS flexibilities, on the other hand some Members 
seek to negate the same by seizing drug consignments in transit and creating barriers to 
legitimate trade.”); see also William New, Concern Erupts over WTO System and Medicines 
Shipments: TRIPS Talks Rekindling, IP WATCH (Feb. 3, 2009, 11:16 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2009/02/03/concern-erupts-over-wto-system-and-medicines-
shipments-trips-talks-rekindling/ (noting that the in transit suspensions in the 
Netherlands could undermine the WTO agreement to permit countries lacking 
manufacturing ability to import needed medicines from other countries under a 
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addition, the seizures are inconsistent with a recent resolution 
adopted by members of the World Health Assembly—again 
including the EU—suggesting that public health be considered 
when adopting rules that exceed the minimums required under 
TRIPS.201 Moreover, the same resolution declared a 
commitment to improving access to health products and 
overcoming access barriers; commitments that are clearly 
undermined by the EU seizures.202 
The EU seizures are not only unacceptable, but they set a 
dangerous precedent in the global arena.203 Patent holders and 
those who support them are promoting a coordinated and 
global approach toward maximizing intellectual property rights 
while simultaneously threatening the delicate balance under 
TRIPS.204 The in-transit seizures in the EU are a mere symptom 
of a much larger and more dangerous phenomenon that 
involves creating new laws to control generic drugs and unduly 
confusing low-cost, but high-quality generics with counterfeit 
medicine that is substandard.205 Such actions are inconsistent 
with the spirit of the TRIPS Agreement, which sets minimum 
                                                                                                                            
compulsory cross-licensing arrangement). The global accord that removes an obstacle 
to use of the TRIPS flexibility of compulsory license is a WTO measure that creates an 
exception to one of the usual TRIPS rules for compulsory licenses based on broad 
consensus that this was necessary. See Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 6 
(indicating a need to address the fact that countries without manufacturing capacities 
for pharmaceuticals could not effectively use compulsory licenses to promote access to 
cheaper patented drugs); Council for TRIPS, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003). The 
EU has already modified its domestic laws to effectuate this measure. See Council for 
TRIPS, Annual Review of the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health ¶ 5, IP/C/42, (Nov. 2, 2006). 
201. See NGO Letter to Chan, Feb. 2009, supra note 5, at 3 (citing WHO 
resolution WHA61.21). 
202. See Statement, Access to Medicines, WHO (Mar. 13, 2009), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/access-medicines-
20090313/en/index.html. 
203. See Intervention by Brazil, Feb. 2009, supra note 197, para. 4 (noting that the 
Dutch seizure was unacceptable and sets a dangerous precedent). 
204. See Intervention by India, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Mar. 3, 2009), 
http://keionline.org/node/309 (noting the trend “to implement the protection and 
enforcement of IPRs in a maximalist manner and thereby upset the delicate balance 
between rights of IPR holders and the public policy objectives under the TRIPS 
Agreement”). 
205. See Intervention by India, Feb. 2008, supra note 199, at 2 (arguing that seizure is 
clearly an unfounded attempt to “enlarge the definition of counterfeits” beyond its 
accepted definition under TRIPS). 
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standards,206 and have disastrous implications for access to 
medicine.207 Moreover, as the EU well knows, drug quality is 
controlled by laws directly regulating such drugs and not by 
intellectual property laws. However, the EU has shown no efforts 
to aid in promoting stronger regulatory systems in developing 
countries and instead improperly suggests that stronger 
intellectual property rights will somehow protect consumers 
from poor quality medicines. 
The negotiation of the ACTA is only the latest example of 
its improper action. While the EU was asserting that there was 
no problem with in-transit suspensions in the EU, it was 
simultaneously negotiating the ACTA, and one issue during the 
negotiation was the scope of border measures, which would 
include whether member countries could suspend in-transit 
goods for patent infringement in a manner similar to the EU 
Regulation.208 The EU never honestly addressed how the ACTA 
would impact in-transit goods in the context of addressing 
questions by those who criticized the EU Regulation and sought 
                                                                                                                            
206. See id. (noting that the actions “run counter to the spirit of the TRIPS 
Agreement which is a minimum standards agreement”); Intervention by India, June 2009, 
supra note 5 (“Enforcement of IPRs in disregard of [TRIPS] Objectives and Principles 
and efforts to enshrine new, maximalist TRIPS plus enforcement provisions in other 
multilateral forums will seriously undermine the delicate balance in the TRIPS 
Agreement . . . .”). 
207. See HAI, Dutch Seizure of Drugs, supra note 177 (quoting Sophie Bloemen 
from HAI saying that “the European Commission . . . ‘must modify the way it applies IP 
enforcement globally, because it is even demanding exactly the same provisions of IP 
enforcement in developing countries through free trade agreements. This could prove 
to be disastrous for access to medicines in their regions’”). 
208. As noted earlier, the in-transit suspensions happened in 2008–09 and the 
ACTA was simultaneously negotiated in that time frame. See, e.g., European 
Commission, THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) FACT SHEET, 
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/docs/2009/january/tradoc_142039.pdf 
(indicating that ACTA negotiations began in 2007 and were still ongoing in 2009); Ctr. 
Int’l Envtl. L., The Dangers of Including Patent Infringements in ACTA: Some Implications for 
Access to Medecines, Intellectual Property Law Quarterly, Second Quarter, 2008, available 
at http://www.ciel.org/ Publications/ IP_Update_2Q08.pdf; see also PETER MAYBARDUK, 
ACTA’S SCOPE AND ACCESS TO MEDICINE (2010), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/ACTAScopeAccessbyPublicCitizen.pdf (noting continued discussion in 
2010 of whether the ACTA should include patents within the scope of border 
measures).  
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a clear answer on the ACTA.209 In fact, the EU repeatedly 
asserted that trade in generic medicines would not be impacted 
by the ACTA even when draft provisions did not foreclose this 
possibility.210 
                                                                                                                            
209. See European Communities Statement to TRIPS Council, IPEG (June 8–9, 2009), 
http://www.ipeg.eu/blog/wp-content/uploads/EU-comments-on-use-of-BDO-against-
seized-medicines.pdf [hereinafter EC Statement, June 2009] (stating that “the EU does 
not intend to hamper trade in generic medicines” in the context of defending the EU 
regulation permitting suspension of in-transit drugs, but without mention of pending 
ACTA negotiations); Explanatory Note on the Application of Council Regulation (EC) No 
1383/2003 Concerning Customs Action against Goods Suspected of Infringing Certain 
Intellectual Property Rights and the Measures to be Taken against Goods Found to Have 
Infringed Such Rights, HUNG. INTELL. PROP. OFFICE 1, 1–4 (July 13, 2009), 
http://www.sztnh.gov.hu/hirek/kapcsolodo/Explan_note_1383_2003_EN.pdf 
[hereinafter EU Explanatory Note, July 2009] (clarifying and defending application of 
EU Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 without any mention of international issues beyond 
compliance with the Doha Public Health Declaration); EC Statement, June 2009, supra, 
at 4 (defending EU Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 and its application by customs 
officials and stating that it is “fully in line with WTO/TRIPS requirements,” but not 
mentioning the pending ACTA discussions); see also Letter from Christian Wagner-
Ahlfs, BUKO PHarma-Kampagne, et al. to Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO (Feb. 18, 
2009), http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/seizures/WTO_seizures_18feb.pdf; Letter 
from Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO, to Christian Wagner-Ahlfs, BUKO Pharma-
Kampagne, et al. (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/seizures/
dglamyresponse.pdf (acknowledging a letter from public health advocates concerning 
suspensions of generic drugs from India and asserting that the EU has “reiterated its 
commitment to the efforts being made to facilitate access to medicines,” but failing to 
address the letter’s specific concern that ACTA negotiations might challenge the goal 
of “providing medicine to all” pursuant to the Doha Declaration”). 
210. For example, in the August 2010 draft of the ACTA, the section on border 
measures indicates that it could apply to goods infringing any intellectual property 
right covered by TRIPS, which would include patents. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement: Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, art. 2.X(2) (Aug. 25, 2010) 
[hereinafter ACTA Draft, Aug. 2010], available at http://publicintelligence.net/anti-
counterfeiting-trade-agreement-acta-august-2010-draft/. Granted, this same draft 
suggested that parties “may” decide to exclude patents, but patents were definitely at 
play. Id. (stating that members may exclude rights “other than trademarks, copyrights 
and GIs;” the key intellectual property right that could be excluded is patents). 
However, despite the fact that broader measures to include patents were under 
discussion, the EU, and other countries,suggested that the ACTA would not impact 
trade in generic medicine. E.g. Press Release, Negotiation Participants, Joint-Statement 
on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), IP/10/437 (Apr. 16, 2010) 
[hereinafter Press Release, IP/10/437] (“ACTA will not address the cross-border 
transit of legitimate generic medicines”); FFII, ACTA Undermining Access to Medicines (E-
4292/2010), FFII ACTA BLOG (Oct. 22, 2010), http://acta.ffii.org/?p=131 (“The 
Commission can assure the Honourable Members that there are no provisions in the 
Anti Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) text being currently negotiated that 
could directly or indirectly affect the legitimate trade in generic medicines.”); James 
Love, Part 2: Notes on the August 25, 2010 Version of the ACTA Consolidated Text, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Sept. 8, 2010, 1:50 PM), http://www.keionline.org/
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2. The Uber-Right View 
There has been great confusion and many overstatements 
made concerning a few shipments of drugs that were 
temporarily detained.211 There is a critical need to put these 
limited situations into their proper perspective rather than have 
them continue to be misconstrued.212 
The EU has been improperly and incorrectly criticized by 
overly zealous healthcare advocates and misguided news 
reporters as “seizing” drugs. The EU does not seize goods.213 
Rather, small shipments of goods are merely temporarily 
detained. It is incorrect and unfair to characterize the EU as 
seizing generic drugs when it is only temporarily detaining them 
for further investigation. 
In addition, the number of shipments that have been 
detained is miniscule compared to the number of counterfeit 
drugs that have been seized;214 the detained generic drugs are 
likely only a “nano-percentage” of medicine passing through the 
EU.215 Moreover, most of the detained drugs are not essential 
ones, so claims that the detainments created life-threatening 
                                                                                                                            
node/937 (noting that only Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have argued against 
including patents in border measures while the EU, among others, favor permitting 
countries to decide for themselves what types of IP rights to include). 
211. See EFPIA Press Release, supra note 166 (acknowledging “a certain amount of 
media coverage” concerning detained in-transit drugs). 
212. See id. (stressing that “[i]t is important that these events are not 
misconstrued”). 
213. See Intervention by the European Communities, WTO General Council, IP WATCH, 
¶ 4 (Feb. 3, 2009), available at http://www.ip-watch.org/files/WTO_GENERAL_
COUNCIL.doc [hereinafter Intervention by EC, Feb. 2009]. In an official statement to 
the WTO, the EU stated that “Dutch authorities temporarily detained (which does not 
mean seize, confiscate or destroy) a small shipment of drugs” in a Dutch airport and 
underscored that this was consistent with TRIPS. See id. 
214. See, e.g., EFPIA Press Release, supra note 166 (characterizing the number of 
detentions as “minuscule relative to the massive flow of medicines . . . transiting 
through the EU” while noting that the number of “counterfeit pharmaceutical items” 
seized numbers over thirty-four million). 
215.  S e e  Catherine Saez, WTO Forum: Bypassing International Agreements May 
Hamper Medicines Access, IP WATCH (Oct. 11, 2009), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
2009/10/11/wto-forum-bypassing-international-agreements-may-hamper-medicines-
access/ (quoting Luc Devigne of the European Commission trade directorate). 
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delays to treatment are simply unwarranted.216 The detained 
drugs include treatments for dementia and schizophrenia, 
which are not life-threatening conditions. In addition, not all 
treatments are for life-threatening illnesses—a substantial 
number are for lifestyle conditions.217 Although some drugs 
were for heart treatments, unpatented and affordable 
alternatives existed. For example, aspirin has been used as a 
substitute for the heart drug sold as Plavix by its patent owner. 
Objections to the temporary delays are an “over-
exploitation” of limited instances.218 If there were an actual 
problem with the EU Regulation permitting suspensions, all EU 
Member States would have continuously stopped medicines 
since the Regulation was enacted. To the contrary, goods have 
only been detained in a handful of countries that elected to 
consider in-transit goods as violating patent laws.219 Moreover, 
the few instances all occurred a number of years ago, such that 
they are no longer relevant.220 This is especially true since 
European patent owners have clarified that although they 
recognize they have the legal authority to stop goods in some 
EU countries, it is not their policy or practice to detain 
legitimate generic drugs intended for shipment to customers in 
developing countries.221 
                                                                                                                            
216. Although there were two instances of HIV treatments being temporarily 
detained in 2008, they comprised a mere eleven percent of all goods detained in the 
EU. See HAI Letter from Netherlands, supra note 154, Annex 1 (noting that two out of 
seventeen drugs were AIDS inhibitors). Moreover, one of the HIV shipments was 
destined for Brazil, which has its own generic drug industry such that it could have 
easily made the desired drug. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, Brazil Cites Growing Instances of 
‘Illegal’ Dutch Generic Medicine Seizures, 2009 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY 
(BNA), Mar. 4, 2009, available at 2009 WL 524673.  
217. In 2008, there were five life-style drugs seized out of a total of seventeen 
suspended shipments; in other words, twenty nine percent were for life style 
conditions. HAI Letter from Netherlands, supra note 154, Annex 1. 
218. See, e.g., Jonathan Lynn, Developing States Attack EU on Generic Drug Seizure, 
REUTERS, Feb. 4, 2009, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-
37821420090203 (noting that EU ambassador Eckart Guth warned WTO members not 
to blow the Dutch seizure case out of proportion). 
219. See EU Explanatory Note, July 2009, supra note 209 (noting that in several 
member states, patent rights do not extend to goods in transit). 
220. See Saez, supra note 215 (mentioning that Luc Devigne of the European 
Commission trade directorate noted that there were only a few cases of detention in 
2008, creating “much noise about nothing”). 
221. See EFPIA Press Release, supra note 166 (“[I]t is neither the policy nor 
practice of [EFPIA] members to encourage Member States to use the powers of 
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Indian companies and organizations have loudly protested 
detention of drugs from India, yet failed to note their own 
complicity in any unnecessary delay of drugs to developing 
countries. In at least one case after a temporarily detained 
shipment was released, the Indian company returned the 
shipment to India rather than continuing it on the original 
route.222 In other cases, Indian companies have abandoned their 
shipments after those shipments have been released.223 
Even some of the examples that advocates put forth as 
being illustrative of a problem suggest otherwise. For example, 
public health advocates strongly protested the temporary 
detention by German customs of a shipment of antibiotics from 
India destined for Vanuatu.224 However, the shipment was 
detained for suspected infringement of trademark rights, so this 
event has no bearing on the issue of trade in generic drugs 
based on patent rights.225 Moreover, once customs received 
information that there was no trademark infringement, the 
goods were promptly released and reached their final 
destination.226 
The EU has an interest in safeguarding the health of its 
own citizens, as well as all the citizens of the world. Counterfeit 
drugs pose serious risks to health and constitute a major 
problem. Customs officials are acting properly when they detain 
drugs that may be counterfeit.227 The EU has no intent to 
                                                                                                                            
detention available to them to prevent the flow of legitimate generic products from 
manufacturer to customer outside the EU. This applies even where goods transit 
through EU countries where intellectual property legislation could be applied.”). 
222. See Intervention by EC, Feb. 2009, supra note 213 (indicating that the owner of 
the released generic drug returned the shipment of the hypertension drug losartan 
potassium to India rather than continuing on to Brazil). 
223. See, e.g., id.; Cipla Export Consignment Too Seized at Amsterdam, supra note 162 
(noting that Cipla abandoned a shipment that was suspended while in transit because 
litigation costs were considered “disproportionate to the value of the consignment”).  
224. See, e.g., Aiyar, supra note 194. 
225. See EC Statement, June 2009, supra note 209, at 2 (“This shipment was 
suspected to infringe a trademark, not a patent. Therefore, it did not involve the issue 
of generics, which is a patent matter in the present context.”). 
226. See id. (characterizing the issue as “solved quite swiftly” since the shipment 
was initially detained on May 5 and released by May 28). 
227. See id. (suggesting that customs officials act within their authority to control 
goods in transit to address “global trade in counterfeit products”).  
2011] COMPETING PATENT PERSPECTIVES 59 
hamper legitimate trade in generic drugs, and its laws do not 
have this effect.228 The EU supports the goal of promoting low-
cost drugs to developing countries.229 However, counterfeit 
drugs are not beneficial to anyone. EU customs authorities play 
an important role in addressing the global trade in counterfeit 
products, especially fake medicines whose effects 
disproportionately impact developing countries.230 In fact, fake 
medicines are often shipped to developing countries through 
Europe and forty percent of the seventy-six million counterfeit 
and pirated goods stopped in the EU in a single year were in-
transit goods.231 
Accordingly, EU customs officials have played an important 
role in protecting consumers from dangerous counterfeit 
medicines such that consumers should be grateful to the EU for 
its laws and policies.232 Contrary to repeated allegations, the EU 
is not confused concerning the distinction between generic 
medicines and fake medicines.233 Although generics may be 
distinct from fakes, “EU customs probably saved lives around the 
world by stopping fakes” pursuant to the EU Regulation.234 
The EU Regulation does not constitute extraterritorial 
enforcement of patent rights—and all claims to the contrary are 
                                                                                                                            
228. See, e.g., Intervention by EC, Feb. 2009, supra note 213. 
229. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Access to Medicines, C 175 E/591. 
230. See EC Statement, June 2009, supra note 209, at 2 (noting that “it is important 
to continue to allow the Customs Authorities to control goods in transit and ensure 
that measures can be taken against global trade in counterfeit products, and in 
particular fake medicines whose effects mainly hit developing countries”); see also id. 
(“EU customs statistics for 2007 have revealed a significant increase—compared to 
2006—in trade of fake medicines (+51%). Although customs controls of this kind of 
goods are often difficult, their role is crucial to prevent the flow of fake medicines in 
transit from reaching the populations of EU and other countries, in particular 
developing countries.”). 
231. See id. (“[M]any dangerous goods, such as fake medicines, are shipped to 
developing countries, often via European ports and airports. In 2007, out of seventy-six 
million counterfeit and pirated goods stopped by the European customs, 40 percent 
were goods in transit.”). 
232. See, e.g., EFPIA Press Release, supra note 166. 
233. See EC Statement, June 2009, supra note 209, at 2–3 (“[T]o respond to what has 
been said I want to insist that we do not make any confusion between generic 
medicines, which are legitimate quality products, and fake medicines, which are too 
often sub-standard products aiming at confusing the consumer about its quality.”). 
234. Saez, supra note 215 (quoting Luc Devigne of the European Commission 
trade directorate). 
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erroneous.235 Any goods seized must be in violation of domestic 
laws.236 In addition, the EU Regulation provides procedures to 
protect against overzealous enforcement. EU customs officials 
do not make any final decision on whether goods infringe 
intellectual property rights.237 Customs officials merely detain 
goods if there is a suspicion of infringement of an intellectual 
property right, and it is up to the right holder to pursue the 
matter in national courts.238 Moreover, if goods are found to be 
improperly detained, compensation is provided.239 These 
procedures are fully in compliance with TRIPS. TRIPS permits 
border measures to cover patent infringements, including in-
transit infringement.240 In addition, border enforcement by 
customs is expressly contemplated by both the WTO and the 
World Customs Organization.241 Although the EU believes that 
its actions have always been consistent with domestic and 
international laws, it has nonetheless clarified that customs 
authorities should avoid actions that would delay or 
unnecessarily disrupt legitimate trade in generic drugs.242 
The EU remains committed to combating counterfeit drugs 
that pose deadly dangers to consumers and especially consumers 
in developing countries. The EU’s commitment is reflected in its 
leading role in establishing a new international framework 
under the ACTA to “combat more effectively the proliferation of 
counterfeit and pirated goods” that not only undermine 
                                                                                                                            
235. EC Statement, June 2009, supra note 209, at 4 (noting that “regarding the 
principle of territoriality let me reassure you that the EU Customs Regulation has no 
extra-territorial effect”). 
236. See EC Statement, June 2009, supra note 209, at 3 (noting that the final 
decision of whether goods suspended by customs constitute infringement is decided 
under national laws). 
237. See id. 
238. See id. 
239. See id. 
240. See id. (“TRIPS foresees that border enforcement measures may apply not 
only to imports of goods infringing any IPR, including patents, but also to goods 
introduced into the customs territory or leaving that territory, including transit.”). 
241. See id. 
242. See EU Explanatory Note, July 2009, supra note 209, at 2 (noting that 
“[c]ustoms [a]uthorities . . . are invited to pay particular attention when controlling 
pharmaceutical products in transit in order to avoid actions that would delay or cause 
unnecessary disruption of legitimate trade in generic drugs.”). 
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legitimate trade but also pose serious health risks.243 Trade in 
illegitimate goods is not only inconsistent with legitimate trade, 
but may also contribute to organized crime and increased 
numbers of dangerous fake products.244 The ACTA will not 
interfere with fundamental rights and liberties.245 In particular, 
the ACTA is consistent with TRIPS and the Doha Declaration, 
but it will not hinder global trade in legitimate generic drugs 
since patents are not covered in the section on border 
measures.246 
3. Reflections on the Perspectives 
As the vignettes above illustrate, different perspectives on 
patents can lead to dramatically different portrayals of the same 
facts. Just as citizens of a Presidential debate may come to 
different conclusions concerning whose candidate “won” after 
watching the same debate, so too advocates on different “sides” 
of the in-transit trade in drugs have come to differing 
conclusions concerning recent events. This section aims to recap 
how different views of the same facts are consistent with social 
science evidence concerning the operation and power of 
schemas. 
The vignettes repeatedly show that the same information 
may be viewed differently by both sides. For example, to the 
privilege view, all suspended drugs are a problem. This is 
consistent with a broad privilege view that wants to modify 
patent rights to accommodate access to any medication. 
However, those with an uber-right view are less inclined to find a 
problem when the drugs are for “lifestyle conditions.” As noted 
earlier, the uber-right does not believe that patent rights should 
                                                                                                                            
243. See, e.g., Press Release, European Union, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) Moves Forward, No. 25/09 (June 12, 2009) 
http://www.eurunion.org/eu/2009-News-Rrleases/EU/NR-25/09-ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING-TRADE-AGREEMENT-ACTA-MOVES-FORWARD.html (“Trade 
in these illegitimate goods undermines legitimate trade and the growth of the world 
economy, and in some cases, may contribute to funding organized crime and exposing 
American consumers to dangerous fake products.”). 
244. Id. 
245. Press Release, IP/10/437, supra note 210 (“ACTA will not interfere with a 
signatory’s ability to respect its citizens’ fundamental rights nad liberties.”) 
246. See, e.g., id. (“ACTA will not address the cross-border transit of legitimate 
generic medicines.”). 
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ever be altered to promote access to affordable medicine at all. 
The only situation in which the uber-right has acknowledged 
that patent rights might be modified is in the case of an 
epidemic involving an infectious disease; drugs for lifestyle 
conditions would be the exact opposite situation.247 That is still, 
however, a limited situation. Accordingly, the different views of 
the impact of the suspended drugs are consistent with the 
patent perspectives. 
In addition, the vignettes are consistent with social science 
evidence that individuals tend to ignore facts inconsistent with 
schemas and selectively use facts that support their schema. For 
example, the most extreme privilege view of patents ignores the 
existence of Dutch law that permits suspensions of in-transit 
drugs for patent infringement.248 In addition to ignoring the 
Dutch law that conflicts with the privilege schema, selected facts 
are also relied upon to support the privilege view conception of 
what the Dutch law should be. For example, since some 
suspended drugs have been released, the privilege view 
considers these releases to prove that there were no viable legal 
claims regarding in-transit drugs.249 However, release of the 
                                                                                                                            
247. See, e.g., Roger Bate, Editorial, Thailand’s Patent Attack, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 13, 
2007, http://www.nysun.com/opinion/thailands-patent-attack/48499 (asserting that 
heart disease and leukemia are not epidemics, such that Thailand’s compulsory license 
was not justified). 
248. See supra notes 103–13 and accompanying text (describing the privilege view 
of patents); supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text (showing that Dutch law finds 
that in-transit products can interfere with Dutch patents). However, not all groups with 
similar interests will necessarily share the same schema or be similarly impacted by the 
same schema. For example, the European Generic Medicines Association, which 
generally promotes generic drugs, did not make the mistake of some with a privilege 
view in completely dismissing relevant law. Rather, it stated that “the EU is entitled 
under TRIPS to detain products under alleged patent infringement,” although it 
nonetheless urged caution to avoid public health risk. See Letter from Greg Perry, Dir. 
Gen. of Eur. Generic Meds. Ass’n, to Mr. László Kovács, Eur. Comm’r for Taxation & 
Customs Union (Feb. 20, 2009), available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-
content/uploads/2009/03/rotterdam-seizure-letter-to-customs-commissioner-09.pdf. 
249. Interestingly, although there is a decision from the Court of Justice of the 
European Union that suggests trademark rights do not encompass in-transit goods, the 
most extreme privilege view does not consider this since it may be easier to simply 
ignore the undesirable Dutch law rather than to acknowledge its existence and 
advocate for an extension from an analogous area of law. However, scholars who may 
have a privilege view may conclusively determine that the Dutch law is inconsistent with 
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goods does not mean that there are no rights that are violated—
they may be released despite legal authority to suspend them. 
This is especially true if there is public pressure and controversy. 
Moreover, the lack of acknowledgement of the Dutch law 
may reveal an additional nuance to the patents as privilege 
schema. Some additional nuance is probably expectable since 
the basic privilege view of patents focuses only on exceptions to 
patent rights within a single country. However, the issue with in-
transit suspensions is that countries have an interest in the scope 
of patent rights beyond their borders; for example, India does 
not want Dutch patent law to suspend drugs made in India 
destined for a third country. The privilege view of in-transit 
drugs appears to be that a drug made as a generic must 
necessarily continue to be generic in global trade—at least when 
it is destined for a market that would similarly consider the drug 
generic. This conclusion would be consistent with the general 
privilege view that patents should be limited to permit access to 
affordable medicine. At the same time, it is an expansion on that 
basic principle to suggest that global patent rights should be 
interpreted to enable trade in generic drugs. Accordingly, as 
noted in the vignettes, some have asserted that a drug not sold 
in the Netherlands cannot violate patent law without regard for 
the actual Dutch law that would hold otherwise. Although this 
view deviates from the Dutch law, it is consistent with the 
complementary schema that patent laws must be construed to 
promote global trade in drugs that are generic where made and 
at their final destination. 
The vignettes also suggest an additional schema to 
complement the traditional uber-right schema concerning 
patents. As discussed above, the uber-right traditionally focuses 
on promoting patent rights in the name of innovation while 
suggesting that public health issues are beyond the patent 
system. However, in discussions concerning in-transit drugs, the 
                                                                                                                            
law of the Court of Justice, even though there is no specific case on in-transit patents. 
See, e.g., Ruse-Khan & Jaeger, supra note 143, at 518–19 (although admitting that the 
Court of Justice has not specifically ruled in this area, concluding that there is no 
reason to assume analogous case law “should not be applicable to patents”); see also 
SEUBA, supra note 148, at 18. (suggesting that the Dutch law “contravenes” Court of 
Justice jurisprudence). This is admittedly a much smaller deviation from ignoring the 
Dutch law entirely. 
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uber-right view emphasizes the importance of policing 
counterfeit drugs that are suspected to be unsafe. Another 
complementary schema to the traditional uber-right narrative 
may be that the only truly safe and effective drugs are those 
made by the original patent owner, regardless of whether a 
national regulatory agency has found a generic to be 
bioequivalent.250 
These vignettes are also consistent with the phenomenon of 
naïve realism.251 Each side assumes that the other—and only the 
other—is biased. For example, those with a privilege view 
assume that the EU is acting at the behest of “corporate 
criminals” whereas those with an uber-right view assert that 
public health advocates are over-stating the facts by focusing on 
a “nanopercentage” of drugs. These views are not only 
consistent with naïve realism but also with other social science 
evidence suggesting that divergent views on the same socially-
charged topic may cause increasing polarization.252 This has 
important implications not only for the issues concerning in-
transit suspensions of generic drugs, but for the broader topic of 
how to address access to medicine when there are clearly 
polarized views. 
IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
This Part explains the legal framework that applies to 
whether countries can or must police in-transit goods for 
infringing patent or trademark rights. In particular, this Part 
explains the legal framework under both TRIPS and the ACTA. 
This Part provides an important backdrop to understanding and 
                                                                                                                            
250. See, for example, Eli Lilly Letter, supra note 8, in which Eli Lilly’s attorney 
contacted a generic Indian manufacturer whose tablets had been suspended by Dutch 
customs authorities for violating Eli Lilly’s patent, stating that “the [t]ablets are not 
genuine Eli Lilly products and they have not been produced by Eli Lilly or any of its 
licensees worldwide. As such, the [t]ablets may not be safe or effective.” 
251. See supra, Part II.A.3. 
252. See Pronin, supra note 89, at 41; see also Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal 
State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 130–42 (2007) (showing that when individuals perceive 
others to be the only group distorting facts, this breeds resentment and distrust, which 
leads to further entrenchment regarding a variety of controversial topics, such as 
sodomy, guns, smoking, nuclear energy, and global warming). 
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evaluating the extent to which patent perspectives diverge from 
the proper legal interpretation, as further explained in Part V. 
A. TRIPS 
This Section first explains the basic requirements and then 
considers whether members can properly exceed these 
minimum requirements by considering in-transit goods to 
infringe patent rights while temporarily in a country. As 
explained below, although members can generally exceed the 
minimum requirements of TRIPS, they can only do so to the 
extent that would not “contravene” another provision of TRIPS. 
1. TRIPS Border Measures—Articles 51 and 52 
The fundamental provision under TRIPS concerning 
border measures is Article 51. This provision states as follows: 
Members shall, in conformity with the provisions set out 
below, adopt procedures to enable a right holder, who has 
valid grounds for suspecting that the importation of 
counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright goods may take 
place, to lodge an application in writing with competent 
authorities, administrative or judicial, for the suspension by 
the customs authorities of the release into free circulation of 
such goods. Members may enable such an application to be 
made in respect of goods which involve other infringements 
of intellectual property rights, provided that the 
requirements of this Section are met. Members may also 
provide for corresponding procedures concerning the 
suspension by the customs authorities of the release of 
infringing goods destined for exportation from their 
territories.253 
In essence, Article 51 only requires member states to 
suspend goods intended to be imported into a country for free 
circulation if they are counterfeit, trademark, or pirated 
copyrighted goods. However, pursuant to the second sentence, 
members may also suspend imported goods that violate other 
intellectual property rights, such as patents and non-counterfeit 
                                                                                                                            
253. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 51 (citations omitted). 
66 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1 
 
trademarks.254 Moreover, although not required, members may 
also suspend goods in transit. In particular, a footnote to Article 
51 states that “there shall be no obligation to apply such 
procedures . . . to goods in transit.”255 In the context of a 
minimum obligation treaty such as TRIPS, the lack of an 
obligation does not mean that exceeding minimum obligations 
is prohibited. To the contrary, this clarifying footnote seems to 
suggest that applying suspensive procedures to in-transit goods is 
expressly contemplated.256 
However, Article 51 alone does not define which in-transit 
goods member states can police. After all, Article 51 only 
permits customs authorities to act “in conformity with the 
provisions set out below,” which refers to the related TRIPS 
provisions, such as Article 52. Article 52 is of critical importance 
because it refers to the relevant proof to establish infringement. 
Article 52 states: “Any right holder initiating the procedures 
under Article 51 shall be required to provide adequate evidence 
to satisfy the competent authorities that, under the laws of the 
country of importation, there is prima facie an infringement of 
the right holder’s intellectual property right . . . .”257 
The critical question with respect to in-transit goods is what 
constitutes infringement “under the laws of the country of 
importation.” Although the Article 51 footnote clarifies that in-
transit goods may be suspended, that footnote is of no assistance 
to evaluate which country’s laws should apply in assessing 
whether infringement has occurred. This is a critical issue for 
global trade in generic goods because a drug may be considered 
generic at the points of origin and destination, but not where it 
                                                                                                                            
254. See id. (stating explicitly that members may apply the same procedures to 
“goods which involve other infringements of intellectual property rights”).  
255. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 51 n.13 (“It is understood that there shall be no 
obligation to apply such procedures to imports of goods put on the market in another 
country by or with the consent of the right holder, or to goods in transit.”). 
256. While one commentator has argued that in-transit goods should not be 
within the scope of Article 51 because such goods are not generally “released” by 
customs, see SEUBA, supra note 148, at 13–14, a coherent reading of the entirety of 
Article 51, including the clarifying footnote, suggests that TRIPS intended to permit 
such action whether or not customs officials formally “release” goods. 
257. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 52. 
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is in transit. This was true for each of the drug shipments 
suspended in the Netherlands—although patent owners had 
rights in the Netherlands, there were no patent rights in the 
country of origin (India) or final destination (mostly South 
American countries). Accordingly, the key question is whether 
“country of importation” should refer to the final destination—
in which case there would be no infringement—or whether it 
should refer to an in-transit country. 
According to traditional tools of treaty interpretation, the 
proper starting place for interpretation is with the ordinary 
meaning of terms.258 In this case, the issue is the ordinary 
meaning of the phrase “law of the country of importation.” In 
particular, the issue is what constitutes “importation.” This word 
is broad enough to include both goods that are imported 
permanently for sale as well as in-transit goods.259 Indeed, some 
countries have occasionally interpreted in-transit goods—that 
are not sold in transit—to be imports that violate domestic 
intellectual property laws.260 
                                                                                                                            
258. See Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose.”). 
259. See Import, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/import?region= us#m_en_ us1257355.015 (last visted Sept. 7, 2011) (defining 
the word import as to “bring (goods or services) into a country from abroad”); BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 647 (9th ed. 2009) (defining import as to bring merchandise from a 
foreign source, without specifically requiring a sale). 
260. For example, in Gramophone Co. of India v. Pandey, the Indian Court found 
that the right of a copyright owner to exclude imports included the case of an import 
within Indian territory en route to Nepal. See Gramophone Co. of India v. Pandey, 
(1984) 2 S.C.C. 534, ¶ 32 (India). In addition, in a trademark case, a US court 
concluded that merchandise was adequately imported for the purpose of applying 
trademark laws banning trafficking in counterfeit goods, even though the merchandise 
was not intended to enter for free-circulation; the goods were considered to have been 
imported into the United States even though duties were not assessed or paid. See 
United States v. Watches, Watch Parts, Calculators & Misc. Parts, 692 F. Supp. 1317, 
1321, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 1988). In addition, the World Customs Organization’s (“WCO”) 
model legislation recommends that customs officials take action against goods in 
transit. See WCO, MODEL PROVISIONS FOR NATIONAL LEGISLATION TO IMPLEMENT FAIR 
AND EFFECTIVE BORDER MEASURES CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS art. 1(1) (2007) (“A rights 
holder may submit applications to Customs, in accordance with the procedures and 
under the conditions set out in this law, for the suspension of the customs clearance 
and the detention of imported goods, goods destined for exportation and goods in transit.” 
(emphasis added)); see also WCO, PROVISIONAL STANDARDS EMPLOYED BY CUSTOMS FOR 
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However, the ordinary meaning of terms must also be 
considered in light of the broader interpretive TRIPS context. 
The TRIPS provision on enforcement of intellectual 
property rights in general provides some context that might 
suggest that “country of importation” should mean the country 
of final destination. In particular, Article 41 requires that 
enforcement of intellectual property rights should not be a 
barrier to “legitimate trade.”261 Arguably, if global trade in 
generic drugs constituted “legitimate trade,” then “country of 
importation” should be interpreted to prevent border measures 
from disrupting such legitimate trade. While those sympathetic 
to global trade in generic drugs may consider this argument 
intuitive and obvious, it is not the only possibility. After all, this 
would depend on the meaning of “legitimate trade,” which is 
again an important, yet undefined term. In addition, intellectual 
property rights generally inhibit trade, so it is unclear how to 
interpret this term.262 Moreover, if countries may only suspend 
in-transit goods that infringe at the point of final destination, 
this would seem at odds with the traditional territorial limits of 
patent protection since the in-transit country would be 
enforcing foreign law. 
There is another part of the TRIPS context that may also 
lend support to interpreting “country of importation” as the 
final destination. The TRIPS Council has created a mechanism 
permitting drugs to be made under a compulsory license in one 
country for export to a country unable to make its own low-cost 
generic drugs.263 Arguably, this mechanism cannot be effective if 
drugs made for export never reach the final destination because 
of in-transit infringement. Accordingly, the successful use of this 
                                                                                                                            
UNIFORM RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT (SECURE) ¶ 10 (2007) (recommending customs 
enforcement action against any goods under custom supervision, which would include 
transshipment, as well as free zones). 
261. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 41. 
262. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to 
International Trade?: ACTA Border Measures and Goods in Transit, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
645, 696–97 (2011). 
263. See Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, ¶ 2, 
WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003). 
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mechanism could suggest that “country of importation” should 
be interpreted as the country of final destination. However, this 
mechanism technically only applies to a very narrow subset of 
global trade in generic drugs; thus far, there has only been a 
single time this has happened.264 An important interpretive 
question is whether the existence of this TRIPS mechanism 
should mean that “country of importation” under Article 52 
should be interpreted as the country of final destination only for 
trade initiated under this mechanism, or under all cases. If 
applied to all cases, customs officials would once again be 
applying the laws of other countries; this application extends 
beyond the traditional norms of territoriality inherent in patent 
rights. 
Another part of the broader interpretive context that could 
be consulted is the Doha Public Health Declaration 
(“Declaration”).265 Although the Declaration does not address 
in-transit goods, it does suggest that public health interests are 
important to countries. There may be a tendency to assume that 
this Declaration necessarily weighs in favor of interpreting 
“country of importation” to mean the final destination so that 
public health is promoted. However, the Declaration could be 
read differently. In particular, the Declaration generally 
supports the rights of countries to make their own decisions 
concerning the scope of intellectual property rights at their 
borders; most of the provisions concern the sovereign ability of 
countries to decide how to apply exceptions to patent rights.266 
None of the specific provisions of the Declaration discuss the 
basic scope of patent rights or potential limits to patent rights. 
Importantly, nothing in the Declaration suggests that a nation 
such as India should be able to decide how a nation such as the 
Netherlands defines the scope of its patent rights. Any such 
                                                                                                                            
264. See Catherine Saez, Patentable Subject Matter, IP Waiver for Health Discussed at 
WTO, IP WATCH (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/03/02/
patentable-subject-matter-ip-waiver-for-health-discussed-at-wto/ (noting that delegations 
have expressed concern that the mechanism has only ever been used once since 2003 
and that when it was used it took about three years for a Canadian generic 
manufacturer to deliver drugs effectively to Rwanda). 
265. See generally Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 1.  
266. See Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 5(b)–(d) (clarifying the 
ability of nations to decide the basis for issuing compulsory licenses, as well as whether 
to permit international exhaustion of intellectual property rights). 
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suggestion is inconsistent with the territorial limits of patent 
rights. 
As noted above, TRIPS Articles 51 and 52 do not clearly 
explain when a nation can suspend in-transit goods at its 
borders. Under Article 51 of TRIPS, it seems that nations can 
enact laws that consider in-transit goods to infringe patent and 
non-counterfeit trademarks. However, what constitutes 
infringement under Article 52 is far from clear; infringement 
could be based on either infringement in the in-transit country 
or in the country of final destination. 
2. TRIPS Ceiling?—Article 1 
According to Article 1 of TRIPS, member states may exceed 
the minimum standards in TRIPS but only to the extent that 
other “provisions” of TRIPS are not “contravene[ed].”267 In 
other words, even if Articles 51 and 52 may suggest that nations 
can suspend in-transit goods for patent infringement, Article 1 
may provide an independent basis to preclude such action—if 
other provisions are contravened. 
An initial inquiry must be what it means to “contravene” a 
“provision” of TRIPS. As with many other critical terms under 
TRIPS, neither term is defined. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines contravene as something that is “counter to” or “in 
conflict with.”268 Although these definitions do not clearly 
resolve what it means to “contravene,” when they are considered 
together with the ordinary definition of a “provision,” things are 
a bit clearer. The Oxford Dictionary definition of “provision” 
includes “a condition or requirement in a legal document.”269 
Given that a treaty, such as TRIPS, is a legal document, a 
“condition or requirement” would suggest some type of 
obligatory part of TRIPS. In addition, given that the customary 
interpretation includes the preamble and objects and purposes 
as the appropriate context, it would seem redundant to also 
                                                                                                                            
267. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1. 
268. Contravene, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 847 (2d ed. 1989). 
269. See Provision, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/provision?region=us (last visited Sept. 4, 2011). 
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include them in the definition of “provisions” of TRIPS. Since 
general principles of treaty interpretation require favoring 
interpretations that give meaning to all provisions and avoiding 
redundancy, the phrase “other provisions” should refer to other 
substantive articles of TRIPS that provide affirmative 
requirements on member states.270 Accordingly, to “contravene” 
a provision of TRIPS should refer to actions that are inconsistent 
with affirmative obligations under TRIPS rather than actions 
that are inconsistent with general principles and policies. 
Importantly, although the Doha Public Health Declaration 
contains some positive statements concerning the importance of 
public health, it does not contain a clear affirmative obligation 
that can be expressly violated. 
There are affirmative obligations under TRIPS that could 
be contravened. In fact, two aspects of TRIPS discussed earlier as 
possibly supporting an interpretation of “country of 
importation” to mean the country of final destination could 
alternatively be TRIPS provisions that would be contravened. In 
particular, Article 41 of TRIPS, which requires that enforcement 
of intellectual property rights not be a barrier to “legitimate 
trade,” as well as the TRIPS Council mechanism for providing 
generic drugs to countries, could both be considered TRIPS 
provisions that might be contravened if member states exceeded 
the minimum TRIPS border measures.271 In particular, although 
these provisions did not clearly determine how to define 
“country of importation,” when these provisions are considered 
in light of the Article 1 prohibition against contravening 
provisions of TRIPS they may suggest that member states should 
not be permitted to consider in-transit goods to infringe. In 
other words, although the TRIPS border measures arguably 
permit countries to suspend in-transit goods for infringing 
patent rights, which could be interpreted to mean patent rights 
of the in-transit country, Article 1 may nonetheless suggest that 
this is impermissible. 
                                                                                                                            
270. In addition, even if it were not redundant to consider such provisions, it 
would be difficult to “contravene” general principles and policies since such principles 
under TRIPS often assert competing principles that cannot be simultaneously promoted. 
See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 7–8. Also, these provisions are couched as things that 
should be promoted, which makes them more difficult to contravene. 
271. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 41; Decision of the General Council of 30 August 
2003, supra note 263, ¶¶ 4–5. 
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Although this application of Article 1 of TRIPS would 
provide a powerful limit to exceeding the minimum standards of 
TRIPS, as well as an important resolution of the otherwise 
ambiguous interpretation of the border measures, there is still 
some ambiguity. Although Article 41 and the TRIPS Council 
mechanism both easily qualify as “provisions” that can be 
contravened, there are still some interpretive difficulties. As 
noted earlier, it is not clear that trade in drugs that are generic 
at point of origin and destination always constitute “legitimate 
trade.” The TRIPS Council mechanism suggests that at least in 
one case, where goods are made under compulsory license for 
export, such drugs are legitimate. 
B. The ACTA 
This Section explains the relevant ACTA provisions 
concerning policing of intellectual property infringement to 
provide a foundation for later analysis of how the ACTA has 
been interpreted based on patent perspectives. This Section first 
explains that border measures include basic trademark 
infringement, with patent infringement possible but not 
required. The Section then explains that the ACTA clearly 
permits—but does not require—Member States to police in-
transit goods that violate trademark or patent rights based on 
the law of the in-transit country. Finally, this Section discusses 
the implications of the ACTA border measure provisions for 
trade in generic goods. 
1. Scope of Intellectual Property Rights Covered 
The basic ACTA provision concerning the scope of border 
measures provides as follows: 
In providing, as appropriate, and consistent with its 
domestic system of intellectual property rights protection 
and without prejudice to the requirements of the TRIPS 
Agreement, for effective border enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, a Party should do so in a manner that does 
not discriminate unjustifiably between intellectual property 
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rights and that avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate 
trade.272 
As highlighted above, the border measure requirements 
apply to intellectual property rights, defined in the ACTA to 
include intellectual property rights under TRIPS, which would 
generally include patents and trademarks.273 
Although patents are a type of intellectual property right 
under TRIPS, there is a footnote that states: “The Parties agree 
that patents . . . do not fall within the scope” of Section 3.274 In 
other words, although patents would ordinarily be included as 
an intellectual property right, members need not extend border 
measures to patents. However, since the ACTA is a minimum 
standards agreement, like TRIPS, the lack of an obligation does 
not necessarily preclude a country from exceeding that 
minimum.275 
An important question to proponents of global trade in 
generic drugs is whether the ACTA can prevent member states 
from extending border measures to patents—despite the 
minimum standard framework of the ACTA. According to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaty terms—such 
as the aforementioned ACTA footnote—are to be interpreted 
“in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.”276 Here, there is a question 
concerning the “ordinary meaning” of the footnote that says 
that patents are not within the scope of the section. In 
particular, the question is whether this footnote not only 
excludes patents from the minimum ACTA standard, but 
precludes member states from extending border measures to 
include patents. The language notably does not use any word 
similar to “preclude” to suggest that members are prohibited. 
Additional interpretive context for the meaning of the 
patent footnote to the border enforcement section might be 
found in comparing this footnote to the footnote of the civil 
                                                                                                                            
272. ACTA, supra note 10, art. 13 (emphasis added). 
273. See id. art. 5(h) (defining intellectual property as all categories under TRIPS 
Pt. II, §§ 1–7). 
274. Id. art. 13 n.6. 
275. See id. art. 2(1). 
276. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 257, art. 31(1). 
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enforcement section. Whereas the border enforcement section 
states that patents “do not fall within the scope” of the section, 
the civil enforcement section states that parties “may exclude 
patents.”277 The different language suggests that the footnotes 
have differing meaning. The ordinary meaning of “may exclude 
patents” in the civil enforcement section suggests that parties 
can, but need not, apply the ACTA civil enforcement provisions 
to patents. The different wording for the border measures could 
be interpreted to suggest that patents are intended to be 
precluded rather than merely excluded. However, that would 
seem inconsistent with the generally accepted wisdom that 
parties can exceed stated minimums, especially when the 
language does not clearly prohibit exceeding the minimums. As 
noted above, drafters could have stated something to the effect 
that “border measures can not be applied to patents” for more 
clarity. 
Even if the border section footnote does not clearly 
preclude members from policing patent infringement, 
additional interpretive context within the ACTA could suggest 
that members are barred from policing such infringement. 
Although the ACTA is a minimum standard agreement, more 
extensive enforcement cannot “contravene” provisions of the 
agreement. In addition, the border measures section explicitly 
states that border enforcement should “avoid[] the creation of 
barriers to legitimate trade.”278 This could be interpreted to 
argue that trade in generic drugs should not be barred. 
However, as discussed with respect to TRIPS, this could be 
interpreted differently, depending on whether generic drugs are 
considered “legitimate” trade. The argument for considering 
global trade in generic drugs as legitimate may be weaker in the 
context of the ACTA since the border provisions explicitly 
define infringement to be based on the laws of the in-transit 
country, as discussed below. 
Arguably, the meaning of the patent footnote in the border 
measures section is not clear based on a textual interpretation. 
                                                                                                                            
277. See ACTA, supra note 10, § 2, n.2. 
278. See id., art. 13; see also id., art. 6(1). 
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Accordingly, resorting to “supplementary means” of 
interpretation, such as preparatory work of the treaty, would be 
appropriate. Prior drafts of the ACTA included suggestions to 
both explicitly include in-transit patent infringement as well as 
to exclude in-transit patent infringement from the scope.279 In 
rejecting language that either clearly included or excluded 
patents from the scope of border measures, perhaps the most 
appropriate interpretation is that the final language permits 
countries to include patents among border measures but is 
intended to clarify that there is no obligation to do so, such that 
it embraces the desires of all countries. This would be consistent 
with statements from negotiating parties that they did not 
intend for the ACTA to prevent trade in global generic drugs. 
2. In-Transit Policing 
A second issue is the procedures the ACTA requires its 
member ststes to have at their borders. Member states are 
required to police all imports and exports that infringe on the 
applicable intellectual property rights.280 In addition, members 
may, but need not, similarly police goods that merely pass 
through “in transit” to a final destination.281 In particular, the 
ACTA states as follows: 
A Party may adopt or maintain procedures with respect to 
suspect in-transit goods . . . under which: (a) its customs 
authorities may act upon their own initiative to suspend the 
release of, or to detain, suspect goods; and(b) where 
                                                                                                                            
279. See, e.g., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Public Predecisional/
 Deliberative Draft, § 2, art. 2.X(2) (Apr. 21, 2010) [hereinafter ACTA Draft, Apr. 
2010], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/april/tradoc_146029.pdf 
(“Parties may decide to exclude from the scope of this section, certain rights other 
than trade marks, copyrights and GIs . . . .”). In the August 2010 draft, the last version 
that did not have a footnote stating that parties agreed patents were not encompassed, 
some countries proposed different language. For example, whereas some countries 
suggested that the border measures should be applied to trademark counterfeiting and 
copyright piracy, a few countries suggested adding the language “at least” and also 
stating explicitly that countries may provide border measures “to be applied in other 
cases of infringement of intellectual property rights.” See ACTA Draft, Aug. 2010, supra 
note 210, § 2, art. 2.X(2). 
280. See ACTA, supra note 10, art. 16(1) (referring to “import and export 
shipments” when discussing each member state’s ACTA-mandated border 
requirements). 
281. See id. art. 16(2) (referring to “in-transit goods” when discussing each 
member state’s ACTA-permitted border requirements). 
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appropriate, a right holder may request its competent 
authorities to suspend the release of, or to detain, suspect 
goods.282 
Although it is clear that member states may police in-transit 
goods that infringe intellectual property rights, there is a critical 
issue for global trade in generic goods concerning which 
country’s law applies to assessing infringement. Article 17 of the 
ACTA, entitled “Application by the Right Holder,” states: 
Each Party shall provide that its competent authorities 
require a right holder that requests the procedures 
described in subparagraphs 1(b) and 2(b) of Article 16 
(Border Measures) to provide adequate evidence to satisfy 
the competent authorities that, under the law of the Party 
providing the procedures, there is prima facie an infringement 
of the right holder’s intellectual property right . . . .283 
By specifying that the relevant law to assess prima facie 
infringement is the law “of the party providing the procedures,” 
this suggests that in the case of a country that permits policing 
of in-transit goods, the in-transit country would use its own laws 
to assess infringement. Importantly, this would mean that a 
good that did not infringe at point of origin or final destination 
could nonetheless be legitimately stopped by border officials for 
infringement of in-transit goods. In addition, this would not be a 
mere delay. If the goods infringe within the in-transit country, 
the ACTA requires that “competent authorities have the 
authority to order the destruction of [the] goods.”284 
3. Impact on Global Trade in Generic Drugs 
The ACTA has more serious repercussions for trade in 
generic goods than TRIPS. There are two important issues with 
respect to the border provisions. First, although the ACTA 
members do not have to adopt border measures for in-transit 
                                                                                                                            
282. Id. 
283. Id. art. 17(1) (first emphasis added). 
284. See id. art. 20(1). 
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goods, the ACTA clearly permits this.285 In addition, although 
members are not required to police patent infringement at their 
borders, the ACTA does not preclude them from doing so. In 
fact, as a minimum standard agreement, members should 
generally be able to exceed the standards in the ACTA—so long 
as they do not contravene any other provision. In addition, 
whereas there is arguable ambiguity concerning which country’s 
law applies to find in-transit infringement under TRIPS, the 
ACTA clearly permits the in-transit country to use its own laws. 
However, even if members did not police in-transit patent 
infringement, there would be major problems if they policed in-
transit trademark infringement—as permitted under the ACTA. 
Whereas TRIPS only required member states to police 
counterfeit (virtually identical) trademarks, the ACTA requires 
policing of goods for basic trademark infringement (based on 
mere likelihood of confusion) if a country elects to extend 
border provisions to in-transit goods.286 
A major challenge for trade in generic drugs is that the 
nonproprietary generic name may be somewhat similar to the 
trademark—at least based on a cursory inspection by customs 
officials. As noted earlier, there was one shipment of drugs in 
the EU that was suspended for suspected counterfeit trademark 
because of its use of the word amoxicillin that was actually a 
nonproprietary name for a drug sold by the brand owner as 
Amoxil.287 Importantly, the generic name “amoxicillin” is the 
international nonproprietary name (“INN”) for the drug. INNs 
are by definition not owned by any single company and 
intended to facilitate easy identification of drugs world-wide 
without trademark problems.288 Although the WHO, which 
designates global INNs, has suggested that companies not 
choose brand names that are similar to INNs, it nonetheless 
                                                                                                                            
285. See id. art. 16(2) (“A [p]arty may adopt or maintain procedures with respect 
to suspect in-transit goods . . . .”). 
286. See supra notes 253–54, 273–74 and accompanying text. 
287. See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text. 
288. See WHO, GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROPRIETARY 
NAMES (INNS) FOR PHARMACEUTICAL SUBSTANCES §§ 1.1, 2.2, WHO Doc. 
WHO/PHARMS/NOM 1570 (1997). 
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occurs, as underscored by the similarities between amoxicillin 
and Amoxil.289 
V. EXPOSING THE IMPACT OF PERSPECTIVES ON THE LAW 
This Part shows how patent perspective schemas impact 
how laws are interpreted. As noted earlier, schemas are 
particularly important when information is ambiguous. This Part 
extends this principle to the interpretation of law . In particular, 
although there are canons of treaty interpretation, they are basic 
principles that do not always yield clear answers, as noted in Part 
IV. This Part shows how interpretations of TRIPS and the ACTA 
may be especially influenced by schemas to result in conclusions 
that are not firmly supported by proper means of treaty 
interpretation. This Part is an important complement to the 
prior Part concerning the operation of schemas to perceptions 
of facts concerning in-transit suspensions. In particular, whereas 
factual interpretations highlighted schemas beyond the 
traditional patent perspectives, legal interpretations of TRIPS 
and the ACTA emphasize the traditional patent perspectives. 
A. Privilege View 
The view that patents are a privilege that should be 
modified to ensure access to affordable medicine may play a 
strong role in some asserted interpretations of TRIPS that may 
appear to lack firm grounding in TRIPS provisions that are 
interpreted according to customary principles of international 
law. This Section first addresses interpretations of the specific 
TRIPS border measures and then considers the contextual 
provisions such as the TRIPS preamble, TRIPS articles relating 
to the “objectives and purposes,” of TRIPS and the Doha Public 
Health Declaration. 
                                                                                                                            
289. See, e.g., World Health Assembly Res. WHA46.19, ¶ 1(3), in WHO, 
GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROPRIETARY NAMES (INNS) FOR 
PHARMACEUTICAL SUBSTANCES, WHO Doc. WHO/PHARMS/NOM 1570 (1997) 
(discouraging trademarks based on INNs). 
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1. TRIPS 
 This Section focuses on the two fundamental TRIPS 
provisions governing member obligations to police intellectual 
property violations at their borders. In particular, this section 
focuses on how the requirements of Articles 51 and 52 of TRIPS 
have been interpreted from a privilege view. 
a. TRIPS Article 51 
As explained earlier, although TRIPS does not require 
member states to suspend goods for allegedly infringing patents, 
there is a footnote that explicitly contemplates in-transit goods. 
Nonetheless, those who hold a privilege view may reach 
conclusions that seem to contradict the clear text. 
b. TRIPS Article 51 Footnote 
The best example of the impact of how a privilege view may 
lead to incorrect interpretations of Article 51 of TRIPS is a 
listserv post by Daya Shanker, a scholar in the area of 
international business. He correctly stated that the footnote to 
Article 51 “specifically mention[s] that there shall be no 
obligation to apply such provision to [suspend] the goods in 
transit.”290 However, he then asserts that “use of the term ‘shall 
be’ does not leave any doubt that the provision of Article 51 is 
not to be applied to the case of goods in transit.”291 In other words, he 
is suggesting that the “shall be” reference means that countries 
are precluded from policing in-transit goods.292 Such an 
                                                                                                                            
290. See Daya Shanker, Re: Can India, Brazil Take on EU over Regulation?, IP-
HEALTH (Feb. 8, 2009, 2:35 PM), http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2009-
February/013452.html. Daya Shanker is a lecturer at Deakin University. See Dr. Daya 
Shanker, Deakin University, http://www.deakin.edu.au/buslaw/ management-
marketing/staff/profiles/shanker.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
291. See Shanker, supra note 290; see also Nirmalya Syam, Seizures of Drugs in 
Transit: Why Europe’s Law and Actions are Wrong, S. BULL. (S. CTR., GENEVA, SWITZ.), 
Sept. 22, 2009, at 3 (stating that the footnote “clearly obliges WTO Members . . . not to 
apply border measures to goods in transit”); NGO Letter to Chan, Feb. 2009, supra 
note 5, at 2 (relying on footnote thirteen of Article 51 of TRIPS to state that “[u]nder 
some legal traditions and consistent with WTO rules,” goods in transit are exempt from 
normal restrictions associated with IPR when in transit). 
292. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that the states that the footnote 
makes it “clear” that the ability to police intellectual property goods besides counterfeit 
trademarks and pirated copyrights “shall not be applicable in the case of losartan which 
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interpretation would be inconsistent with the fact that TRIPS is 
generally a “minimum standards” agreement.293 In other words, 
while the footnote does say that members are not required to 
police in-transit goods, member states may do so since TRIPS 
generally permits member states to provide more extensive 
protection than its minimums.294 Shanker’s contrary reading 
could reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the fact that 
TRIPS provides minimum standards that countries can exceed. 
However, given that Shanker is a scholar in the area of 
international business, it is unlikely that he misunderstands a 
fundamental concept of TRIPS. 
A more plausible interpretation is that despite his 
understanding of the minimum standards framework of TRIPS, 
he nonetheless arrived at an inconsistent reading of the 
footnote because he has a view of patents as a privilege, which 
may result in reading TRIPS in a way that is most consistent with 
his world view that patents—and provisions implicating 
patents——should be narrowly construed to promote access to 
health. This would be consistent with the social science 
literature that individuals perceive information in a way most 
consistent with their pre-existing views. This could be true even 
if he does not explicitly endorse a privilege view of patents, since 
social science literature suggests that some “biases” are in fact 
not conscious.295 
A privilege view of patents may alternatively lead to a 
different yet still questionable interpretation of the same Article 
51 footnote. For example, Professor Frederick Abbott, a noted 
                                                                                                                            
was in transit in Amsterdam.” See Shanker, supra note 290, at 2. Similarly, he later states 
that the EU regulation permitting suspension of goods infringing all intellectual 
property rights, including patents, “is in direct violation of the TRIPS agreement.” See 
id. at 4. 
293. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1(1) (“Members may, but shall not be obliged 
to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this 
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this 
Agreement.”); see also Intervention by India, Feb. 2008, supra note 199 (describing TRIPS 
as a “minimum standards agreement”). 
294. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1(1) (establishing TRIPS as a minimum 
standards agreement); id. art. 51 n.13. 
295. See Pronin, supra note 92, at 378. 
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scholar in international intellectual property law, states that “[i]t 
places too much weight on footnote 13 to suggest that it was 
intended to authorize the seizure of patented goods in transit 
when the practice was almost certainly outside the 
contemplation of the drafters of the TRIPS Agreement.”296 He 
seems to suggest that while the footnote does not explicitly bar 
members from considering in-transit goods, this should be the 
effect nonetheless. This is at odds with the fundamental tenet of 
treaty interpretation that gives controlling weight to the final 
language rather than whether the language was consistent with 
accepted practice. Moreover, Professor Abbott’s belief that there 
was no contemplation of in-transit infringement is not consistent 
with contemporaneous documents concerning TRIPS 
negotiations.297 His comments are perhaps better explained as 
revealing not only a view of patents as privilege, but a schema 
that a drug created as a generic should always be a non-
infringing generic, regardless of domestic or international laws. 
As discussed above, schemas persist because individuals are 
prone to focus only on confirming evidence. In addition, 
disconfirming evidence—such as the contemporaneous 
documents—could be forgotten as information that is not 
consistent with a desired schema. 
c. TRIPS Article 52 
The privilege perspective is clearly seen in interpretations 
of what constitutes the “country of importation” upon which 
prima facie infringement must be established under Article 52 
of TRIPS . As noted earlier, interpretation of this term is far 
from clear or simple. Nonetheless, there have been statements 
and assumptions that the country of importation must 
necessarily be the final destination. For example, during the 
                                                                                                                            
296. Frederick M. Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based on 
Allegations of Patent Infringement: A Threat to International Trade, Development and Public 
Welfare, 2009 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. J. 43, 46. 
297. See Secretariat, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, ¶ 51, MTN.GNG/NG11/17 (Jan. 23, 1990); 
Submission from Hong Kong, GATT Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, ¶¶ 22, 34, 
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/54 (Dec. 7, 1989); GATT Secretariat, Negotiating Group on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 
¶¶ 30(9.a), 30(10), 31, MTN.GNG/NG11/13 (Aug. 16, 1989). 
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ACTA negotiations, some suggested that the language “country 
of importation” be used in the ACTA provisions of border 
measures based on the assumption that this language must 
necessarily mean the country of final destination.298 This 
interpretation would be consistent with a privilege schema that 
would interpret ambiguous information—such as the undefined 
term “country of importation”—consistent with a pre-existing 
schema. In this case, country of importation is assumed to 
necessarily mean the country of final destination since that 
would promote global trade in generic drugs. Importantly, those 
operating under this schema believe so strongly in it that they 
do not see that there is ambiguity and assume that there can 
only be a single proper interpretation. 
In addition, some statements made by India and Brazil 
assume that the country of importation is the final 
destination.299 For example, India asserted that it was 
“farfetched” to claim that the in-transit country will understand 
the laws of a destination country.”300 Moreover, the Indian Joint 
Secretary of Commerce asserted that “international law says you 
can’t stop anything in transit if there’s no evidence that the 
products aren’t destined for those countries,” without citing any 
actual supporting law.301 Brazil similarly asserted without any 
specific authority that under TRIPS, medicines are generic 
under the law of market in which they are meant to be 
commercialized.302 Moreover, Brazil asserted that “[w]hether or 
not the medicines were generic under the law of the country of 
                                                                                                                            
298. See, e.g., Sean Flynn, Amend ACTA: Defining Terms by Country of Importation, 
PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. (Sept. 9, 2010), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/amend-acta-defining-terms-by-
country-of-importation. 
299. This is admittedly an assumption since India and Brazil cited no specific 
provisions of TRIPS. However, Article 52 of TRIPS is the most plausible TRIPS 
provision to support their assertion that the country of importation is the final 
destination, especially in light of the fact that this would be consistent with the stated 
schema to consider a drug generic based on where it is made and sold only. 
300. See Intervention by India, June 2009, supra note 5. 
301. See Miller & Anand, supra note 157 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
302. See Intervention by Brazil, Feb. 2009, supra note 197, ¶ 6; see also Day, supra note 
184 (“Aid agencies note that under World Trade Organisation rules, intellectual 
property rights only apply at a shipment’s point of origin and its destination.”). 
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transit is an irrelevant question.”303 In both cases, there is no 
relevant provision that directly supports these interpretations. 
TRIPS never uses the term “generic;” TRIPS simply requires 
members to provide patent rights and leaves it up to members to 
decide what is patent infringement.304 In addition, the footnote 
to the TRIPS border provisions explicitly permits suspension of 
in-transit goods but does not clearly state how to assess 
infringement; as noted earlier, infringement is based on the 
ambiguous phrase “country of importation.” The statements by 
Brazil and India assume that “country of importation” must 
necessarily mean the final destination, despite the fact that this 
is ambiguous. Similarly, Brazil’s claim that whether a drug is 
generic under the law of country is irrelevant is only one 
possible view of the ambiguous term “country of importation.” 
Nonetheless, these interpretations are consistent with the 
schema that a drug is generic based on where it is made and 
sold. 
d. TRIPS Articles 1 & 41 
Those with a privilege view may also be inclined to assume 
that Article 1 of TRIPS read in conjunction with Article 41 must 
necessarily prohibit suspensions of in-transit generic drugs. 
However, as discussed above, this is not a foregone conclusion; 
to the contrary, it hinges on the interpretation of key terms, 
such as what constitutes “legitimate trade” as well as a “barrier” 
to such trade. To those with a privilege view, a drug that is made 
and sold as generic is necessarily legitimate trade. Indeed, some 
have claimed that such trade is “not contested at all.”305 
However, the fact that the EU repeatedly expresses an interest in 
                                                                                                                            
303. See intervention by Brazil, Feb. 2009, supra note 197, ¶ 6. 
304. See TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 28, 52. 
305. See, e.g., Xavier Seuba, Border Measures Concerning Goods Allegedly Infringing 
Intellectual Property Rights: The Seizures of Generic Medicines in Transit 9 (Int’l Ctr. For 
Trade & Sustainable Dev., Working Paper, June 2009) (on file with author and the 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development); see also Intervention by 
Brazil, June 2009, supra note 5, at 1 (“[T]rade in generic medicines is perfectly legal 
from the intellectual property point of view.”); Shamnad Basheer, India’s “TRIPS” Case 
Against the EU: How Strong is it?, SPICY IP (Jan. 30, 2009, 11:39 PM), 
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2009/01/indias-trips-case-against-eu-how-
strong.html (asserting that drugs that are not patented in country of export or import 
“easily qualify as ‘legitimate trade’”). 
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promoting “legitimate trade in generic medicines,” yet defends 
its regulation permitting in-transit suspension of generics 
suggests that there is more than one view.306 
e. TRIPS Context—Doha (Over-Reliance) 
Those with a privilege view seem to also place undue 
reliance on other contexts, especially the Doha Public Health 
Declaration. For example, some have suggested that the EU 
Regulation permitting suspension of drugs for alleged in-transit 
patent infringement is “clearly inconsistent” with or a “direct 
violation” of Doha.307 Similarly, Professor Abbott stated in an 
early article that the Doha Declaration “should preclude” 
member states from suspending goods that allegedly infringe 
patents in transit.308 Although Professor Abbott is correct that 
the Doha Declaration is an interpretive agreement, his 
                                                                                                                            
306. See, e.g., Intervention by EC, Feb. 2009, supra note 213 (stating that “the EU has 
absolutely no intention to hamper any legitimate trade in generic medicines or to 
create legal barriers to prevent movement of drugs to developing countries, nor have 
our measures had this effect”); EC Statement, June 2009, supra note 209, at 3–4 (stating 
that “the EU does not intend to hamper trade in generic medicines” while 
simultaneously defending the EU regulation permitting suspension of in-transit drugs). 
307. See, e.g., NGO Letter to Chan, Feb. 2009, supra note 5, at 2; see also 
Intervention by Brazil, Feb. 2009, supra note 197, para. 8 (asserting that “[e]xtraterritorial 
enforcement of patent rights cannot be reconciled with the terms of the Doha 
Declaration” and that TRIPS “can and should be interpreted and implemented in a 
manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); HAI, Dutch Seizure of Drugs, supra note 177 (quoting 
Rohit Malpani from Oxfam International as stating that the seizures are a “‘nonsensical 
encroachment . . . on the WTO’s Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, which 
ensures that intellectual property rules should not interfere with the ability of 
developing countries to protect and promote public health’” (emphasis added)). 
308. See Frederick M. Abbott, Worst Fears Realised: The Dutch Confiscation of 
Medicines Bound from India to Brazil, 13 BRIDGES (Int’l Ctr. For Trade & Sustainable 
Dev., Geneva, Switz.) Feb.–Mar. 2009, at 13, available at 
http://www.frederickabbott.com/uploads/Abbott_-_Worst_Fears_Realized_-
_Pages_from_Bridges-vol13-no1.pdf; see also Abbott, supra note 296, at 49 (referring to 
the suspension of drugs in transit as a “frontal assault by the EU on the object and 
purpose of the Doha Declaration”). Professor Abbott maintains that it is improper to 
consider the TRIPS footnote to permit suspension of goods that allegedly infringe 
patents in transit, but relies more on the fact that there was no practice of suspending 
goods in transit for patent infringement at the time TRIPS was adopted. See id. at 44, 
46. In addition, he focuses primarily on arguing that in-transit infringement violates the 
principle of limited territoriality of patents. 
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subsequent assertion that the EU Regulation conflicts with 
Brazil’s “right . . . to protect the public health of its citizens 
and to promote access to medicines for all of them” borders on 
an overbroad interpretation of what the Doha Declaration 
provides.309 As noted earlier, the Doha Declaration does not 
guarantee nations the ability to take any action to promote the 
public health of their citizens; after all, it simultaneously 
acknowledges TRIPS requirements.310 At some level, Professor 
Abbott seems to acknowledge that the Doha Declaration does 
not provide a carte blanche to nations to take any action that is 
supportive of public health. Indeed, he correctly recognizes that 
TRIPS does not explicitly bar the EU regulation, although he 
nonetheless states that the regulation is “beyond that required” 
by TRIPS and is “not ‘supportive’ of public health.”311 However, 
the belief that the Doha Declaration provides broader support 
for public health may reflect not only the importance of the 
privilege schema but also a recollection of originally proposed 
language for the Declaration that was not adopted.312 
                                                                                                                            
309. See Abbott, supra note 308, at 13. 
310. The complete context states as follows: 
“We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while 
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the 
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all.” 
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, art. 4 (2001). Although the last clause about promoting 
access to medicine for all may be tempting to focus on, neither this clause nor the 
sentence in its entirety sets forth a condition that can be easily violated. 
311. See Abbott, supra note 308, at 13. In addition, he states in the same document 
that the in-transit seizures may present an opportunity for Brazil and India to claim that 
their benefits under TRIPS are nullified or impaired because they had a legitimate 
expectation that products unpatented in their territories could be freely traded. See id. 
at 14. Although the facts may present a good case for this argument, it is nonetheless 
not a permissible one at this time. There is presently a moratorium on so-called “non-
violation” claims under TRIPS, which he duly recognizes. See id. However, the fact 
Professor Abbott mentions a non-violation claim suggests that he knows there is no 
direct violation of the TRIPS border provisions. 
312. See World Trade Organization, Draft Ministerial Declaration: Proposal from a 
Group of Developing Countries, ¶ 1, IP/C/W/312, WT/GC/W/450 (Oct. 4, 2001) 
(affirmatively stating that “nothing in the TRIPS Agreement shall prevent Members 
from taking measures to protect public health” without any caveats to this principle). 
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f. TRIPS Context—Articles 7 and 8 
Another example of the power of schemas is evident in 
claims that TRIPS’ Articles 7 and 8—the objectives and 
principles—would prohibit suspension of in-transit goods 
despite the fact that these Articles do not clearly prohibit such 
suspension and in fact do not even mention in-transit goods. For 
example, Brazil asserted that “the TRIPS Agreement does not 
allow the detention of goods in transit” because it is counter to 
the objectives and purposes of TRIPS as stated in Articles 7 and 
8.313 Brazil cites Article 7 as stating that enforcement of rights 
must be done “in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare” while Article 8 “upholds members’ rights to ‘protect 
public health and nutrition.’”314 However, Article 7 actually 
states that enforcement of rights should contribute to social and 
economic welfare; not only is “should” not a mandatory 
requirement, but it is also ambiguous what would contribute to 
“social and economic welfare.”315 Most likely, “social and 
economic welfare” would be interpreted differently by those 
with a privilege versus uber-right view. Similarly, Article 8 does 
not provide member states an unfettered right to take any action 
that promotes public health; to the contrary, an essential caveat 
to Article 8 is that measures to protect public health must be 
“consistent” with TRIPS.316 In other words, Article 8 does not 
provide a complete loophole from TRIPS obligations. At a 
minimum, Articles 7 and 8 are not as clearly breached as Brazil’s 
statement seems to suggest. 
Brazil’s focus on Articles 7 and 8 is consistent with the fact 
that individuals interpret information consistent with schemas 
and selectively focus on information that supports those 
schemas. To the extent that the footnote to Article 51 of TRIPS 
does not support the schema that a drug is generic based on 
where it is made and sold—such that it could not conceivably 
infringe in-transit—Brazil ignores this footnote. This is 
                                                                                                                            
313. See Intervention by Brazil, June 2009, supra note 5, at 3. 
314. See id. 
315. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 7. 
316. See id. art. 8. 
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consistent with social science evidence that individuals ignore 
disconfirming evidence. Moreover, Brazil’s over-emphasis of the 
importance of ambiguous language in Articles 7 and 8 is 
similarly consistent with social science evidence that schemas 
appear when there is ambiguity. 
g. TRIPS “Context”—Territoriality 
Along similar lines, the privilege view may result in 
arguments that suspensions of in-transit goods for patent 
infringement under TRIPS violate territoriality or are 
extraterritorial. For example, India has said that the in-transit 
seizures violate territoriality principles that are the “key stone in 
the edifice” of TRIPS, without citing a specific provision of 
TRIPS or explaining the territorial violation.317 Similarly, Brazil 
has asserted that “TRIPS “does not allow the detention of goods 
in transit” because it “violates the principle of territoriality, a 
keystone of the international IP system,” again without citing a 
specific provision of TRIPS that is being violated.318 
Although there are territorial limits to patent protection, 
both as a historical matter and under TRIPS it is an 
overstatement to suggest that suspension of in-transit goods 
necessarily violates territorial principles. While each nation must 
comply with the minimums of TRIPS, each has the discretion to 
decide how to do so; thus, TRIPS can be seen as consistent with 
the traditional principle of territoriality that patents granted by 
individual nations are independent of each other.319 However, 
the issue with in-transit goods is more nuanced. As noted earlier, 
                                                                                                                            
317. See Intervention by India, Feb. 2009, supra note 199; see also Preneet Kaur, 
Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, Address to High-Level Segment of the 
Economic and Social Council at Special Event on Africa and the Least Developed 
Countries: Partnerships and Health (July 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.keionline.org/blogs/2009/07/08/india-ecosoc-seizures (noting the 
“seizures contravene the concept of ‘territoriality’ enshrined in the TRIPS 
Agreement”). 
318. See Intervention by Brazil, June 2009, supra note 5, at 3; see also Intervention by 
Brazil, Feb. 2009, supra note 197, para. 8 (stating that “[e]xtraterritorial enforcement of 
patent rights cannot be reconciled with the terms of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS 
and Public Health”). 
319. See TRIPS, supra note 2, at art. 2 (requiring compliance with provisions of the 
Paris Convention); see also Paris Convention, supra note 17, at art. 4 bis (1) (stating that 
patents in separate countries are independent of each other, which is consistent with 
the concept of territorial limits to patent protection). 
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TRIPS requires each member state to provide certain patent 
rights, including the right to exclude imports of the patented 
invention; however, TRIPS does not define what constitutes an 
“import.”320 The issue raised by in-transit goods is whether a 
nation can consider “import” to be a good that is only 
temporarily within the its borders.321 As a general matter, 
member states have the right to self-define terms that are 
undefined under TRIPS.322 Applying this basic rule suggests that 
a country could define “import” to include goods that are 
imported only in the customs area. While most nations have not 
defined importation in this way, this does not mean that such a 
definition would necessarily violate territoriality principles 
under TRIPS. At a minimum, such an action is not an 
extraterritorial extension of patent rights. Indeed, while there is 
no clear precedent under patent laws, nations have previously 
considered in-transit goods to be imported and thus 
impermissible infringements of the rights of copyright as well as 
trademark owners.323 
Holders of the privilege perspective may view the national 
right to determine patent scope as inviolate so as to disregard 
the ability of other countries to consider in-transit goods as 
                                                                                                                            
320. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 28. 
321. The Dutch law that permits suspension of in-transit goods for patent 
infringement actually does so based on a fictional assumption that the in-transit goods 
were “made” in the Netherlands. See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text 
(discussing case law in the Netherlands where in-transit products were found to 
infringe on Dutch patents based on the legal fiction that the products were made in the 
Netherlands). Although nations can define TRIPS patent rights, including the right to 
“make” an invention within a country, considering in-transit goods to infringe would 
seem to more logically be considered a type of “import” that would violate patent 
rights. However, in either event, the same principle applies—TRIPS permits countries 
to define terms that it leaves undefined. 
322. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1(1); see also Reichman, supra note 113, 30–35 
(suggesting that developing countries could choose and interpret the TRIPS patent 
requirements concerning the novelty and inventive step consistent with their goals); 
UN CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. & INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., 
RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 358 (2005) (noting that members have 
“considerable leeway” in defining the undefined TRIPS criteria of patentability). 
323. See supra note 260 (reviewing various instances in which member states have 
interpreted in-transit goods to be imports that violate domestic intellectual property 
laws). 
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infringing patent rights. After all, the action of other countries, 
such as the EU, could effectively preempt the ability of other 
nations, such as Brazil and India, to take a different view of 
patent rights. Not only may this reflect the privilege view’s 
assumptions about national rights but it may reflect a schema 
previously mentioned—that a drug made as a generic and 
destined for a country where it is considered generic must 
necessarily always be generic. Although this schema does not 
reflect basic tenets of patent law that permit individual nations 
to determine the scope of patent rights, the schema is 
sufficiently strong that some claim a violation of territoriality 
that is inconsistent with the facts. 
2. The ACTA—Privilege View 
Some of the discussion of the ACTA’s border provisions 
reinforce the prior point that ambiguity—including legal 
ambiguity—provides more room for schema-based 
interpretations. Whereas TRIPS border provisions were arguably 
ambiguous concerning which country’s laws were used to 
determine in-transit infringement, the ACTA’s border provisions 
clearly refer to the country where in-transit procedures are 
initiated.324 Although this clarity would not work in favor of 
global trade in generic medicines, those with a privilege view 
seem to understand that the ACTA permits countries to apply 
the law of the in-transit country.325 This could suggest that where 
language is clear and unambiguous even inconsistent schemas 
will not distort the text. However, there is an alternative 
possibility. In particular, those with a privilege view may believe 
that member states cannot suspend in-transit goods for patent 
                                                                                                                            
324. See supra notes 283-84 and accompany text (discussing the ACTA’s border 
provisions under Article 17 and positing that if a country permits policing in-transit 
goods, the in-transit country can use its own laws to assess infringement). 
325. See Jimmy Koo, ACTA December (Final) Draft—Section by Section Analysis 
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Jan. 28, 2011), http://infojustice.org/archives/2912 (noting that 
Article 16 is “dangerous” in that it could result in more in transit suspensions, which 
would be consistent with an understanding that Article 16 permits in-transit countries 
to decide whether goods infringe); Sean Flynn, Note on ACTA and Access to Medicines, 
PROGRAM INFO. JUST. INTELL. PROP., http://www.wcl.american.edu/ pijip/go/blog-
post/note-on-acta-and-access-to-medicines (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (in discussing a 
draft of the ACTA with the same language, it is noted that the border measure 
language suggests that the law violated is the law of the in-transit country, not the 
destination country). 
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infringement in general, regardless of what law would apply. 
Although the ACTA does not explicitly state this, there is a 
footnote indicating that “patents are excluded” from the border 
measures section.326 As discussed earlier, a proper interpretation 
of this footnote should be that Member States are not required 
to, but nonetheless, may police in-transit goods for patent 
infringement.327 However, this interpretation would be contrary 
to the schema that a good is generic, if generic where 
manufactured and sold. 
In addition, there are other opportunities for interpreting 
the ACTA consistent with certain schemas. In particular, 
although the ACTA permits member states to suspend in-transit 
goods for the lesser infraction of trademark infringement, there 
has nonetheless been the suggestion that the ACTA should be 
interpreted in a way to exclude such infringement where it 
would impact public health.328 For example, a group of 
European academics concluded that the ACTA “requires re-
wording or, at least, a narrow interpretation” to prevent 
members from excluding trademark infringement based on 
mere confusion and to ensure global trade in generic 
medicines.329 However, as noted earlier, this reflects a schema 
that a drug that is considered generic at point of origin and 
destination is necessarily legitimate trade—a point that not all 
will concede. Further evidence of the strength of the schema is 
that the European academics recognized some ambiguity, yet 
characterized an alternative interpretation as “misuse.”330 This is 
consistent with naïve realism in that others are assumed to be 
biased in their interpretations. 
                                                                                                                            
326. See ACTA, supra note 10, art. 13 n.6 (“The [p]arties agree that patents . . . do 
not fall within the scope of this [s]ection.”). 
327. See supra notes 271–76 and accompanying text (describing the ACTA’s 
provisions for policing of in-transit goods by the in-transit country); see also Ruse-Khan, 
supra note 262, at 668–69. 
328. See Roberto D’Erme et al., Opinion of European Academics on Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 65, 65, 67 
(2011). 
329. See id. at 67. 
330. See id. 
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B. Uber-Right View 
The uber-right view of patents also plays an important role 
in how laws are interpreted. The impact of uber-right view on in-
transit suspensions is more difficult to document since most of 
the critique and analysis seem to reflect the views of those with a 
privilege view. However, that does not mean that an uber-right 
view does not exist with respect to in-transit goods. To the 
contrary, considering in-transit goods to infringe in the first 
instance would be consistent with an uber-right view that 
advocates maximum patent rights to promote improved 
innovation and social welfare. In addition, treaty provisions that 
promote an uber-right view are less likely to prompt discussion 
from those with an uber-right view because such provisions 
would be consistent with this view.331 Nonetheless, there are still 
some examples of how the uber-right view may influence 
interpretation as well as negotiation of international 
agreements. 
1. TRIPS Border Measures 
An uber-right perspective may be relevant to the EU’s 
consistent view that its border measures Regulation complies 
with TRIPS.332 As noted earlier, interpretation of the relevant 
TRIPS provisions on border measures is difficult. To date, 
however, the EU has not provided a comprehensive explanation 
of how its Regulation complies. While the EU has noted that the 
procedures for detaining goods are consistent with TRIPS, it has 
never explicitly addressed the critical interpretative question of 
what constitutes a “country of importation.” Its actions suggest 
that it believes that the country of importation should be 
                                                                                                                            
331. In contrast, there is more discussion from the uber-right when treaty 
provisions are less consistent with their view. For example, the uber-right perspective is 
inclined to distort the TRIPS requirements concerning compulsory licenses to favor 
their preferred view of patents so that in some cases they contradict even clear text. See 
Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1047, 1081–88 
(2009). 
332. See, e.g., EC Statement, June 2009, supra note 209, at 4 (stating that the 
Regulation “is fully in line with WTO/TRIPS . . . TRIPS foresees that border 
enforcement measures may apply not only to imports of goods infringing any IPR, 
including patents, but also to goods . . . [in] transit”); World Trade Organization, 
General Council, Minutes of Meeting, ¶ 94, WT/GC/M/118 (2009) (asserting that 
suspensions are consistent with Article 51 of TRIPS). 
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interpreted as the in-transit country. However, it notably never 
articulated this in response to claims from Brazil and India that 
this was impermissible under TRIPS. 
An uber-right view may also have a different view of what 
constitutes an extraterritorial application of laws. As noted 
earlier, those with a privilege view suggest that the Dutch law 
constitutes an extraterritorial application of the laws.333 The EU 
has denied any extraterritorial effect of its customs 
Regulation.334 This seems consistent with the EU’s view that each 
EU member state decides whether to consider in-transit goods 
to infringe and thus be potentially suspended under the EU 
Regulation.335 Pursuant to this view, even when suspensions 
occur, there is no extraterritorial application of the law because 
no country is applying the laws of another country. For example, 
the Dutch border officials are applying Dutch law and not the 
law of a distant nation such as Brazil or India. 
An uber-right perspective may also be relevant to 
interpreting Article 1 of TRIPS, which allows member states to 
exceed TRIPS requirements only to the extent that they do not 
contravene TRIPS. As noted above, there are reasonable 
grounds for considering that domestic laws that consider in-
transit drugs to infringe patent (or trademark) rights to violate 
the requirement under Article 41 of TRIPS that enforcement 
procedures not create barriers to legitimate trade.336 The EU’s 
repeated statements that it is not interested in disturbing 
“legitimate trade in generic drugs” suggests that there may be a 
view that drugs that infringe while in transit are perhaps not 
                                                                                                                            
333. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing the privilege view’s 
refusal to recognize the Dutch law that considers in-transit goods to infringe on Dutch 
patent rights under the fiction that the in-transit products were made in the 
Netherlands). 
334. See, e.g., EC Statement, June 2009, supra note 209, at 4 (claiming that the EC 
Regulation has “no extra-territorial effect”). 
335. See EU Explanatory Note, July 2009, supra note 209, at 1 (stating that national 
courts determine infringement and that different patent laws may result in differing 
conclusions among different member states). 
336. See id. at 1–2. 
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actually legitimate generics to the extent they might infringe in-
transit.337 
In addition, an uber-right view of Article 1 of TRIPS might 
discount the relevance of the clause that suggests that additional 
protection should not contravene other provisions. Countries 
known to promote uber-right views, including the United States 
and the EU, have suggested language that would have had no 
limitations on stronger rights; both suggested that “nothing . . . 
shall prevent contracting parties” from granting more extensive 
protection without the current caveat in Article 1 concerning 
contravening other provisions.338 Those with an uber-right view 
may believe so strongly in the correctness of their view that they 
improperly assume that TRIPS reflects their beliefs. While there 
is no clear evidence of this with respect to Article 1 of TRIPS , an 
uber-right view has resulted in interpretations of other TRIPS 
provisions that are contrary to TRIPS text and erroneously rely 
on past negotiating language rather than on clear text.339 
An uber-right view of patents may also result in a different 
view of what international obligations are consistent with the 
Doha Public Health Declaration,340 which relates to 
                                                                                                                            
337. See, e.g., EC Statement, June 2009, supra note 209 (stating that “the EU does 
not intend to hamper trade in generic medicines” while simultaneously defending the 
EU regulation permitting suspension of in-transit drugs); Intervention by EC, Feb. 2009, 
supra note 213 (stating that “the EU has absolutely no intention to hamper any 
legitimate trade in generic medicines or to create legal barriers to prevent movement 
of drugs to developing countries, nor have our measures had this effect”). 
338. See GATT Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Draft Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from the United States, 3, 
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 (May 11, 1990) (emphasis added); GATT Negotiating Group 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in 
Counterfeit Goods, Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: 
Communication from the European Communities, 2, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68 (Mar. 29, 
1990) (emphasis added). 
339. See Ho, supra note 331, at 1081–88 (discussing the influence of patent 
perspectives on TRIPS compulsory license requirements and presenting specific 
examples of the uber-right’s distortion of clear TRIPS language); CYNTHIA M. HO, 
ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 76-80, 341 (2011) (interpreting TRIPS 
provision on data protection and explaining why an uber-right view, as propagated by 
the US Trade Representatives Office as well as by patent owners, is incorrect). 
340. Similarly, an uber-right view may believe that stronger rights can only bring 
social benefits, such that there is no need to address Article 1 of TRIPS concerning 
stronger rights that contravene other provisions. 
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interpretation of TRIPS as well as the ACTA.341 Governments 
that have tended to advocate an uber-right view, such as the 
United States and sometimes the EU, have consistently claimed 
that rights exceeding the minimums of TRIPS are consistent 
with the Doha Declaration.342 However, that consistency seems 
to be premised on a very narrow view of the Doha Declaration. 
In particular, the uber-right view of the Doha Declaration seems 
to be that countries fully compliant as long as one paragraph of 
the Declaration is complied with—the part relating to waiving 
one of the usual compulsory license requirements to enable 
generic drugs to be made for poor countries.343 Although health 
advocates have suggested that domestic laws permitting 
suspension of drugs for alleged infringement in transit are 
inherently inconsistent, an uber-right view may find no problem 
unless a shipment was actually made pursuant to the 
Declaration, which has yet to happen. In fact, in the EU’s 
explanation and defense of its Regulation, it suggested its 
                                                                                                                            
341. See Draft Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement pmble., Dec. 3, 2010, 
available at http://www.actawatch.org/blog/final-acta-text-december-3-2010 
(“Recognizing the principles set forth in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health . . . .”). 
342. See, e.g., EU Explanatory Note, July 2009, supra note 208, at 2 (asserting that 
decision of EU pharmaceutical industries not to exercise right under EU regulation to 
suspend “legitimate generic” drugs is consistent with Doha Declaration). 
343. See, e.g., EU-India FTA Negotiations and Access to Medicines Q&A, EUROPEAN 
COMM’N TRADE (May 26, 2010), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2010/may/tradoc_146191.pdf (showing that in responding to a question concerning 
how the proposed Free Trade Agreements will limit access to affordable medicines, the 
EU focused solely on the provision permitting compulsory licenses for export while 
ignoring the possibility that nations can interpret TRIPS provisions to limit 
patentability of drugs and thus promote more generics). Although there are US laws 
requiring that the United States negotiate trade agreements consistent with the Doha 
Declaration, not all agree that agreements in fact are consistent. See, e.g., H.R. COMM. 
ON GOV. REFORM—MINORITY STAFF SPEC. INVESTIGATIONS DIV., TRADE AGREEMENTS 
AND ACCESS TO MEDICATIONS UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 18 (2005), available at 
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20050609094902-
11945.pdf (stating that US trade agreements “undermine” Doha); Letter from Henry 
A. Waxman, Cong. Rep., et al., to Susan Schwab, U.S. Trade Rep. (Mar. 12, 2007), 
available at http://www.forumdemocracy.net/downloads/Congress%
20to%20USTR%20on%20Trade%20in%20Medicines.pdf (urging reconsideration of 
Free Trade Agreements negotiated with the United States to comply with the Doha 
Declaration). 
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Regulation was consistent with the Doha Declaration.344 
However, given that there has only been a single shipment of 
drugs pursuant to this procedure—and none that were 
suspended in the EU—there would be no conflict from an uber-
right perspective. 
2. The ACTA and Beyond 
The views of the uber-right are better highlighted in 
developments beyond TRIPS. The genesis of TRIPS, as well as 
the continued proliferation of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements requiring stronger patent rights, is consistent with 
an uber-right view that more patent rights are better to promote 
innovation and other social benefits. In addition, the border 
measures under the ACTA may also illustrate an important 
issue. Where existing agreements are susceptible to 
interpretations inconsistent with an uber-right view, there may 
be an incentive to create new agreements that more explicitly 
embrace the uber-right view. For example, in the case of border 
measures, whereas TRIPS is ambiguous concerning which 
country’s laws are relevant to assessing infringement for border 
measures and those with a privilege view repeatedly suggested 
that it must mean the country of final destination, this could 
have led to different language under the ACTA. As noted 
earlier, the ACTA more clearly states that infringement of in-
transit goods is to be assessed by the in-transit country. 
An uber-right view may also consider the ACTA to not pose 
any serious problem for global trade of generic problems.345 For 
example, when a draft of the ACTA was first publicly released in 
April 2010,346 the EU stated that the ACTA would be consistent 
with TRIPS and that it “will not address the cross-border transit 
of legitimate generic medicines.”347 At the time of this 
                                                                                                                            
344. See EU Explanatory Note, July 2009, supra note 209, at 2–4 (suggesting that 
details of the EU regulation actually minimize problems). 
345. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand apparently favored a clear exclusion of 
patents from border protection, whereas others, such as the United States, while not 
advocating mandatory suspension based on patent infringement, seemed to be open to 
this possibility. 
346. ACTA Draft, Apr. 2010, supra note 279. 
347. See Press Release, IP/10/437, supra note 210; see also Press Release, European 
Commission, EU Welcomes Conclusion of Negotiations on Russia’s WTO Accession 
(April 21, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/ rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
96 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1 
 
statement, however, the draft text did not prevent members 
from considering in-transit drugs as infringing on local patent 
rights. To the contrary, the draft made clear that enforcement of 
patent rights against in-transit goods was explicitly being 
considered.348 While some health advocates may believe that the 
EU statement was made in bad faith, an alternative explanation 
is possible when viewed through the uber-right lens. In 
particular, an uber-right view might consider the term 
“legitimate generic medicines” to only constitute medicines that 
do not infringe a patent at any point, including even where it is 
only in the customs area of a nation while in-transit. The EU has 
never stated this. However, this is consistent with its actual 
statements, as well as an uber-right view of patents. After all, if 
patents are strong rights, the borders of a country where patents 
exist are a natural extension of where patents should be 
enforced. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article provides an important understanding of patent 
policy perspectives that operate as key schemas in discussions 
concerning the balance between patent rights and access to 
affordable medicines. The case study demonstrates that patent 
schemas operate similar to other schemas as a lens through 
                                                                                                                            
reference=IP/11/1334; Letter from Ambassador Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Rep., to Ron 
Wyden, U.S. Sen. (Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/
ustr_acta_response.pdf (stating that the ACTA would be consistent with TRIPS and 
would respect the Doha Declaration, yet failing to articulate what steps the United 
States would take despite the question). Similarly, in July 2010, the EU issued a press 
release on ACTA negotiations and again stated that the ACTA would be consistent with 
TRIPS. Negotiating participants not only reiterated that “ACTA will not hinder the 
cross-border transit of legitimate generic medicines,” but also that “patents will not be 
covered in the [s]ection on [b]order [m]easures.” See Press Release, European 
Commission, Anti-Counterfieting Trade Agreement, Report on the 9th Round of 
Negotiations (July 2, 2010), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/press/
index.cfm?id=588&serie=352&langId=en. 
348. See ACTA Draft, Apr. 2010, supra note 279, § 2.6; see also id. § 2.X(3) 
(“Parties shall provide for the provisions related to border measures to be applied [at 
least] in cases of trade mark counterfeiting and copyright piracy. [Parties may provide 
for such provisions to be applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual property 
rights.]” (alteration in original)). 
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which individuals interpret information. This Article builds 
upon prior social science work to establish that such schemas 
play a critical role in how laws are interpreted. Although some 
have previously noted that schemas impact evaluation of facts 
that may be relevant to subsequent legal interpretations, this 
Article shows how schemas may impact the process of treaty 
interpretation—a process that has previously been considered to 
be objective and not inherently subject to bias. Moreover, 
because of the combination of schemas and naïve realism, 
individuals may not only interpret treaty provisions consistent 
with their schemas but also assume that their view is correct and 
only others are biased. Although all individuals—including this 
author—are subjects to schemas and bias, hopefully the 
examples shown here help expose the significance of patent 
perspective schemas and naïve realism in furthering conflict. 
The existence of these perspectives may play a prominent 
role in how parties approach specific solutions that attempt to 
promote access to medicine. Currently, adherents of each view 
propose solutions consistent with their schemas while dismissing 
proposals of the other side as inadequate and biased. Although 
social scientists have not studied conflicts concerning access to 
medicine, they have studied conflicts in other areas of social 
conflict that consistently suggest that due to the operation of 
naïve realism, individuals tend to not only assume that the other 
side is more biased, but also holds more extreme positions than 
they in fact do, which can lead to further polarization and 
animosity. This seems to perfectly describe discussions 
concerning access to medicine. This knowledge can thus lay the 
groundwork for subsequent inquiry into how to address 
perspectives to promote an improved balance between patent 
rights and affordable access to health. 
